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
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
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
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2. The report consists of overall descriptions and evaluations of friendly and enemy activities, followed by details of military operations and the status of pacification activities and logistics. The annexes contain supporting statistical data and serve to amplify the evaluations and to highlight trends.
3. The QUARTEVAL is based on reports submitted by senior commanders and advisors under the command or operational control of COMUSMACV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Claude R. Sasso*

CLAUDE R. SASSO  
Captain, USA  
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## SECTION I

### OVERALL EVALUATION

#### 1. (S) GENERAL:

a. The second quarter of 1969 was a period of transition in military operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Although US/RVNAF/Free World Military Forces remained committed to the three interdependent "One War" objectives--destruction of enemy forces, pacification, and RVNAF expansion and improvement--increased emphasis was placed on all aspects of pacification and the further development of RVNAF capabilities. To these ends, combat operations became more attuned to the needs of pacification and more integrated with the aim of developing RVNAF combat posture. With the commencement of stand down status of battalions of the US 9th Infantry Division and the 9th Regimental Landing Team (USMC), "Vietnamization" became in this quarter an important reference point in planning requirements and in executing operations.

b. A shift in enemy operations away from sustained offensives to smaller scale actions peaking in highpoints occurred in 2d Qtr CY69. Except for the smaller number of large scale attacks, the enemy level of activity was on a par with that of the May Offensive of 1968; as a result, he sustained a similar level of KIA. Throughout the corps tactical zones the enemy displayed heavy reliance upon attacks by fire and only secondarily upon concerted ground attacks. During the last two weeks of June, the level of activities dropped off sharply. This too paralleled the pattern of 1968.

c. Allied Forces continued to undertake active and static security missions to safeguard civilian population centers. Enemy base areas were repeatedly penetrated and considerably neutralized. Supply and weapons caches were seized and destroyed but on a much reduced level compared to the first quarter of the year. Total enemy battle losses rose by almost 7,000 as Allied Forces responded vigorously to the enemy's shift to smaller scale tactics and his return to guerrilla/sapper operations.

d. During the quarter the ABC population of the Republic rose from 82.1 percent to 85.6 percent by Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) standards. Neutralization of VCI increased by more than 500 during the period, under the more stringent definition of VCI adopted at the beginning of the year. Significantly, by the end of the quarter the 1969 Hoi Chanh total had already surpassed the total figure for all of 1968.

2. (S) ENEMY STRATEGY: The most probable course of enemy action in the future will be to attempt to outlast Allied Forces--especially US Forces--instilling the belief that VC/NVA Forces can protract the war indefinitely. The Paris Peace Talks and the redeployment of 25,000 American troops may well have strengthened the enemy's belief in the primacy of political and psychological factors in his strategy for the months to come. In I CTZ

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the enemy will continue to maintain pressure by means of attacks by fire and light to moderate ground and sapper attacks against friendly installations, outposts and troops. He will continue the use of terrorist tactics coupled with PSYWAR techniques. In II CTZ ground probes will probably resume in the Highlands, coupled with sporadic attacks by fire; moreover, there are indications that enemy forces may attempt to "target" ARVN in the 24th STZ. In III CTZ enemy units have generally fallen back to base areas after actions in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. The enemy seem to be attempting to regroup and refit to reinstitute major offensive activity, since personnel infiltration into III CTZ more than doubled in the quarter. In IV CTZ ground attacks will probably be directed against remote, lightly defended outposts; attacks by fire and sapper and terrorist activity will be used to conserve manpower. If multibattalion attacks occur, Chau Doc, Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces are the most likely targets.

### 3. (S) GROUND OPERATIONS:

a. I CTZ: Combined operations were stressed throughout the Corps as ARVN forces became even more involved in combat operations. Indeed ARVN units remained among the most heavily committed in the Corps. Allied interdiction of enemy personnel and supply infiltration was unrelenting. Enemy forces were pushed back from the coastal plains and LOC security saw major improvement. Noteworthy in this quarter were Operations FREDERICK HILL, a continuing search and clear/pacification effort in Quang Tin Province, and PIPESTONE CANYON, with a search and clear mission in Quang Nam Province. FREDERICK HILL resulted in 1,628 enemy KIA; PIPESTONE CANYON produced a KIA ratio of 14:1.

b. II CTZ: The second quarter of the year saw ARVN tested in sustained combat by a multidivisional NVA force immediately after most of Kontum Province was officially made an ARVN TAOR. Resultant engagements provided early indications of the potential of ARVN units and leadership for conducting sustained heavy combat operations assisted only by US advisors and US combat support. ARVN responsibility for Kontum Province freed the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in the Highlands and it redeployed to Binh Dinh Province. In that key province great strides were made in pacification as the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, in Operations WASHINGTON GREEN and WAYNE JAVELIN, respectively, worked closely with all RVNAF forces as well as district authorities. Throughout the remainder of the CTZ, activity was generally sporadic. The redeployment of the 2d Squadron, 1st US Cavalry from Binh Dinh to Binh Thuan Province and the deployment of the 4th Battalion, 53d ARVN Regiment to Tuyen Duc Province were both important developments.

c. III CTZ: The TOAN THANG Campaign continued throughout the quarter to defeat enemy forces, interdict enemy movement toward Saigon and preempt his offensive operations while extending RVN control throughout

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the CTZ. Enemy losses were high and, while his activity was generally at a low level in the quarter, those attacks which did occur were markedly unsuccessful. ARVN forces increased their small unit operations and responded with greater tenacity when threatened, inflicting increased kills on the enemy in this period. Defensive techniques were improved in the "rocket belts" around the Capitol Military District (CMD) and the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC). A number of ARVN battalion missions/locations were modified as part of the expansion of all pacification efforts in the CTZ.

d. IV CTZ: Efforts in the quarter resulted in an improved KIA ratio and a greater number of large and small unit operations; however, there was a sizeable reduction in actual contacts with the enemy. One important cause of this reduction was that enemy units were forced by allied pressure to disperse and operate at squad and platoon level. A change of possibly great import occurred in enemy force composition when elements of the 273d Regiment (1200 strong) moved into the Delta with sixty to eighty percent NVA personnel. ARVN desertions became a major problem in the quarter and a survey was undertaken to seek solutions to this difficulty. One brigade of the 9th US Division was ordered to stand down in late June, a prelude to the withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam announced by President Nixon earlier at the Midway Conference.

4. (S) NAVAL OPERATIONS:

a. Progress toward naval objectives in 2d Qtr CY69 was excellent. US naval units attained a kill ratio of 23.2:1 and joint VNN/ARVN/USA operations accounted for 3,753 enemy losses. Employment and modernization of VNN and the developments in the Accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV) were especially noteworthy. USN units were even assigned OPCON to a Vietnamese unit on one occasion.

b. MARKET TIME forces under TF 115 control continued to intercept enemy personnel and supplies attempting to infiltrate into the Republic from sea, deterring similar activities along the coasts and on all rivers within TF 115 coastal control.

c. GAME WARDEN forces achieved an outstanding record in the quarter. While enemy losses increased, friendly losses were reduced to forty percent of last quarter's figure. Such striking successes materially aided GAME WARDEN in its military and psychological aims of denying the Delta to the enemy and providing security for the people through a reliable RVN presence.

d. The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) was also well ahead of its first quarter record. Enemy kills/captures were one-fifth higher while allied KIA/WIA dropped to 54 percent and 61 percent of their 1st Qtr CY69 totals respectively. Destruction of enemy forces in Kien Hoa Province was substantial as the MRF prepared to redeploy from the Tien Giang DTA.

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e. SEA LORDS operations such as GIANT SLINGSHOT, SEAFLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO and BARRIER REEF WEST gave visible evidence of the growth in naval power of Allied Forces. By moving into areas heretofore used by the enemy with impunity, SEA LORDS severed his LOCs and thereby limited his offensive efforts. SEAFLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO, for example, was a particularly important joint USN/VNN venture with such a mission in the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula.

f. Though some elements of the Vietnamese Marine Corps were committed to unproductive tasks and hence restricted in their usefulness, their overall combat posture continued to improve. Their combat results were not comparable to those of first quarter because of the paucity of enemy units in their second quarter areas of assignment.

5. (S) AIR OPERATIONS:

a. Seventh Air Force flew slightly more than half of all strike sorties during the quarter, which represented an increase of almost 800 in USAF sorties but a decrease in operations supporting troops in contact. ARC LIGHT sorties increased by almost twenty percent over last quarter with known and possible infiltration routes as prime targets. Airlift tonnages dropped for the third consecutive quarter to roughly 340,000 tons. Armament systems for the OV-10 were tested in the quarter with favorable results and the first multi-channel survival radio, the URC-64, began to be used in Vietnam.

b. First Marine Aircraft Wing continued to support III MAF ground operations in I CTZ. Approximately one-fifth of all fighter/attack sorties flown were out of country, while a significant proportion of sorties went to 7th Air Force support and, to a lesser extent, 7th Fleet support (Operation BARRIER CAP).

c. Army aviation continued to provide tactical mobility and logistical supply support to the US Army, FVMAF and to ROK and GVN forces in support of combat operations. Twelve percent more flying hours were logged this quarter in accomplishing these missions. Use of helicopters expanded significantly in the quarter and performance results indicated effectiveness in their use. Army aviation airlifted more troops and tons of cargo than in first quarter while Medevac of patients increased by nearly ten percent. Support to RVNAF forces continued to rise, while ROK support rose and reversed a previous downward trend. Both operational and combat attrition rates dropped from 1st Qtr CY69 levels.

d. Vietnamese Air Force operations expanded actively during the quarter. Flying hours for all except reconnaissance aircraft surpassed the percentages of programmed hours attained in 1st Qtr CY69. The 524th Fighter Squadron was deployed to northern II CTZ on 1 June to improve VNAF strike capability there. VNAF airlifted almost 28 percent more passengers in this quarter. The 211th and 217th Hel Sqdns of the 74th Wing began combat assault operations in IV CTZ using the UH-1H.

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6. (C) PACIFICATION: During the quarter a total of 689,000 inhabitants were upgraded to relatively secure status; as of 30 June, 85.6 percent of the population resided in relatively secure areas. An additional 126 RF companies and 122 PF platoons were given priority missions of village security in this period. Almost 266,000 enrollees were added to the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) Program during this period, a 21.8 percent increase over the 31 March figure. The total of Hoi Chanh in the quarter was not only well ahead of the first quarter figure, but as noted above, brought the 1969 rallier total to a higher point than the total for all of 1968. Though VCI neutralizations continued to rise, there appeared to be a need for increased governmental emphasis on this program, and the ancillary PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) program. Undoubtedly the trend toward the use of US forces in pacification roles greatly assisted the attainment of military as well as political/psychological objectives and will continue to do so in the future. Further, the observed trend toward more active security missions for territorial forces, greater emphasis on combined operations using these forces with US elements, and collocation of US units with district headquarters will eventually enable RVNAF to provide seasoned, capable troops throughout RVN to support its pacification program.

7. (C) LOGISTICS: The stockage positions of all classes of US supplies continued to be sufficient to support all missions. The RVNAF logistical situation was in general satisfactory. RF/PF units were in some cases limited in preparing defensive positions by a lack of barrier materials, and ARVN reported the deadlining of 159 two and one-half ton trucks in the quarter due to nonavailability of engines, with resultant losses in unit operational readiness. When the 213th ARVN Field Artillery Battalion benefited from an equipment turnover from the 6th Battalion, 77th US Field Artillery (105mm howitzer), it became the first ARVN unit to receive equipment from a US unit. VNAF logistics continued to improve though special problems remained in the areas of equipment management and priority supply support. In the area of VNN logistics, the final naval base development plan was submitted and the Accelerated Turnover Plan for Naval Logistics (ACTOVLOG) was written. A logistics offensive was implemented to seek out solutions to problems in the existing VNN system.

8. (S) RVNAF PROGRESS:

a. The estimated strength of RVNAF at the end of the quarter indicated that the Phase II Accelerated Force Goals would be exceeded. However a six percent decrease in maneuver battalion assigned personnel strength occurred during the quarter (from 109,981 to 103,464). Since the number of maneuver battalions rose from 189 to 192 in the quarter, maneuver battalions averaged 43 fewer men per battalion at the end of the quarter. Current manpower estimates indicate that combat units will remain understrength at least through 1973, though RVNAF will be able to maintain the current force level.

b. Weapons modernization of RF and PF continued to improve. The M16 program progressed ahead of schedule and issue should be complete by 1 Oct 69. Eighty-six percent of authorized M-79s have been issued. The weapons modernization program is scheduled for completion by Nov 1969.

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c. There remained a serious lack of technically skilled personnel in most RVNAF activities. This shortage, as well as a severe shortage of officers and NCOs, constitutes a long range bottleneck in the development of RVNAF military preparedness.

d. Although JGS directed activation of permanent desertion control committees as a means to control desertions (and activated a successful test leave program), desertion rates remained unacceptable. RVNAF units continued to lose troops to desertion at a rate equivalent to one Vietnamese division per month.

e. Though Command and Staff college enrollees totalled almost 1,500 for classroom and correspondence courses in the quarter, there remained a striking absence of staff capability in most combat areas. Insufficient emphasis has been placed on the assignment of fully qualified staff officers to ARVN units engaged in combat operations.

f. Both previously noted trends in RVNAF development -- more combined operations and fewer static defensive missions -- have aided RVNAF in its efforts to improve and modernize. Combined operations have set examples of good tactics and the proper usages of new weapons and equipment. When properly advised and trained, ARVN has benefited from combat roles through the development of combat seasoning and the confidence which training alone can never instill. The results of these trends, coupled with efforts to instill the belief that the Armed Forces are of and for the Vietnamese people, should lead to the establishment of a secure political and military framework in the Republic of Vietnam.

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## SECTION II

### ENEMY ACTIVITIES

#### 1. (S) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Enemy Strengths: As of 30 Jun 69, North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) strength was estimated to be 456,500 men, including some 51,000 NVA troops in Laos and about 84,500 NVA troops in RVN. During the quarter at least one regiment and some support elements of the 325th NVA Division infiltrated into RVN through the DMZ.

#### b. Out-of-Country Situation:

(1) Communist forces spearheaded by North Vietnamese Regulars attacked and overran Mung Soui (TG 7960), forcing the Neutralist Headquarters to abandon this politically strategic area while simultaneous unrestricted attacks were conducted against Forces Armees Neutralistes (FAN) at Mung Soui Airstrip, Phou Soung - Phou Sout complex, and the SR (Thai) artillery positions which support FAN. A Pathet Lao/NVA force estimated to comprise at least four battalions attacked with automatic weapons, supported by tanks, artillery, and mortar fire. Mung Soui fell to the enemy's assault during late June, and all indications are that this was a determined enemy effort.

(2) Although there have been numerous incidents between the Cambodian Army (Forces Armees Royales Cambodges) and the VC/NVA along the Cambodian/RVN border, there seems to be no basic change in the Cambodian policy of tolerating the VC/NVA and supplying them with arms and ammunition. Their incidents seem to be on a local scale, between small unit commanders in the border area, and they do not seem to reflect the overall policy of the Cambodian Government.

#### c. In-Country Situation:

##### (1) I CTZ:

(a) Major enemy tactical units remained withdrawn and out of contact with friendly forces to retrain and refit in I CTZ during April. May was the most active month for enemy activity during the quarter. The only apparent coordinated activity in June occurred on 7 June in Quang Nam Province.

(b) In the B-5 Front (Quang Tri area) during April, Allied positions received harassing indirect fire attacks. Enemy ground activity in the B-5 Front was characterized by sporadic contacts of up to company size. Several small contacts occurred northwest of the Rockpile from 21 to 29 April. PW from these engagements identified their units as the newly infiltrated 36th NVA Regiment and the 20th Transportation Battalion, 325th (AKA 308th) NVA Division. Documents captured in western Quang

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Tri Province identified the 57th NVA Regiment, 304th NVA Division in the assaults near Khe Sanh on 25 and 28 April. In the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, enemy activity was primarily in reaction to friendly operations. Allied operations discovered a series of rice and munitions caches in the region and PW identified the 10th NVA Sapper, 808th and 814th NVA Battalions, subordinate to the 7th Front in the Quang Tri area. The shift of the entire 7th Front from Base Area 101 to western Quang Tri Province was believed to be due to the rice shortage in the coastal lowlands and the enemy's attempts to protect his logistics network in the western Quang Tri-Laos border area. In Front 4 (Quang Nam) PW from the 31st and 141st NVA Regiments revealed plans for renewed offensive activity in late April, though no significant attacks occurred. Enemy-initiated activity in the Da Nang area was limited to rocket attacks against Allied installations. In the two southern provinces of I CTZ, enemy-initiated activity was limited to indirect fire attacks and ground probes in the Quang Ngai City and Duc Pho areas as major enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces remained out of contact.

(c) In the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, enemy activity continued to be primarily in reaction to friendly operations, while friendly units engaged elements of the 6th and 29th NVA Regiments in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Documents captured during this quarter revealed that the 29th NVA Regiment was relocated from RVN to Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, in Jul 68 for replacements and re-training, returning to RVN in Feb 69. Their mission was protection of supply depots and restriction of Allied intrusions in western Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. The enemy renewed his offensive on 21 May with indirect fire attacks and ground attacks. In Front 4 on 11 and 12 May, PW were captured who identified the attacking forces as elements of the 3d NVA Sapper Battalion, and the 36th and 90th NVA Regiments, while in the two southernmost provinces significant enemy-initiated activity was limited to the week of 11 through 17 May when ground attacks took place around the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, Quang Tin Province. Elements of the 1st VC and 31st NVA Regiments, 2d NVA Division, were identified in contact. On 22 May, Fire Support Base (FSB) Erskine was the target of indirect artillery fire. The enemy was unidentified, but they were probably elements of the 675B NVA Artillery Regiment. During the last two weeks of the month enemy-initiated activity decreased throughout the CTZ, with the exception of an increase in indirect harassing fire attacks north of Highway 9.

(d) On 7 June Da Nang experienced seven terrorist and three indirect fire attacks, while enemy ground attacks occurred at several locations in the An Hoa area. The 3d NVA Sapper Battalion and 90th NVA Regiment initiated several of these ground attacks, which resulted in approximately 280 enemy KIA. In the B-5 Front enemy activity was characterized by indirect harassing fire from the southern half of the DMZ, with several ground probes on 17 June in the Gio Linh area by elements of the 270th NVA Regiment and the 33d NVA Independent Sapper Battalion. In western Quang Tri Province, elements of the 20th NVA Sapper Battalion and the 57th NVA Regiment, 340th NVA Division, increased their activity with

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several ground probes which resulted in more than 220 enemy KIA. In Thua Thien the enemy conducted sapper attacks against Fire Support Bases Berchtesgaden, Currahee, and Tomahawk on 14, 16, and 19 June, respectively, and prisoners identified the enemy forces in the contacts as elements of the 29th, 6th, and 4th NVA Regiments. Enemy activity in the southernmost provinces continued with indirect fire attacks and limited sapper-type ground probes in the Tien Phuoc and Duc Pho areas. The last ten days of the month were marked by a sharp reduction in enemy-initiated activity throughout I CTZ, with the exception of continued ground probes in western Quang Tri Province.

## (2) II CTZ:

(a) April was characterized by enemy refitting and resupply activity. The enemy's Spring-Summer Offensive began in the middle of May and continued through the first half of June. The enemy increasingly relied upon standoff attacks by fire as opposed to ground attacks, particularly in the western highlands.

(b) During April enemy units retrained and refitted while conducting sporadic indirect fire attacks against weaker RF/PF and ARVN outposts and units, and three battalion-size groups infiltrated through Darlac Province to reinforce the Cong Truong 10 NVA Regiment. Disruption of the GVN Pacification Program also became a prime enemy mission. A significant attack by fire occurred on 18 April when Can Ly Airfield in Tuyen Duc Province received forty to forty-five rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Enemy losses were two KIA; friendly casualties were two KIA, one WIA, two aircraft damaged, 57,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel, and 20,000 gallons of aviation fuel destroyed. On the morning of 21 April the Duc My Training Center in Khanh Hoa Province received a barrage of approximately seventy-five 82mm mortar rounds, followed by a sapper attack. Three sapper elements breached the perimeter and were followed by a company-size force throwing satchel charges. Final results were 10 enemy KIA, while friendly losses were 46 KIA, 137 WIA, and thirteen buildings damaged or destroyed. During April, attacks on population centers and unit headquarters were reduced as were mining and terrorist incidents.

(c) During May the level of enemy activity increased significantly, reaching a high point for the quarter on the night of 11 May. Enemy-initiated battalion-size or larger contacts more than doubled the number of April contacts with Ben Het CIDG Camp receiving fifty-six rounds of 85mm artillery. Limited counter battery fire accounted for one enemy 85mm artillery piece damaged. In Binh Dinh Province the city of Phu My was attacked on the morning of 12 May by an enemy force estimated at two companies using mortars, rocket grenades, satchel charges, hand grenades, and small arms fire. First light revealed two enemy KIA and friendly losses of 11 KIA, 112 WIA, and 87 homes destroyed. Although company and platoon-size contacts increased throughout the CTZ, the major activity throughout May was in the western highlands. On 30 May the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion was attacked by an estimated enemy rein-

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forced battalion. After much support and reinforcement, contact was broken on 1 June with final casualty figures of seven friendly KIA, 136 WIA and ten MIA, and 309 NVA KIA.

(d) Enemy activity decreased in June. They appeared reluctant to engage in any decisive battles, probably because of their heavy losses during the previous month. The enemy relied almost wholly upon attacks by fire while positioning units to interdict major Allied lines of communication. On 11 June, in Pleiku Province, a 4th US Infantry Division convoy traveling on Highway 14 was ambushed by an unknown-size enemy force employing mortar, rocket grenade, and small arms fire and before continuing the friendly element counted 42 enemy KIA. Friendly losses were one KIA, one WIA, and one fuel tanker damaged. On the afternoon of 13 June, Hung My hamlet and refugee camp in eastern Binh Dinh Province received an unknown number and type of mortar rounds. This attack killed one Vietnamese civilian, wounded twelve others, and destroyed 512 homes, leaving 4,765 persons homeless. Enemy losses were unknown. The beleaguered Ben Het CIDG camp, suffering attacks by fire for over two months, bore the brunt of enemy firepower during the last week of June, receiving 871 incoming rounds of mixed mortar, rocket and artillery fire which resulted in four friendly KIA, and 37 WIA. Enemy losses were sixteen KIA.

(3) III CTZ:

(a) During the second quarter, activity in III CTZ consisted of indirect fire attacks and ground assaults with action concentrated in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. Activity was particularly intense on the nights of 11 and 22 May, and 5 June, confirming indications in captured documents that the enemy's summer campaign would consist of a series of high points. Action increased from April as several ground attacks and indirect fire attacks were launched, although the latter part of June showed a decline in enemy activity.

(b) Indirect fire attacks continued at a moderate level during April, and it appeared that the enemy was attempting to screen infiltration of troops and supplies to understrength units. During early April, the 272d VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, sustained heavy casualties in three attacks on FSB Diamond located near the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh Province, while the 268th VC Regiment suffered heavy casualties in several engagements. Finally, on 26 April, the 271st VC Regiment followed a heavy shelling of FSB Frontier City, located in Tay Ninh Province, with a multibattalion assault, losing 213 KIA while friendly casualties were one WIA. All enemy divisions attempted to keep forces in forward bases in order to provide a threat during the summer campaign.

(c) A major resubordination of units was noted as documents and PW indicated that the 88th NVA Regiment, Sub-Region 1, became subordinate to the 9th VC Division, while the 273d VC Regiment deployed to Chau Doc Province in IV CTZ and probably became subordinate to Military Region 2.

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In ground action, the 271st VC Regiment sustained heavy casualties in two attacks against ARVN positions in southwestern Tay Ninh Province. On 12 May FSB Jamie, located in Tay Ninh Province, received a heavy attack by fire and a ground attack from the 101D NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division. Elements of the 7th NVA were active as the 141st, 165th and 209th NVA Regiments took part in several attacks in Binh Long Province. In Saigon, the National Police arrested over 80 individuals associated with VC terrorists and sapper cells, while the city was the target of enemy rocket harassment with a total of six 122mm rocket attacks throughout the month. Sapper elements from all three regiments of the 5th VC Division and the Division 21st Sapper Battalion were identified in an 18 May attack on Allied positions in the Xuan Loc area. There were indications of an easterly shift by the 9th VC and 1st NVA Divisions in Tay Ninh Province. The movement of the 88th NVA Regiment to an area near Tay Ninh City increased the enemy threat in this area while the disposition of the 5th VC Division posed a threat to Allied installations in the vicinity of Xuan Loc.

(d) In June activity continued at a high level with a high point on the night of 5 June when 62 indirect fire attacks and three significant ground attacks were launched. This period of the summer campaign was probably staged for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at Midway on 8 June to emphasize the enemy's continuing capability to conduct offensive action. The most significant attacks occurred at FSB Crook in Tay Ninh Province on 6 and 7 June and at the RTAVF base camp at Bearcat in Bien Hoa Province on 16 June, and the 272d VC and 88th NVA Regiments of the 9th VC Division lost a total of 399 KIA. The 274th VC Regiment sustained 212 KIA in their attempt to take the Thai camp. Elements of the 1st NVA Division were identified in contacts in Tay Ninh Province during the week of 15 through 21 June and the 95C NVA Regiment sustained 122 KIA in three contacts while the 18B NVA Regiment and the K28 Sapper Battalion lost ninety and 37 KIA respectively in separate attacks on Landing Zone (LZ) Ike. Elements of the 275th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division, lost 35 KIA in an attack on LZ Joy, located in Binh Tuy Province, on 12 June. Enemy-initiated activity decreased toward the end of the quarter, and the enemy made attempts to avoid contact, using economy of force measures that were adopted in preparation for possible renewed action in July.

#### (4) IV CTZ:

(a) The enemy continued to use concentrated, well coordinated, corps-wide attacks by fire in high points of activity during the quarter. After a heavy attack on 11 April, activity steadily declined for the remainder of the month. This pattern continued during May with concentrated attacks by fire on the 12th. Increased attacks by fire took place on 6 June as the enemy continued to avoid ground contact with friendly forces.

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(b) In April the enemy conducted low intensity harassing attacks. Enemy activity reached a high point on 11 April with 99 enemy-initiated incidents, most of which took place in Military Region 3. Vinh Long City received twenty-five rounds of 60mm mortar, which resulted in 27 civilians killed and 87 wounded. Enemy forces attacked an ARVN company night defensive position in Bac Lieu Province on 17 April, with 38 friendly KIA, 26 WIA, and two MIA. In addition, the enemy captured 27 individual weapons, five crew-served weapons, and four radios. Enemy losses were eleven KIA. On 27 April the VC fired one 122mm rocket at Thanh Tri Special Forces Camp in Kien Tuong Province along the Cambodian border, and though only slight damage was sustained and no casualties resulted, this incident represented the first confirmed tactical use of the 122mm rocket by the VC in IV CTZ.

(c) A high point in enemy activity occurred 12 May, when there were 78 incidents. Enemy activity decreased toward the end of the month. The use of the 107mm rocket in IV CTZ was confirmed on at least one previous occasion, but the week of 11 through 17 May marked the first significant use of this rocket. On 12 May, the Ben Xoai Special Forces camp received indirect fire attacks in which 107mm rockets were used. On 13 May Chi Lang Training Center, north of Tri Ton in Chau Doc Province, was attacked with 107mm rockets. On 22 May Dong Tam Base, Dinh Tuong Province, received two indirect fire attacks in which 107mm rockets were used. Most of the enemy-initiated activity during May occurred in Military Region 2. The 273d VC Regiment relocated from III CTZ to the Chau Doc Province area in IV CTZ.

(d) There were fifty enemy-initiated incidents on 6 June, marking the high point of enemy activity for the month. On 15 June elements of the 9th VC Battalion, 273d VC Regiment, attacked the 42d ARVN Ranger Battalion night defensive position in Chau Doc Province, using B-40 rockets, 82mm and 60mm mortars, and automatic weapons fire. Results of this attack were 27 enemy KIA, two friendly KIA and 26 WIA. Enemy activity declined after the 18th of June.

## 2. (C) SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD.

- a. Strengths (see paragraph 2a, Annex E).
- b. Enemy Initiated Attacks (see Appendix 2, Annex D).
- c. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment.

(1) On 5 Apr 69, a VC squad disguised as Cambodian monks passed the Lai VI OP, three kilometers south of Phu Vinh City while one-half of a PF squad was out on a mission. The VC used weapons hidden under their garments to attack the OP, inflicting heavy casualties.

(2) On 23 Apr 69, a ChiCom receiver XS-D14 was captured in I CTZ by the 101st Airborne Div. The XS-D14 receiver is a tactical manpack/

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vehicular radio receiver manufactured in Communist China. The receiver is also used in other configurations, such as a component of the ChiCom radio set 102E. Electronically it resembles early versions of the US radio set AN/GRC-9, and is the same receiver as the ChiCom 139. The ChiCom XS-D14 receiver requires a dry cell battery and operates in the 2.0 to 12.3 MHz range.

(3) A ChiCom A211B transceiver was captured in Kontum Province, by elements of the 5th Special Forces Group. This is the first time an A211B transceiver has been captured in RVN and is the only ChiCom FM radio known to be used by VC/NVA forces. Captured documents and interrogation reports have made no reference to its being used in RVN. The ChiCom A211B is a copy of the Soviet R-108 transceiver and operates in the 28.0 to 36.5 Mhz frequency range.

(4) Significant intelligence concerning the enemy's use of ChiCom claymore mines in Allied helicopter landing zones was provided by a Hoi Chanh from northern I CTZ. One mine is placed in the middle of the landing zone facing skyward and others are placed at the edges facing inward. The wires for command detonation are buried and lead into a bunker located on lower ground. If the mines are destroyed by landing zone preparation fires, mortar and RPG fire is placed on the landing zone in an attempt to destroy the first wave of helicopters. During these activities, the enemy employs an absolute minimum of troops.

(5) Recent reports indicate that VC/NVA river ambush sites in the Hoi An River basin employ booby traps that completely surround their RPG/RR positions. After firing at passing patrol craft, the enemy retreats into bunker complexes in the center of the booby trapped area with the expectation that an immediate reaction force will be inserted into the area of the ambush. The enemy hopes that the reaction team will be wounded or killed by the booby traps without endangering their own personnel. It has been reported that the VC/NVA will wait as long as 12-14 hours in their bunkers for the plan to take effect. To counter this, Allied forces establish a blocking force around the ambush site and merely wait for the VC/NVA to attempt an escape. Heavy artillery or airstrikes are also employed by Allied forces in an effort to destroy the enemy in place.

(6) The VC are employing satchel charges, captured artillery rounds, and bombs as "flying charges," propelled by explosives placed in a hole underneath the bombs or shells. In this manner they have propelled objects as large as a 500-pound bomb into friendly positions, though the range of these devices is limited to several hundred meters. This may be the method by which 250 pound bombs were launched into the 7th USMC Regiment CP on 20 May and again on 27 May 69.

(7) On 4 Jun 69, approximately 10 kilometers northeast of Phan Rang, 1/2/44th ARVN Regiment sighted an estimated VC squad moving northeast. The enemy reportedly had dogs with them that sensed the friendly positions. This is the first known use of dogs for this purpose by the enemy in II CTZ.

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(8) Reports issued on 19 Jun 69 stated that crater and fragment analysis confirmed that the Ben Het compound has received 120mm mortar rounds, some of which had delayed fuses permitting the round to penetrate to a depth of from eight to ten feet before detonation. This combination increased the enemy's attack by fire capabilities in the Western Highlands.

(9) On 20 Jun 69, approximately fifteen kilometers west-southwest of Dak To, an ARVN tank traveling on Route 512 was destroyed when it struck a mine which was believed to have been a 250-pound bomb. This is the first known use of this weapon as a mine.

(10) After a recent attack on a friendly fire base by enemy units, including sappers, two different types of linear shaped-charge grenades were found on the battlefield. The first type of grenade is a single linear shaped-charge. It resembles a sheet metal box, about two and one half inches square and four inches long, with a tubular handle projecting from one end. The side which imparts the shaped-charge effect contains a deep triangular groove running the length of the grenade. This type grenade can be placed on top of horizontally stacked artillery shells, POL drums, or ammunition boxes. The second type of grenade is similar to the first, but two opposite sides of the grenade are designed to produce a shaped charge effect. This grenade can be placed between stored shells or drums and sends detonation waves in two directions. The tubular handle of each grenade contains a pull-friction fuse with a 4.5 second delay element. This fuse allows the grenade to be employed as a trip-wired booby trap, or to be command detonated by means of a long string. It may also be placed and fired during a penetration attack.

### 3. (S) ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

#### a. Courses of Action:

(1) Continue attempts to outlast the United States and create the image that he can protract the war indefinitely.

(2) Conduct an all-out multidivisional attack in III CTZ with the hope of ultimately taking Saigon.

(3) Mount a major attack across the DMZ.

(4) De-escalate the intensity of his activity and revert to a lower stage of insurgency warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla and small-unit operations.

(5) Move major units into South Vietnam to intensify the war, expand his control of the countryside, and enhance his bargaining position in any future cease-fire or peace settlement.

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## b. Discussion and Analysis:

(1) Continue attempts to outlast the United States and create the image that he can protract the war indefinitely. The enemy is capable of continuing the war as he has in the recent past, with standoff attacks by fire throughout the country and limited objective ground attacks primarily against US installations. He is also capable of launching a coordinated, large scale offensive, although these have been very costly to him. The purpose of a new offensive, according to captured documents, is to compel the US to accept serious negotiations on withdrawing its troops and to accept a coalition government. By continuous military pressure, the enemy hopes to erode US will, engender frustration and war weariness among the South Vietnamese and Americans and create the impression that he is prepared and willing to pursue the war indefinitely.

(2) Conduct an all-out, multidivisional attack in III CTZ with the hope of ultimately taking Saigon. The enemy is capable of launching an attack with Saigon as his ultimate objective, although such a venture would be extremely costly and almost certainly doomed to failure. He views the outlying provinces as "spring boards" for the eventual attack on Saigon; however, he has serious doubts about the possibility of reaching Saigon. His documents complain of the heavy security belt around the capital and the difficulty of prepositioning forces within the city. The continuing capture of terrorists and sappers has caused setbacks to his plans for striking the city from within. Allied operations continue to preempt him at long range. For a number of months, evidence has indicated that the enemy considers the 9th VC Division his elite division, reserved for the major attack on Saigon. In the fourth, or post-Tet Offensive, 1969, the 9th was never fully committed; instead, it remained primarily in Cambodia, venturing out on occasion to attack Allied installations along the border. These battles cost the Division heavy casualties. Ralliers from the 9th Division state that Allied operations prevented the Division from moving against Saigon in May and that the offensive has been postponed until July. In the meantime, major elements of that Division's 273d Regiment, which were to have participated in the attack against Saigon, have relocated to the IV CTZ area, thereby reducing the III CTZ threat. With this exception the enemy has concentrated his forces in III CTZ at the expense of other areas. Thus, he may be willing to mount a new all-out effort to kill US forces, despite the cost to himself, in order to fan the flames of the antiwar movement in the US or to influence the negotiations at Paris, achieving psychological gains.

(3) Mount a major attack across the DMZ. Since the bombing halt of 1 November, the enemy has carried out a major logistical build-up in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. He is now probably capable of supporting the equivalent of three divisions in positions immediately north of the DMZ. If the enemy elects this option, his primary targets will be US and ARVN units operating south of the DMZ. He may also have hopes of attacking Quang Tri City, although his forces would probably be decimated before reaching the objective.

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(4) De-escalate the intensity of his activity and revert to a lower stage of insurgency warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla and small-unit operations.

(a) Recent captured enemy documents seldom refer to future offensives. Since the disastrous Post-Tet Offensive of 1969, the enemy appears to have settled for a succession of "high points" or "action phases" within the framework of his seasonal campaigns. The enemy himself admits that the Post-Tet offensive of 1969 failed to accomplish his objectives. A document prepared by the propaganda and training section of MR-7, dated 23 Apr 69, states:

The missions (of MR-7) were not accomplished because the revolutionary movement in the city areas was not expanded: the enemy accelerated pacification program in the urban areas was not totally disrupted, and the guerrilla warfare movement made little progress. The deficiencies (of the region) were poor combat coordination, poor preparation of the battlefield, and poor liaison from (MR-7 Hqs) to provinces, from provinces to districts, and from districts to villages. In addition, subordinate forces failed to deal decisive blows to the enemy due to poor logistic support.

(b) Several enemy documents captured in June have referred to the summer campaign as the final stage of the general offensive/general uprising. An undated document, possibly originated by Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN), states:

We desire to settle the war as do the Americans. Our standpoint and determination is to frustrate the enemy intentions which are to attain favorable conditions in the Paris negotiations. The 1969 summer campaign is the climaxing and final stage of the all-out offensive and uprising. It is initiated to pave the way for our final victory, bring our revolutionary movement to a new stage of development, and create political effects on the US congressional elections which will influence the situation in South Vietnam.

A directive, dated 7 Jun 69, prepared by the military affairs committee of an unspecified district unit, states that "the current offensive can be regarded as the final and decisive stage between the enemy forces and ours."

(c) In the meantime, we began to capture his directives for the summer campaign, and for the first time his directives contained a genuine note of doubt about a complete, clear-cut victory. A very important

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COSVN document reflects the enemy's growing pessimism: The general offensive and general uprising phase, the document states, is:

...a course of action through which we repulse the enemy one step at a time and attain piecemeal victory. Why is this so? This is because the enemy still has more than a million troops and it is just impossible for us to destroy or to wipe out a million men. The enemy is still capable of resisting us. He is still capable of acquiring replacements. His oppressive administrative machinery at village levels has been damaged, but not totally neutralized. He still has a large psywar machinery. Therefore, the general offensive and general uprising is a hard and difficult campaign, full of rigors, sacrifices and hardships. We do not intend to attain victory overnight or in a single phase, nor do we plan to obtain victory in any predetermined phase after conducting many phases. Victory will not come to us in such an easy way, but it will come in a difficult and complicated way. It will be a limited victory and not a clear-cut, complete victory.

(e) This document was followed by a number of others containing almost identical language, indicating that this was COSVN's latest position. At the same time, enemy documents suggested that he has become increasingly defensive about his July 1967 decision to advance to the climaxing phase of the third stage of the war of insurgency--the general offensive/general uprising stage.

(f) The COSVN document cited above claims that the party made a correct decision but that the people let it down. According to the document:

The policy guidelines (of the NVN Politburo) proved to be totally correct throughout the four phases. The situation developed exactly as (the Politburo) had anticipated. The (Politburo) also anticipated that we would achieve decisive victory during the (1968-1969) winter-spring. If each individual unit, and each locality had made a subjective effort, no one can deny that we would have been capable of achieving the decisive victory during winter-spring.

Another document states that an all-out effort should be made to end the general offensive/general uprising in the immediate future, because of the fact that an inconclusive prolonging would be detrimental for the VC/NVA.

(g) The enemy declares that the decision to advance to the general offensive/general uprising stage was a correct one in that it forced the

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US to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and to sit down at the negotiation table in Paris. Yet, he may have decided to scale down the intensity of the conflict, and modify his objectives from "high risk, high cost" to "lower risk, lower cost" tactics. It is estimated that his infiltration of troops to South Vietnam has been substantially reduced. Truck traffic in the Lao Panhandle has dropped off sharply since mid-March. Increasingly, enemy documents call for units to avoid large scale ground attacks which decimate their forces. He sees his base areas in Cambodia threatened as the Cambodian Government takes a tougher line toward the Viet Cong and Red Khmers. There are many reports of war weariness in North Vietnam and a real desire for peace to come and reconstruction to commence. Thus, the enemy may decide to reduce his effort in South Vietnam, reverting to the second stage of insurgency warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla and small-unit operations. The enemy may resort to the old communist tactic employed when confronted with superior forces--"one step backward, two forward." Eventually, after US forces are withdrawn, he could resume his efforts to control the countryside and topple the GVN.

(5) Move major units into South Vietnam to intensify the war, control more of the countryside, and enhance his bargaining position in any future cease-fire or peace settlement. The enemy could make one last effort by moving regiments from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in order to seize as much control of the countryside as possible in anticipation of a cease-fire or peace settlement. He possibly believes that initial negotiations will involve a "stand-in-place" by all belligerents, followed by a mutual withdrawal of foreign forces. Thus, the emergency dispatch of regiments to the south could serve to show his strength in-country when a cease-fire is declared and will serve as a "quid pro quo" in withdrawal negotiations. Furthermore, in a phased withdrawal, it is to the enemy's advantage to have maximum forces in the south to prolong the NVA presence there and to allow the communists to train and equip guerrilla forces.

#### 4. (S) Overall Assessment (conclusions):

a. Probable Course of Action: The enemy will probably employ no single strategy among those described, though he will favor the first course: attempting to outlast Allied forces to instill the belief that he can protract the war indefinitely. He launched his "summer campaign" on the night of 11-12 May with a short-lived "high point." He planned a more intense "high point" in June which was to last 15 days instead of the two or three day effort in May. However, his "high point" of 5-6 June--measured in terms of his own initiated activity and casualties sustained by friendly forces--was less intense than his May phase. There are indications that the enemy is proceeding with preparations for a July "high point." He has the resources to step up his military activity for a brief country-wide effort. However, he may reconsider and postpone his July phase, depending on the military and political situation. Any "high point" in the near future would probably consist of one to five days on increased indirect fire attacks and limited-objective ground attacks. A number of captured enemy documents suggest

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that the enemy will try to economize his forces and conserve his materiel for the long haul. Also, it appears that the enemy may have recognized that the number of casualties he inflicts does not rise proportionately with the number of rounds fired. The enemy has announced that if he is unable to obtain his goals in the summer campaign, he will try again in the autumn (August, September, October).

## b. Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy forces are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks and to vertical envelopment by airmobile forces.

(2) Because of limitations in the enemy's logistical system, those units in South Vietnam which are separated from the sanctuaries of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam are vulnerable to sustained friendly operations.

(3) The enemy's logistical system is vulnerable to ground, sea, and air interdiction.

(4) Enemy Main Force attacks are characterized by extensive preparations and inflexibility in execution. They are vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling actions.

(5) Enemy base areas and supply caches are vulnerable to destruction.

(6) The VC are dependent upon the people. Continued Allied emphasis on the Revolutionary Development Program will stimulate the shift to the population from VC to GVN control.

(7) As a result of high personnel turnover, low quality of replacements, protracted peace talks, and failure to achieve objectives, the enemy is highly vulnerable to military and psychological pressure.

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## SECTION III

### GROUND OPERATIONS

#### 1. (S) GENERAL:

a. Objectives: The major objectives of the GVN/US/Free World Military Forces in RVN are (1) to inflict casualties on the enemy at a rate exceeding his ability to replace losses, (2) to upgrade the security of friendly base areas and lines of communication and (3) to extend overall security progressively to encompass all the population and territory of the RVN.

#### b. Relative Combat Strength: (See Annex E)

(1) The enemy personnel strength in country as of 30 Jun 69 was estimated to be 204,877, a decrease of 23,680 from the 1st Qtr, CY69.

(2) The total GVN/US/FWMAF personnel strength at the end of the quarter was 1,609,203, an increase of 34,476 since 31 Mar 69. During the period friendly ground force strength remained at 310 maneuver battalions. Statistical breakdowns of maneuver battalions by nationality and type and their distribution by CTZ follow:

TABLE 1

#### MANEUVER BATTALIONS BY NATIONALITY, TYPE AND CTZ

NATIONALITY	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL 30 JUN	TOTAL 31 MAR
US					111	112
(ARMY)	24	17	41	7	(89)	(89)
(USMC)	22				(22)	(23)
GVN					168	167
(INF)	33	28	36	36	(133)	(132)
(ABN)	3	3	9	5	(20)	(20)
(RGR)			9		(9)	(9)
(MAR)			3	3	(6)	(6)
FW					31	31
(ROK)*	4	18			(22)	(22)
(AUST)			3		(3)	(3)
(THAI)	—	—	6	—	(6)	(6)
TOTAL	86	66	107	51	310	310

\* Note: Includes Four ROK Marine battalions.

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## c. Relative Friendly/Enemy Activity<sup>1</sup>:

(1) The number of both friendly small unit operations and large unit operations increased during the quarter; however, the number with contact decreased.

TABLE 2

### FRIENDLY OPERATIONS TOTALS, 1ST AND 2D QTR

	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>2d Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Large Unit Operations	2,523	2,569	+1.8
With Contact	1,173	1,121	-4.4
Small Unit Operations	665,104	706,528	+7.8
With Contact	4,499	2,538	-43.5

(2) Enemy initiated attacks during the Qtr were as follows:

TABLE 3

### ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS, 1ST AND 2D QTRS<sup>2</sup>

	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>2d Qtr, CY69</u>
Large Scale Significant	35	15
Large Scale	29	0
Significant	<u>242</u>	<u>158</u>
TOTAL	306	173

(3) The following table compares the overall enemy/friendly KIA and weapons lost rates during the 1st Qtr CY69 with the 2d Qtr CY69.

TABLE 4

### ENEMY/FRIENDLY OPERATIONAL RESULTS, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr CY69 *</u>			<u>2d Qtr CY69</u>		
	<u>EN</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>RATIO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
KIA	48,591	8,945	5.43:1	53,406	8,010	6.67:1
Wpns Lost	20,952	1,021	20.52:1	22,242	1,120	19.86:1

\* Updated Figures

<sup>1</sup>See Annex D for a detailed listing of significant contacts.

<sup>2</sup>Appendix 2 to Annex D defines the three categories of enemy initiated attacks.

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(4) Total Enemy Losses: Total enemy losses consist of five factors; killed in action, died of wounds or permanently disabled (estimated to be 35 percent of KIA figures), prisoners of war, returnees and non-battle casualties (estimated to be 2000 per month). Total enemy losses during 2d Qtr CY69 numbered 85,740 as compared to 79,930 during the 1st Qtr CY69.

d. Security Status of LOC: The 1969 Combined Campaign Plan (AB144) identifies a total of 3,811 km of militarily essential roads and 1,694 km<sup>3</sup> of essential waterways. The Vietnamese National Railway System consists of 687.1 km<sup>4</sup> of railroad. The security status of these LOC is shown schematically on the following five pages. Table 5 summarizes the security status of roads, waterways and railroads as of 30 Jun 69. For comparative purposes the security status as of 31 Mar 69 is shown in parenthesis below the 30 Jun 69 figures.

TABLE 5  
SECURITY STATUS OF LOC<sup>5</sup>

LOC	SECURE (GREEN)		OPEN (AMBER)		CLOSED (RED)		TOTAL*
	<u>KM</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KM</u>	<u>%</u>	
Roads	2484.0 (2392.0)	65.2 (62.8)	1271.0 (1318.0)	33.3 (34.5)	56.0 (101.0)	1.5 (2.7)	3811.0 (3811.0)
Water- ways	1131.0 (1147.0)	66.8 (67.7)	563.0 (547.0)	33.2 (32.3)	- -	- -	1694.0 (1694.0)
Rail- roads	188.3 (126.1)	27.4 (18.4)	414.8 (336.5)	60.4 (49.0)	84.0 (224.5)	12.2 (32.6)	687.1 (687.1)

\* Note: Total km of LOC: as reflected in Combined Campaign Plan AB1441969.

e. Enemy Base Areas: The following table lists the location and status of the 37 recognized enemy in-country base areas. Base area 480, in IV CTZ, has been merged with base area 483.


<sup>3</sup>Reflects change 2 to MACV AB144, 15 Mar 69.

<sup>4</sup>Does not include approx. 400 km of mainline roadbed not restored.

<sup>5</sup>Para 4 Annex E defines security classification terms and shows the security status of LOC by geographic area.

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**SECURITY STATUS**  
**ESSENTIAL MILITARY**  
**ROADS**  
(As of 30 Jun 69)




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
# SECURITY STATUS WATERWAYS I CTZ

(As of 30 Jun 69)



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SECURITY STATUS  
WATERWAYS


III CTZ

(As of 30 Jun 69)

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
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SECURITY STATUS

RAILROADS

(As of 30 Jun 69)



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TABLE 6

ENEMY IN-COUNTRY BASE AREAS

<u>LOCATION (CTZ)</u>	<u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>INACTIVE</u>	<u>NEUTRALIZED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I	3	2	0	5
II	8	3	0	11
III	13	0	0	13
IV	7	1	0	8
TOTAL	31	6	0	37

Enemy base areas within the CTZs are shown on the next four pages.

2. (S) I CTZ (III MAF)

a. General:

(1) Enemy:

(a) Enemy activity in I CTZ was generally light throughout 2d Qtr CY69 except for weekly periods each month in which sapper forays, ground attacks and attacks by fire occurred. The second week of May saw the heaviest enemy activity in I CTZ since the 1969 post-Tet offensive. This activity focussed on the southern three provinces. During the second week in June the enemy conducted a series of offensive efforts against fire support bases and tactical units as well as civilian population areas. Western Quang Tri Province, the A Shau Valley and the Da Nang TAOR were focal points in the period.

(b) While total enemy strength in the second quarter increased by ten battalions (from 54 to 64) enemy casualties remained static. His efforts at economy of force operations have enabled him to retrain, re-supply and improve his combat posture. It is estimated that 11,200 personnel and 4,203 tons of materiel were infiltrated into I CTZ, a drop comparable to the decrease in enemy activity. The following table compares second quarter I CTZ strength with that of first quarter:

TABLE 7

I CTZ ENEMY STRENGTH ESTIMATES BY TYPE


	<u>1ST AND 2D QTRS</u>	
	<u>1st Qtr CY69</u>	<u>2nd Qtr CY69</u>
NVA	20,625	24,940
VC MF	3,845	3,320

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## I CTZ VC/NVA BASE AREAS

(As of 30 Jun 69)



○ ACTIVE

◐ INACTIVE

● NEUTRALIZED

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
PAGE 33 OF 193 PAGES

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**II CTZ  
VC/NVA  
BASE AREAS**  
(As of 30 Jun 69)

- ACTIVE
- ▨ INACTIVE
- NEUTRALIZED


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III CTZ  
VC/NVA BASE AREAS  
(As of 30 Jun 69)



- ACTIVE
- ▨ INACTIVE
- NEUTRALIZED


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# IV CTZ VC/NVA BASE AREAS

(As of 30 Jun 69)



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TABLE 7 (continued)

	<u>1st Qtr CY69</u>	<u>2d Qtr CY69</u>
VC LF	4,315	4,105
Guerrilla	13,809	14,676
VCI	<u>26,700</u>	<u>25,400</u>
Total	69,294	72,441

(c) Enemy losses and weapons captured inflicted by all I CTZ forces were as follows:

TABLE 8

## I CTZ ENEMY LOSSES BY INFLECTING UNIT

	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>3D MARDIV</u>	<u>101ST AIRBORNE</u>	<u>1ST MARDIV</u>	<u>AMERICAL</u>	<u>US TOTAL*</u>
KIA	4,673	889	1,837	1,098	2,923	3,277	9,889
PW	641	19	30	15	35	20	136
Hoi Chanh	110	27	5	3	3	13	53
Weapons Captured	2,253	482	702	1,378	785	708	3,879

\*Note: US totals reflect 1st Bde/5th Mech figures (not shown) and Hoi Chanh surrendering to US installations.

(2) RVNAF: The overall posture of RVNAF forces in I CTZ improved again during this quarter. However, while the number of days on combat operations increased almost 20 percent, the number of days with contact decreased 55 percent. This fact supports the thesis that the enemy is increasingly difficult to locate.

TABLE 9

## RVNAF I CTZ OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

<u>Number of Battalion Days:</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
On Combat Operations	2421	2873
With Contact	548	246

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TABLE 9 (continued)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
<u>Number of Small Unit Operations:</u>		
Daytime	50,452	44,897
Nighttime	93,660	53,886

(3) Friendly Losses: The following table provides friendly loss data for the quarter:

TABLE 10

FRIENDLY LOSSES IN I CTZ

<u>US FORCES:</u>	<u>3D MARDIV</u>	<u>101ST AIRBORNE</u>	<u>1ST MARDIV</u>	<u>AMERICAL</u>	<u>US TOTAL*</u>
KIA	292	155	293	398	1,187
WIA (Evac)	1,771	560	1,346	1,742	5,557
MIA	3	42	0	18	66
Weapons lost	43	253	66	689	1,151

<u>RVNAF and ROK:</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>ROK</u>
KIA	949	25
WIA	2,759	112
MIA	53	0
Weapons lost	275	0

\* NOTE: US totals reflect 1st Bde/5th Mech figures (not shown).

b. Major Operations and Activities:

(1) During 2d Qtr CY69 a total of 28 major unit operations and 35,997 small unit operations were conducted. These compare with 23 major unit and 47,364 small unit operations in 1st Qtr. Thus an increase in major unit operations accompanied a sizeable decrease in small unit operations. STING RAY operations in the quarter (emphasizing massive firepower to fix and destroy the enemy followed immediately by a ground sweep of the area) decreased to 36 from the first quarter total of 58. Tabular summary of these operations is as follows:

TABLE 11

I CTZ OPERATIONS CONDUCTED, 1ST AND 2D QTR

TOTAL BY TYPE

<u>Major Unit Operations</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
US	4	22

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TABLE 11 (continued)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
ROKMC	3	3
Combined US/ARVN	16	1
Combined US/ROKMC	0	2
<u>Small Unit Operations</u>		
Contacts	4,621	1,449
En KIA	4,466	2,290
Fnd KIA	432	255
Kill Ratio	10:1	9:1
<u>Sting Ray Operations</u>		
En KIA	19	167
Fnd KIA	0	4
Kill Ratio	19:0	42:1

(2) Major Named Operations: Eleven major named operations continued or began in 2d Qtr CY69. Each of these operations resulted in more than 150 KIA. At Table 12 is a statistical breakdown of the results of these operations, listed in order of their date of inception. Cumulative totals are parenthesized.

(a) PURPLE MARTIN commenced on 27 Feb 69 in Quang Tri Province and terminated on 8 May 69. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating included 3/3 Marines, 1/4 Marines, 2/4 Marines, and 3/4 Marines. 3d Marine Division was the controlling HQ.

(b) FREDERICK HILL commenced on 18 Mar 69 in Quang Tin Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations. Units participating include 2/1 Infantry, 3/21 Infantry, 4/31 Infantry, 1/46 Infantry, 1/52 Infantry, 17th Cavalry, and 1/1 Cavalry. Americal Division is the controlling HQ.

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(c) GENEVA PARK commenced on 18 Mar 69 in Quang Ngai Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations. Units participating include 1/6 Infantry and 4/3 Infantry. Americal Division is the controlling HQ.

(d) IRON MOUNTAIN commenced on 18 Mar 1969 in Quang Ngai Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations. Units participating include 3/1 Infantry, 1/20 Infantry, and 4/21 Infantry. Americal Division is the controlling HQ.

(e) OKLAHOMA HILLS commenced on 30 Mar 69 in Quang Nam Province and terminated on 29 May 69. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating included 3/1 Marines, 1/7 Marines, 2/7 Marines, 3/7 Marines, and 3/26 Marines. 1st Marine Division was the controlling HQ.

(f) VICTORY DRAGON commenced on 1 Apr 1969 in Quang Nam Province and terminated on 30 Apr 69. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating included 1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th Battalions of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade. 2d ROKMC Brigade was the controlling HQ.

(g) VIRGINIA RIDGE commenced on 1 May 1969 in Quang Tri Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating include 1/3 Marines, 2/3 Marines, and 3/3 Marines. 3d Marine Division is the controlling HQ.

(h) APACHE SNOW commenced on 10 May 69 in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and terminated on 7 Jun 69. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating included 1/9 Marines, 2/9 Marines, 1/506 Infantry, 3/187 Infantry, 2/501 Infantry, and 2/506 Infantry. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was the controlling HQ.

(i) LAMAR PLAIN commenced on 16 May 69 in Quang Tin Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations. Units participating include 1/46 Infantry, 1/501 Infantry, and 1/502 Infantry. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) is the controlling HQ.

(j) PIPESTONE CANYON commenced on 26 May 69 in Quang Nam Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating include 1/1 Marines, 2/1 Marines, 1/5 Marines, 2/5 Marines, 3/5 Marines, and 1/26 Marines. 1st Marine Division is the controlling HQ.

(k) UTAH MESA commenced on 12 Jun 69 in Quang Tri Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations. Units participating include 2/4 Marines, 3/4 Marines 1/9 Marines, a/1/11 Infantry, and B/1/77 Armor. 3d Marine Division is the controlling HQ.

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TABLE 12

SUMMARY OF I CTZ MAJOR NAMED OPERATIONS \*

OPERATION	KIA	CAPTD	INC**	CSMC**	PRD KIA	PRD WTA (FVAC)	KIA RATIO
PURPLE MARTIN	193 (252)	4 (4)	111 (192)	5 (10)	54 (80)	177 (244)	4:1 (3:1)
FREDERICK HILL	1,638 (1868)	8 (11)	263 (308)	41 (46)	142 (171)	664 (825)	11:1 (11:1)
GENEVA PARK	479 (544)	2 (2)	65 (68)	15 (15)	78 (80)	397 (431)	6:1 (7:1)
IRON MOUNTAIN	960 (1095)	13 (13)	120 (204)	37 (38)	118 (134)	509 (604)	8:1 (8:1)
OKLAHOMA HILLS	591 (596)	7 (7)	168 (168)	45 (45)	53 (53)	346 (351)	11:1 (11:1)
VICTORY DRAGON	693 (693)	4 (4)	272 (272)	44 (44)	113 (113)	567 (567)	6:1 (6:1)
VIRGINIA RIDGE	525 (525)	9 (9)	135 (135)	31 (31)	99 (99)	370 (370)	5:1 (5:1)
APACHE SNOW	693 (693)	4 (4)	272 (272)	44 (44)	113 (113)	567 (567)	6:1 (6:1)
LAMAR PLAIN	321 (321)	8 (8)	90 (90)	18 (18)	81 (81)	252 (252)	4:1 (4:1)
PIPESTONE CANYON	588 (588)	24 (24)	317 (317)	18 (18)	42 (42)	293 (293)	14:1 (14:1)
UTAH MESA	253 (253)	5 (5)	87 (87)	21 (21)	19 (19)	58 (58)	13:1 (13:1)

\* As reported by HQ III MAF, unadjusted figures as of 30 Jun 69.

\*\* Individual

\*\*\* Crew-served

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## (3) Preemptive/Reaction Operations:

(a) XXIV Corps. Preemptive operations were conducted in the mountainous jungle areas, along the DMZ, in the Da Krong Valley, the Ruong Ruong Valley, and the A Shau Valley to keep the enemy off balance and unable to concentrate his forces to attack the populated and economic areas of the coastal plains. These actions, coupled with continued turnover of coastal/piedmont regions to RVN forces, have permitted the XXIV Corps to direct more effort in the mountainous jungle regions with emphasis on destroying enemy forces, neutralizing base areas and interdicting enemy LOCs. The 101st Abn Div (AM) and the 3d Mar Div conducted seven major operations of a preemptive nature. XXIV Corps Operation APACHE SNOW occurred during May, and was a most significant deterrent to any planned offensive against the populated areas.

(b) First Marine Division AO. Preemptive operations were conducted in the Happy Valley-Thuong Duc areas in southern portions of the AO. Of note was the disruptive effect of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, which scattered enemy units to the west and destroyed enemy base camp facilities in the area.

(c) Da Nang Vital Area. Preemptive operations consisted of patrolling, road blocks, and sweeps based on intelligence. Reaction drills were held by both ARVN and US units to insure readiness. Due to the generally quiet period experienced during the reporting period, no significant reaction or preemptive operations were launched.

(d) Americal AO: Preemptive operations were conducted throughout the Americal AO. There were three preemptive operations in the course of Operation FREDERICK HILL. These operations involved units of the 196th Inf Brigade, 1/1 Cav, and the 5th ARVN Regiment. Three preemptive operations were launched in Operation GENEVA PARK with units of the 198th Inf Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment participating. Included within these operations were a number of rapid sweeps using helicopter mobility. Operation IRON MOUNTAIN was the scene of two operations with units of the 11th Inf Brigade participating. Two B-52 strikes were made and heavy contact with the enemy in the Song Tra Cau Valley resulted in 98 enemy KIA. These operations denied the enemy the use of the Song Ve and Song Tra Cau Valleys. Operation LAMAR PLAIN recorded two preemptive operations in Base Area 117. Only one reaction operation was required during the reporting period. This was to recapture the Nui Yon OP, taken by an NVA regiment from an RF company. Three companies of the 1/21st and 1/1 Armored Cav suffered heavy casualties in retaking the OP, but this terminated a direct threat to population centers in the Tam Ky City area.

(4) Base Area Neutralization: A determination of the extent of neutralization depends upon information developed by friendly operations in the base areas and intelligence gathered. This information will support only an estimation of the extent of neutralization because firm comparisons

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of enemy activity and strength before and after operations cannot be made due to the constantly shifting locations of enemy units. Current information allows an estimation of 50% neutralized for Base Areas 101 and 114. Base area 112 remains active and there is no indication of any percentage of neutralization. Base Areas 117 and 121 are targets of large and small unit operations. These two base areas will be neutralized with further operations. Operations in both these areas continue to produce contact, thus indicating the continued presence of the enemy. No new base areas were identified during this quarter. The totals of ordnance captured in caches, including all base areas, are shown in the following table. Twelve tons of salt and 298 tons of rice were also recovered from sites.

TABLE 13

ARMS/AMMUNITION CAPTURED IN ALL I CTZ CACHES

1,440 individual weapons
159 crew-served weapons
26,331 mortar rounds
7,085 RPG rounds
1,219 RR rounds
1,017 rocket rounds
953,730 rounds, small arms
79,772 rounds, AA ammunition
55,955 grenades
659 mines

(5) Regional Force/Popular Force Activities:

(a) Authorized/assigned levels for RF companies and PF platoons remained at their I CTZ levels of 212 and 780 respectively. The fifty new RF companies authorized and assigned during last quarter will be deployed by 1 Jul 69.

(b) The number of RF/PF units with LOC security missions is shown in Table 14. Many units contribute to the security of QL-1 by deployment for defense of villages and hamlets along the highway. There are a few cases of periodic sweeps for mines along highways by RF/PF, but they are always combined with FVMAF. Primary emphasis is placed on releasing ARVN and FVMAF from static LOC security missions. Most of the units with LOC security missions in Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Da Nang are protecting the railroad and work sites. Because of the proximity of the railroad and QL-1, most units secure both. Therefore a clear delineation cannot be made between RR and QL-1 security. Units with LOC mission in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai are almost exclusively for bridge security.

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(c) Minor operations were conducted involving RF/PF units as part of a joint or combined force to secure LOCs. These operations included two RF company groups with ARVN for two days, opening Route 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc, a PF platoon with 2d ROK Bn elements daily to open and secure highway 537 from Duy Xuyen District HQ to QL-1, and two RF companies with US elements for two days to open the road from Phu Thu District HQ to Hue.

TABLE 14

NUMBER OF I CTZ RF/PF UNITS WITH LOC SECURITY MISSIONS

<u>Province</u>	<u>Primary Mission</u>		<u>Secondary Mission</u>	
	<u>RF</u> <u>Company</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>Platoon</u>	<u>RF</u> <u>Company</u>	<u>PF</u> <u>Platoon</u>
Quang Tri	9	11	2	15
Thua Thien	10	5	2	27
Quang Nam	9	10	4	19
Quang Tin	6	5	3	7
Quang Ngai	3	15	5	19
Da Nang (Q.D.S.Z.)	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL I CTZ	42	48	16	87

(d) I Corps is authorized to form 144 new PF platoons in 3d Qtr CY69. Total strength of those platoons will be 5,040 men. Under present plans training will be complete by Oct 69. Recruiting will draw down on the best of People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) units. Present needs for replacements in RF/PF units will not be met until the new platoons are formed.

c. New Strategy, Tactics and Techniques:

(1) ARVN Participation: Increased ARVN participation with US Forces has permitted more long range prolonged operations specifically designed to seal off infiltration routes, thus hindering the enemy's efforts to organize and prepare for major offensive action.

(2) ARVN Defensive Posture: ARVN is placing increased emphasis on the defenses around OPs and FSBs to counter the increasing use by the enemy of sapper techniques. Particular emphasis is being given to better use of claymore mines, radar, and starlight scopes. Additionally the control measures in the major populated areas are being strengthened to counter the same threat.

(3) Enemy Strong-point Tactic: During the past few months the enemy has begun utilizing well-fortified strong points manned by a relatively small, well-armed force to counter friendly operations. These strong

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points are usually employed in a series of three or four and positioned so as to provide mutual fire support. The positions are manned by a force, ranging from a section to a platoon at each point depending on the size force utilized. The forces manning the strong points are normally armed with automatic and direct fire weapons, enabling each point to bring a heavy volume of fire to bear upon approaching forces. The remainder of the unit will be utilized as a mobile force and will be employed either to evacuate supplies, weapons and personnel or to attack the approaching unit from the flank or the rear once the strong points have blocked its advance. The probable route(s) of reinforcement for armor are also blocked. By utilizing this technique the enemy endeavors to inflict heavy casualties and destroy US armor. In conjunction with this small heavily armed force, the NVA frequently employ the 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun. This AA element complements the work of the ground troops by engaging reconnaissance/command and control helicopter supporting the US ground troops.

(4) Sapper attacks: During the past few months the enemy has placed an increasing emphasis upon the use of sapper tactics throughout I CTZ. A compilation of numerous agent, PW and Hoi Chanh reports indicates that a majority of the enemy's units have received sapper training and that most of the enemy's maneuver battalions now contain at least one company of personnel trained for utilization as sappers.

(5) RPG Employment: The enemy has begun multiple employment of RPGs within the Americal TAOI. The enemy waits until friendly forces are within 200 meters of initial point of contact before firing RPG barrages against the flanks of the various formation. He has used this method of fire to cover his withdrawals and has increasingly employed RPGs against personnel.

(6) UIDD Neutralization: The enemy is becoming increasingly aware of unattended intrusion detection devices (UIDD), and has attempted to counteract or neutralize them. The enemy finds and takes action against about 5% of the sensors that are emplaced. Enemy action against the sensors includes destroying them in place, breaking off the antennas, and disassembling or moving the sensors. Often those areas in which sensor activations result in artillery fire are considered to be mined areas and are so marked by the enemy. Enemy troops are then restricted from these areas.

(7) Small Force Attacks: The enemy has recently adopted the technique of attacking allied positions with forces smaller than the force being attacked. This can be directly related to the enemy's increased utilization of sapper tactics and has probably occurred as a result of the enemy's heavy personnel losses. According to recent reports, the enemy feels that he can more effectively attack allied positions with smaller sapper-type units than he could with infantry units. Although employment of this tactic seldom results in the overrunning of an

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objective, the enemy believes he can inflict heavy casualties while holding his own losses to a minimum. This technique was effectively utilized in the attack on FSB Tomahawk in June 1969.

## d. Major Problem Areas:

(1) Troop Density: A comparison of troops available and tasks/threats encountered is of the utmost significance in determining how great an area can be denied to the enemy. Maximum use of FVMAF troops in mobile operations has prevented enemy utilization of base areas, but his presence continues and will require such operations in the future. With the re-deployment of US forces out of country, even greater mobility and aggressive employment of available troops will be required.

(2) Security in Quang Ngai: A major problem is posed by the need for security in Quang Ngai Province to permit the pacification program in that area to move ahead at a faster pace. This will require a greater US and ARVN troop density in the coastal plain areas.

(3) Southward Force Orientation: The force disposition of ARVN in I Corps has been the source of advisor comment and recommendation during the second quarter. Several recommendations have been made concerning the possible creation of a 3d ARVN Division within the Corps, all of which have as their ultimate goal the shifting of more of the assets from the 11th DTA to the South.

(4) Bridge Security: Adequate security of bridges remains a problem, though only thirteen bridges were destroyed during the quarter, compared to 25 last quarter. Twelve of the destroyed bridges were located within a fifty km sector of QL-1 between Chu Lai and Dien Ban. The continued loss of bridges not only is disruptive to tactical movement but their replacement is a constant drain on the limited engineer resources available for LOC upgrade. Continued effort is being made to train and equip RF/PF units predominantly involved in bridge security. Careful inspection of security facilities and positions is being conducted by tactical area commanders. In addition, security, particularly for critical bridges is being enhanced by the use of standoff pier protection, security lighting and underwater surveillance.

## e. Overall Assessment:

### (1) 11th Division Tactical Area (DTA):

(a) XXIV Corps has continued to stress combined operations during the 2d Quarter. XXIV Corps units have primarily conducted operations against enemy main force units in the piedmont and mountainous area adjacent to the Laotian border, leaving the lowlands and populated area operations primarily to province forces.

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(b) Significant progress was noted during the quarter in carrying the war to the enemy, largely through combined 1st ARVN Division operations with the 3d Marine Division and the 101st Airborne Division. ARVN forces have shifted sizeable numbers of maneuver battalions from the coastal plain into the Khe Sanh-A Shau areas, denying the enemy free access to this important route. This has had a decided effect on enemy infiltration of both men and material into Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces. The steady increase in time spent by the 1st ARVN Division on combat operations, as opposed to security missions, emphasizes the progress made in the pacification and RD programs.

## (2) Quang Da Special Zone:

(a) The 1st Marine Division had a variety of missions whose goals were interrelated. For example, Operation PIPESTONE CANYON contributed to several missions; elimination of VC/NVA main forces, upgrading and opening Route 4, which supports the nation-building process and pacification effort, and providing security to Da Nang by destroying a known enemy harbor site and staging area. At the same time, other units of the Division providing security for Da Nang and LOCs contributed to the pacification program by their presence. During the quarter the 1st Marine Division also provided forces, as requested by the districts, to assist in providing security for GVN elections in hamlets and villages, and all elections held within the Division's AO were conducted on schedule with only one incident of terrorism.

(b) The ARVN units (51st Inf Regiment and 1st Ranger Group) are among the most heavily committed in I Corps, but the enemy situation is such that few operations have extended beyond the fringes of the major populated areas of Da Nang and Hoi An. Only once during the quarter were supporting friendly forces brought into Quang Nam: the 2d Battalion 54th Regiment was attached to the 51st Regiment for 30 days to support Operation Vu Ninh 03.

## (3) 12th DTA:

(a) In the 12th DTA an improvement in ARVN posture has been noted, primarily due to the redistribution of ARVN and US Forces into three separate brigade AOs. The combined US Americal Division/2d ARVN Division operations that have resulted create better tactical dispersion of combat power. The addition of two battalions of the 101st Abn Div into the Tam Ky-Thien Phuoc area has materially aided ARVN Forces in waging the war in this critical area and lessened the impact of the movement of two NVA Regiments (1st and 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division) into the 12th DTA from Quang Nam Province.

(b) During the reporting period the main effort of the Americal Division combat operations was in preemptive and reaction operations to destroy VCMF/NVA troop concentrations and neutralize staging areas. The

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objective of these operations was the protection of major population centers and provision of a shield behind which pacification operations could be conducted. Large numbers of enemy troops were eliminated; tons of food and arms captured; and long-held sanctuaries were penetrated by Americal Forces. In the northern portion of the Division TAOI, notably the Frederick Hill AO, enemy forces were pushed back from the coastal plain and new pacification operations were being initiated. In the central and southern sections of the Division TAOR similar successes were noted. Southern Quang Ngai Province remains an area of heavy enemy activity that must be cleared of enemy forces. Significant gains in terms of the defeat of enemy forces and the extension of GVN authority were made.

## 3. (S) II CTZ:

### a. General:

#### (1) Enemy:

(a) The second quarter of 1969 saw the Communists terminate the Winter/Spring Campaign with a flurry of attacks in late April. After a brief interval, probably used for resupply and training of replacements, the enemy initiated the first phase of a summer offensive during the second week of May. At the outset, coordinated Corpwide attacks were mounted. However, as the quarter progressed, the enemy chose to mass most of his B-3 Front forces in western Kontum Province against the Dak To/Ben Het areas with the rest of the CTZ experiencing sporadic "highpoints" of enemy activity. Moreover, there was a major influx of NVA replacements into the coastal region in the Phu Yen Province vicinity. By concentrating a near divisional force in the Ben Het/Dak To areas and fighting a war of attrition, the Communists subjected ARVN forces to an extreme test. In spite of severe problems, ARVN prevailed and in the last week of the quarter enemy forces withdrew.

(b) It appears that the enemy has been successful in replacing losses by infiltration and to some extent by impressment. The enemy is able to build up a large force, engage in combat operations, and disengage at will. Because of the enemy's ability to fight when he desires, and to avail himself of sanctuary at fairly secure base areas, it is difficult for Allied forces to inflict heavy losses, unless the enemy is willing to accept the losses to gain a political or military objective. The number of confirmed and probable enemy maneuver and artillery battalions on 31 Mar and 30 Jun 69 in each Combined Campaign Plan effectiveness category were as follows:

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TABLE 15

ENEMY II CTZ BATTALION EFFECTIVENESS STATUS, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>31 MAR 69</u>	<u>30 JUN 69</u>
Fully Combat Effective	6	5
Combat Effective	10	15
Marginally Combat Effective	14	13
Combat Ineffective	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>
	47 Battalions	50 Battalions

(c) The following table compares second quarter II CTZ strength with that of first quarter:

TABLE 16

II CTZ ENEMY STRENGTHS BY TYPE, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1ST QTR</u>	<u>2D QTR</u>
NVA	11,280	12,700
VC (MF/LF)	10,330	9,740
Admin	5,275	6,045
Guerrilla	13,000	10,720
VCI	<u>14,300</u>	<u>17,160</u>
TOTAL	54,185	56,365

(d) Enemy losses sustained during 2d Qtr CY69 are shown in Table 17.

TABLE 17

II CTZ ENEMY PERSONNEL/WEAPONS LOSSES

KIA	6651
Died of Wounds	2325*
PW	441
Military Hoi Chanh	226
Individual Weapons Lost	2349
Crew-served Weapons Lost	222

\* Note: This figure is an estimate based on a factor of 35% KIA.

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(2) RVNAF: ARVN continued to improve and modernize steadily. There was a slight increase in ARVN battalion-size operations during the quarter, but a slight decrease in the number of small unit operations and contacts. The enemy lost a considerably larger number of personnel as a result of ARVN actions in this quarter. A final significant indicator of an improved ARVN posture was the slight decrease in quarterly desertion (from 2067 to 2054) in spite of increases in force structure. ARVN operations are summarized within the summary of allied operations at Table 19.

(3) Friendly losses and other operational results are summarized in the table below. The aggregate II CTZ kill ratio was 5.3:1.

TABLE 18

## II CTZ OPERATIONAL RESULTS SUMMARY

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
ARVN	326	1383	1860	136	245	56
ROK	78	180	1579	84	1341	79
US	215	1256	2033	74	338	42
CIDG	99	616	636	27	151	15
RF/PF	399	1088	504	75	250	29
OTHER	<u>144</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	1261	4920	6651	441	2349	222

### b. Major Operations and Activities:

(1) Table 19 indicates the magnitude of effort expended in II CTZ in 2d Qtr CY69.

TABLE 19

## II CTZ ALLIED OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

### TOTALS BY TYPE AND FORCE

	<u>BN-DAYS OF OPERATION</u>	<u>SMALL UNIT OPERATION</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>
ARVN	1,719	8,264	316
ROK	469	18,596	203

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TABLE 19 (cont)

	<u>BN-DAYS OF OPERATION</u>	<u>SMALL UNIT OPERATION</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>
US	2,203	21,013	886
CIDG	779	1,305	272
RF/PF	<u>1,326</u>	<u>165,654</u>	<u>2,064</u>
TOTAL	6,496	214,832	3,741

(2) ARVN Operations: On 6 May ARVN operation DAN QUYEN 38 began shortly after ARVN assumed tactical responsibility for most of Kontum Province. This short term operation originally planned for two battalions of the 42d ARVN Regt mushroomed into the most vicious action in the Republic of Vietnam during the quarter. By 30 June, a total of thirteen ARVN battalions including all four battalions of the 42d Regt, four battalions of the 47th Regt, two battalions of the 53d Regt, and the 11th, 22d and 23d Ranger battalions were rotated into the action. In addition, five MSF battalions, two ARVN cavalry squadrons, three ARVN scout companies and one ARVN reconnaissance company participated in this operation. The action took place in the Dak To/Ben Het area of Kontum Province. A total of 134,000 artillery rounds, 1,731 air strikes and 144 Arc Light sorties were expended in support of this operation against the 28th and 66th NVA regiments and the 40th NVA Arty Regt. The successive phases of the operation were named DAN QUYEN 38A, DAN QUYEN 40, DAN QUYEN 41 and later QUYET THANG I. During the operations friendly forces lost 341 killed in action and 1,587 wounded. They accounted for 1,768 killed and 22 prisoners of war.

(3) ROKFV-FC Operations:

(a) The 30th ROK Regiment concluded one operation and conducted another to the north and west of Phan Rang. The first, DONG BO 5 ended on 4 April and accounted for 154 enemy killed, three prisoners of war and 20 detainees. There were only four friendly wounded. DONG BO 7 commenced on 9 May. Friendly casualties on that search and clear operation were three killed and one wounded. The enemy suffered 155 killed.

(b) DO KHE BI 12 in Phu Yen Province terminated on 25 April. Two battalions of the 28th ROK Regiment suffered ten killed and eleven wounded while killing 147 enemy and detaining one.

(c) Operations BEE HO 23, 7-19 May, sent the 1st ROK Regiment with a battalion from the ROK cavalry regiment and one from the ROK 26th Infantry Regiment into the Soui Cu Valley in Binh Dinh Province on a search and clear mission against elements of the 18th NVA Regiment operating against the populated area and QL-19 to the south. Friendly forces lost

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three killed and twenty wounded while accounting for 182 enemy dead and one prisoner.

(d) On 4 June the 9th ROK Inf Div deployed elements of all three of its regiments to the west of Cam Ranh Bay on Operation BAEK MA 10 targeted against enemy sapper and artillery battalions. Four friendly soldiers were killed and twelve wounded while the enemy lost 170 dead and five prisoners of war.

## (4) US Operations:

(a) On 13 April the 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division moved to Camp Radcliff in Binh Dinh Province and commenced Operation WAYNE JAVELIN in An Tuc District. Three to four battalions of the 4th Div have participated in this pacification, search and clear, road security operation. Friendly casualties have been eleven killed in action and 71 wounded. Enemy losses are 149 killed and six prisoners of war.

(b) On 22 April a search and clear operation named PUTNAM TIGER began in the area north of Plei Mrong CIDG Camp. Four battalions from the 4th Infantry Division have taken part in this operation which is targeted against elements of the 24th NVA Regt. Friendly casualties have been 600 killed and 204 wounded with enemy losses at 509 killed and nine prisoners of war.

(c) On the 16th of May the 3/12th of the 4th commenced search and clear Operation GREEN BASKET northwest of Pleiku City in the vicinity of the suspected location of the 40th NVA Regiment. The operation terminated on 21 June with three friendly killed in action and twenty wounded. Enemy casualties were 97 killed and one prisoner of war.

(d) Operations PUTNAM TIGER and WAYNE GRAY, which began during the first quarter, came to a conclusion during this quarter. In operation PUTNAM TIGER, which took place in the Plei Mrong - Polei Kleng area against the 66th NVA Regiment, terminating on 21 June, friendly casualties were 42 killed and 238 wounded in combat. Enemy losses were 250 killed and five prisoners of war. Operation WAYNE GRAY, conducted west of Polei Kleng CIDG Camp, terminated 14 April. Friendly casualties were 99 killed, 247 wounded and six missing. Enemy losses were 608 killed, two prisoners of war and four artillery pieces destroyed.

(5) Preemptive Operations: Virtually all friendly operations in II CTZ have a preemptive effect on the enemy's ability to conduct attacks against population centers, economic areas and bases. Particular emphasis has been given during this quarter to securing the maximum number of people in order to promote the Accelerated Pacification Program. This effort attacks the enemy in his effort to subjugate the people and neutralizes the VCI who function as the logistical support of the main force units.

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(6) Base Area Neutralization: There were eleven identified enemy base areas in II CTZ in this quarter. Of this number eight were active and three were inactive. Reconnaissance in force operations, long range patrols, ambushes, artillery fires, and air strikes continually subjected enemy forces in base areas to harassment and disruption of their activities. No significant changes to data or trends were noticed during the quarter. Moreover, HQ I FFORCEV revised the II CTZ Reconnaissance/Surveillance Plan. Included in the Plan are provisions for intensified reconnaissance of areas believed to contain a significant enemy threat. Two of these reconnaissance areas included base areas 226 and 236. Considerable information concerning enemy fortifications and movements has been developed in these two base areas. No new base areas have been established nor have any inactive areas been re-established.

(7) Regional Force/Popular Force Activities:

(a) Due to recent CIDG conversion and four newly authorized RF companies for CY69, II CTZ was authorized 349 RF companies as of 30 June of which 344 were formed. In June JGS authorized an additional 125 PF platoons for II CTZ in CY69. Of the authorized 1328 PF platoons, 1203 were operational and deployed in second quarter.

(b) Seventy-five percent of the PF units had a primary mission of village/hamlet security during the last reporting period. This situation did not change during the second quarter.

(c) Significant events altered the force structure of II Corps in this period. Three CIDG Camps, Vinh Thanh in Binh Dinh Province, Buon Blech in Phu Bon Province and Don Tre in Phu Yen Province, were converted to RF on 30 June. Thirteen RF companies were formed as a result of these conversions.

(d) RF/PF operational results are compared to first quarter results below:

TABLE 20

II CTZ REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES OPERATIONAL RESULTS

	<u>EN KIA</u>	<u>FRD KIA</u>	<u>RATIO</u>	<u>WPNS CAPTD</u>	<u>WPNS LOST</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
Regional Forces	435 (579)	247 (278)	1.8:1 (2.1:1)	210 (224)	172 (69)	1.2:1 (5.2:1)
Popular Forces	264 (273)	220 (191)	1.2:1 (1.4:1)	139 (136)	150 (161)	0.9:1 (1.8:1)

Note: First quarter results are in parenthesis.

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## c. New Strategy, Tactics and Techniques:

(1) US Forces in II CTZ continued collocating their headquarters elements with Vietnamese district headquarters wherever possible, thereby improving Allied coordination. Many US units were placed under the operational control of district chiefs in pursuit of accelerated pacification objectives; these aims were conceived as merging on broad lines with total military strategy.

(2) A survey of the deployment of RF/PF units pinpointed that a number of units were occupying static defense positions. An extensive effort to free these units from such missions resulted in 43 RF and 16 PF platoons being released from static security missions and redeployed in support of pacification.

(3) A major revision in the distribution of mobile advisory teams (MATs) occurred when a study was conducted on the deployment of MATs based on troop density, enemy activity and degree of pacification in each province. As a result of the study, three MATs were moved from Khanh Hoa Province, one from Darlac and one from Ninh Thuan. The recipient provinces were Binh Dinh (three), Pleiku (one) and Kontum (one).

(4) The II Corps Combined Interrogation Center has started to produce a large volume of useful tactical and strategic intelligence information. A major administrative step forward was the joint management of the CIC, making it a functional tool serving intelligence collection agencies in II CTZ. A list of sources held in the detention cage at the CIC is sent to major intelligence agencies bimonthly. This permits the recipient to levy essential elements of information (EEI) on specific prisoners and Hoi Chanh currently detained. Use of trained CIC personnel insures quick and reliable exploitation of human sources. All sources listed by the CIC are less than one month old and are usually less than two weeks old. This system allows for in-depth interrogation on knowledgeability and flexibility in probing areas of particular interest to units and advisors. Significant use of this source list has already been made and greater use is expected.

(5) Increased emphasis on proper reporting of PW and Hoi Chanh resulted from revised MACV Directive 381-11. Interrogation spot reports and initial interrogation reports submitted by electrical means are now required to follow prescribed formats. This is significant since MACV J2 is preparing all reports on a countrywide basis for automatic data processing. ADP will enable J2 to provide more complete source analysis and retrieve information on PW and Hoi Chanh much more rapidly.

(6) The Volunteer Informant Program is an outstanding success in Binh Dinh Province, where both the 173d Airborne Brigade and Binh Dinh Sector are exploiting a variety of means to elicit volunteer information from the local populace. The 4th Infantry Division has obtained a marked increase in volunteer informant responses over the last three months.

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(7) The ARVN Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Program continues to expand, providing extended ground reconnaissance coverage in areas in which US long range patrol units do not operate. During the quarter, ARVN deployed LRRP teams on 200 missions, an increase of 49 percent over the previous reporting period. These operations resulted in 52 enemy sightings, an increase of 86 percent. ARVN LRRPs have killed 58 enemy without suffering any friendly killed since November 1968 when the first records of the program began to be kept. ARVN is rapidly achieving their long range patrol training goals. Current efforts are directed toward the best utilization of these assets by education of ARVN commanders and staffs, along with their US advisors, on the functions, methods of operation and techniques for tasking LRRPs.

d. Major Problem Areas: The problems uncovered by the assumption of responsibility by ARVN in the 24th STZ in May and June are in most respects representative of corpswide and countrywide problems which Vietnamization of the war effort will present in the future. A study of the 24th STZ experience in lessons learned format uncovered many problems and requirements for improvement in ARVN force structure. Among these problem areas were:

(1) Unsatisfactory Staff Functions: Capability in handling such diverse functions as intelligence, fire support planning and coordination of air movement was severely limited throughout the period of transition and ARVN operations.

(2) Inadequate Replacement System: Projections of personnel requirements throughout the Ben Het/Dak To Campaign were well short of losses actually sustained. The replacement pipeline did not provide for original requests nor additional requirements. Of utmost significance, no officer or NCO replacements were received throughout the two-month campaign.

(3) Control and Communication Problems: Use of intermediate headquarters and chain of command was sporadic. ARVN communications required comprehensive reinforcement from the US 4th Division.

(4) Lack of Preparedness for Sustained Combat: ARVN forces lack all-round training to fight sustained battles. ARVN staff structures must be strengthened and all supporting systems must be focused on major battle areas and geared to execute the administrative/support tasks of sustained combat.

e. Overall Assessment:

(1) Major repositioning that took place during the quarter was the move of the 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division from southern Kontum Province to western Binh Dinh Province in April. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry moved from western Binh Dinh Province to southern Binh Thuan Province

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in June. The 4th Bn, 53d ARVN Regiment was deployed to Tuyen Duc Province in April after completing training.

(2) During 2d Qtr CY69 two primary trends developed in II CTZ. The first was the turnover of total responsibility for the area, the population, and the conduct of military operations to ARVN forces in northern Kontum Province. The second was the redirecting of regular force efforts toward the attainment of accelerated pacification goals.

(3) Within two weeks of the signing of the memorandum of agreement turning over full responsibility for all phases of the military effort in the northern eighty percent of Kontum Province to HQ, 24th STZ, a major enemy buildup occurred. The enemy chose to mass most of his B-3 Front forces in western Kontum Province against the Ben Het/Dak To area with the rest of the CTZ experiencing "highpoints" of enemy activity. By concentrating a near-divisional size force in the Ben Het/Dak To area and fighting a war of attrition, the Communists subjected ARVN forces to an extreme test. In spite of severe problems, ARVN prevailed and the last week of the quarter saw the withdrawal of enemy forces. The engagements around Dak To and Ben Het have not only built confidence in the ARVN forces and their allies, but have also proven the validity of the basic concept and methods for turning more of the war in the highlands over to ARVN.

(4) April 15 marked the beginning of a major reorientation of effort by all allied forces toward the attainment of the Phase II goals of the 1969 Pacification Campaign. Initial emphasis was placed on the campaign in Binh Dinh Province with Operation WASHINGTON GREEN. The concept, however, spread to encompass all of II CTZ. Efforts are focused at district level with military command posts collocated with district headquarters. The main objectives are security of the population and the pacification efforts of the GVN, elimination of the VCI and guerrillas and destruction of main force elements that try to disrupt the campaign. Progress toward the goal of inflicting more losses than he can replace initially appeared disappointing in the case of II CTZ. However, extensive casualties were inflicted on major NVA units in the Ben Het action and only through massive infiltration of replacements were the Communists able to maintain previous manpower levels. The loss of seasoned ARVN personnel, on the other hand, may have serious consequences for the future. This quarter produced continued improvement in coordinated intelligence operations and production.

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4. (S) III CTZ:

a. General:

(1) Enemy:

(a) The second quarter of 1969 was characterized by increased enemy attacks on military bases and increased attacks by fire on population centers. Although the enemy was somewhat more successful than during the first quarter, RVNAF units eliminated more enemy during the second quarter and thwarted his effort to get his summer offensive off the ground.

(b) As a direct result of losses suffered during the quarter, the effectiveness of ten of the enemy's regiments was seriously impaired; however, none were disbanded. The enemy added two more sapper battalions, the 6th and 211th. The following table shows the number and effectiveness of all enemy units present in III CTZ on 30 Jun 69 as compared with the units present on 31 Mar 69:

TABLE 21

III CTZ ENEMY UNITS BY TYPE AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

	<u>31 Mar 69</u>					<u>30 Jun 69</u>				
	<u>FCE</u>	<u>CE</u>	<u>MCE</u>	<u>NCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>FCE</u>	<u>CE</u>	<u>MCE</u>	<u>NCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Infantry Regts		12	6	2	20		1	8	10	19
Artillery Regts		3			3		3			3
Infantry Bns		15	5	1	21		3	13	5	21
Artillery Bns		13			13		14			14
Sapper Bns		6			6		8			8
Recon Bns		1			1		1			1

LEGEND: FCE - Fully Combat Effective  
CE - Combat Effective  
MCE - Marginally Combat Effective  
NCE - Not Combat Effective

(c) The following table compares second quarter III CTZ strength with that of first quarter:

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TABLE 22

III CTZ ENEMY STRENGTHS BY TYPE, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>First Quarter 1969</u>	<u>Second Quarter 1969</u>
Maneuver Strength	27,500	28,000
Combat Support Strength	9,000	8,500
Administrative and Rear Service Strength	14,600	14,500
Guerrillas	6,600	5,600
Local Force Strength	4,100	4,200
Viet Cong Infrastructure	<u>10,300</u>	<u>9,866*</u>
TOTAL	72,100	70,666

\* As of 1 June 1969; later figures are not available.

(d) Losses were inflicted on the enemy on a scale which was significantly higher than the preceding quarter and which resulted in an overall decrease in the enemy's effectiveness. In addition, heavy logistical losses were inflicted on the enemy which adversely affected his morale and ability to conduct operations, and played a major role in blunting his offensive campaigns. The magnitude of infiltration in the second quarter has been estimated as being over two times greater than during last quarter (23,900 during the second quarter as compared to 10,200 first quarter.) During the past quarter there were no new regiments entering III CTZ. Enemy losses and replacements are shown in Table 23. Logistical losses are shown in Table 24 and compared with 1st Qtr CY69.

TABLE 23

III CTZ ENEMY LOSSES AND REPLACEMENTS

Gross Losses 2d Quarter 1969

KIA	17,423
Less 5 percent (Kidnap Victims and Laborers)	871
Plus 35 percent Death Resulting from Wounds Factor	6,098
Prisoner of War	1,343
Hoi Chanh	1,770

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TABLE 23 (CONT.)

Loss of 273d Regiment	1,400
<u>Adjusted Gross Losses:</u>	27,163
<u>Replacements 2d Quarter 1969</u>	
Infiltration	23,900
Recruitment	1,125
Total Replacements	25,025
New Units Identified (personnel)	445
Net Loss 2d Quarter 1969	1,693
<u>Estimated Enemy Strength as of 30 June 1969</u>	70,666

TABLE 24

III CTZ ENEMY LOGISTICAL LOSSES, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Second Quarter</u>
Individual Weapons	5,130	5,362
Crew Served Weapons	1,068	1,232
Rice (Tons)	1,065.1	705.5
Rockets	632	533
Mortar Rounds	19,450	10,635
Small Arms Ammunition	1,619,200	6,514,000

(2) RVNAF: The RVNAF assigned strength increased by approximately 2,000 personnel during the quarter primarily because of new unit activations in ARVN and RF/PF units. The quarter was characterized by increased offensive operations resulting in a significant increase in enemy eliminated. The RVNAF showed improvement in troop employment and increased issue of critical items of equipment while there were some shortfalls in maintenance status and unit strengths. Generally RVNAF has improved their overall combat effectiveness.

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## b. Major Operations and Activities:

(1) US/FWMAF: US/FWMAF spent 6,747 battalion days on combat operations during this quarter compared to 6,621 battalion days last quarter. Combined operations of US/FWMAF and the RVNAF also increased. Phase III of Campaign TOAN THANG (Complete Victory) continued into and throughout the quarter. The following are the significant cumulative results for US/FWMAF

FWMAF Losses:	991 KIA (18 Aus, NZ; 28 Thai)
	7,316 WIA (149 Aus, NZ; 313 Thai)

Enemy Losses Inflicted by FWMAF	13,147 KIA
	544 PW
	127 Hoi Chanh
	307 VCI Neutralized

(a) 1st Infantry Division: The 1st Infantry Division continued to participate in Operation TOAN THANG (Complete Victory) Phase III. Increasing combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division and Provincial Forces highlighted the 1st Infantry Division's activities during the period. Operation TOAN THANG 2-64 (21 April-26 June 1969), under the control of the 1st Brigade, consisted of the opening and upgrading of Highway 1A, Highway 14, and Route 311 from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai to Phuoc Binh. A total of 9,243 acres of land were cleared during this two-month operation. From 5 May to 22 June 1969 a combined operation was conducted with 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of An Loc and Quan Loi to find and destroy elements of the 1st and 7th North Vietnamese Divisions. Results of this operation were 601 enemy killed and 29 prisoners with substantial quantities of war materiel captured. An Son Operation (4-25 June), participated in by elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, the 1st Battalion, 7th ARVN Regiment, and four Regional Force companies, was formed under the command of a US field grade officer with a combined US/ARVN staff. A task force was organized to eliminate main force elements which had infiltrated the An Son area. The task force saturated the area and eliminated 83 of the reported VC. Operation Boston Pistol (18-30 June 1969) relieved the 1st Infantry Division of responsibility for Binh Long Province, Phuoc Long Province, and the Quan Loi Base Camp with 1st Cavalry Division (AM) assuming responsibility for the area. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division relocated during the operation to Dau Tieng and assumed responsibility for an area including the Western Trapezoid, Michelin Rubber Plantation, and the Dau Tieng Base Camp. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was relieved of responsibility for Dau Tieng on 30 June 1969. During the reporting period, the 2d Brigade concentrated its efforts on pacification operations.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division (AM): The Division's operations during this quarter differed from last quarter in that operations shifted from small unit patrols and ambushes designed to interdict enemy movement south out

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of War Zone C to a more offensive posture of larger-scale operations to destroy major enemy troop concentrations. During the month of April, 1st Cav (reinforced by the 11th ACR) conducted offensive operations throughout War Zone C against base areas and supply bases of the 1st and 7th Divisions. During the early part of May, 1st Cav forces shifted to the southern portion of War Zone C and assumed an interdictory posture typified by small unit patrols and ambushes. In the latter part of May, 1st Cav reassumed an offensive role to attack major enemy formations in their base areas throughout central War Zone C. Between 1 April and 30 June the division conducted Operation MONTANA RAIDER; this was a three-brigade effort, reinforced with an armored cavalry regiment, conducted from 13 April through 12 May throughout War Zone C. Results of these actions were 39 US killed, 151 wounded and one aircraft destroyed. Enemy losses were 353 killed and eight prisoners, 231 individual weapons, 96 crew served weapons, 1788 large caliber rounds, 79,396 small caliber rounds, 132 tons of rice, and 29 tons of salt captured. Operations in AO MONTANA SCOUT were predominately interdictory with the 1st and 2d Brigades deployed along the southern frontier of War Zone C. Results of Operation MONTANA SCOUT were 64 US killed, 376 wounded, nineteen aircraft destroyed, and one 105mm howitzer destroyed. Enemy losses were 1,570 killed and 39 prisoners, 399 individual weapons, 59 crew served weapons, 1,694 large caliber rounds, 78,256 small caliber rounds captured. Operations in AOs COMANCHE WARRIOR (14 May through 1 June) and CREEK II (19 May through 22 June) were conducted in essentially the same geographical location by the 3d Brigade and targeted against the 5th NVA Division. Results of these operations were nineteen US killed, 104 wounded, and two aircraft destroyed. Enemy losses were 132 killed and five prisoners, 46 individual weapons, 21 crew served weapons, 1,826 large caliber rounds, and 77,070 small caliber rounds captured.

(c) 25th Infantry Division: The second quarter of calendar year 1969 operations had three primary objectives: first, to preempt the efforts of the enemy main force and local force units, secondly, to place emphasis on the improvement of RVNAF through combined operations, thirdly, to continue the pacification program. Greater emphasis was placed on Night Hawk missions (operations employing armed helicopters with night observation devices) which accounted for over a 350 enemy body count during this quarter. The effectiveness of the Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) improved considerably during this quarter. The number of CRIPs was increased to eleven and these efforts have tremendously enhanced the upgrading of many hamlets and considerably improved the working relationship between US and Vietnamese troops. Also the LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) commenced operations with Vietnamese LRRP counterparts this quarter with marked results. Most significant was a major division boundary change which took place late in the quarter resulting in the relocation of the 3d Brigade from Dau Tieng to a forward location at Bao Trai. Initial implementation of this TAOR change was made on 4 June with gradual changes continuing until full responsibility for Dau Tieng and environs was assumed by the 1st Infantry Division. The 2d Brigade remained in the area until 30 June while much of its efforts centered on

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concurrently preparing to commence operations in the lower Hau Nghia Province east and west of Vam Co Dong. Operation TOAN THANG III, which began on 17 February 1969 continued into this quarter. During this period enemy killed in action numbered 5,583, while the division suffered 219 killed. There were also 11,617 enemy weapons either captured or destroyed. Operation SPRING PLOW began on 1 April and continued thru 20 April resulting in the clearing of a total 7,285 acres of jungle and rubber.

(d) 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division: The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued airmobile assault, Eagle Flight, Checkerboard, Bushmaster, cordon and search, reconnaissance in force, and special night operations as the primary combat operational techniques. The Brigade continued Operation Toan Thang III during the reporting period. The Brigade operated with three maneuver battalions (2/60th, 5/60th, and 2/47th Mechanized) in Long An Province until 2 June, when a fourth battalion, the 3/7th Infantry, became OPCON to the brigade. The most significant contact of the quarter was a major engagement southwest of Thu Thua after an RF outpost was attacked on 12 May. B/13/17 Cavalry received heavy fire on reaching the area and 2/47th Infantry subsequently also established immediate contact. A "pile on" operation then was initiated involving 2/60th and 5/60th Infantry, 2/50th ARVN and 3/50th ARVN, two PF platoons, four RF companies and one PRU platoon. Assault helicopters, air cavalry, tactical air and artillery supported the operation. Final results were 91 enemy KIA, six PW, sixteen crew-served and 15 individual weapons. Combined friendly losses were four killed and 37 wounded.

(e) Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC): CMAC conducted offensive operations in Gia Dinh Province and adjacent areas characterized by reconnaissance in force and detailed searches utilizing riverine and airmobile assets in areas inaccessible to foot movement. Extensive night ambushes in conjunction with planned artillery fires focused the effort on a vigorous counter-rocket program. A surveillance plan, utilizing aerial observers and ground-mounted surveillance radar was also employed in conjunction with CMAC's counter-rocket program. Extensive use was made of area of operation (AO) extensions and combined operations with adjacent units to thwart the enemy use of operational boundaries as a means to elude allied forces.

(f) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (Provisional) (BHTAC): Ground activity in the BHTAC TAOR throughout the reporting period was light. Continuous improvement in development of the defense against rocket attacks on the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex was stressed during the period. Coordination between US, Vietnamese, Australian, and Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces was enhanced by the movement of the joint BHTAC/LBSZ Tactical Operations Center to the III Corps Compound. The move resulted in improved working conditions and increased the capabilities for communications. During the period BHTAC exercised OPCON over two infantry battalions, two armored cavalry squadrons, three cavalry troops, one tank troop, and two infantry companies for various periods of time. The Duffel Bag Program

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within the BHTAC AO was aimed at monitoring and denying the enemy free use of access routes into the rocket belt around the Bien Hoa Long Binh area. Targets averaged four per night with one fire mission. There was 31 sensors in six strings deployed around the north and north west approaches into the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area.

(g) 1st Australian Task Force: The task force continued participation in Campaign TOAN THANG III throughout the quarter with operations to destroy the enemy and assist in pacification and civil affairs. The most significant contact of the quarter occurred on 6 June at Binh Ba village. The 5th RAR reacted as a result of an ambush on a small tank convoy. One company of the 5th RAR plus Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF) cordoned the village while another company of the 5th RAR supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers assaulted the enemy in the village. Results were 43 VC killed, 8 prisoners, and 6 AK-47's, 3 rocket launchers, one 60mm mortar, two 9mm K54 Chicom pistols, and one 82mm mortar base-plate and bipod captured.

(h) Company D(Ranger), 151st Infantry: Company D continued operations in Toan Thang III. The company continued OPCON to II FFORCEV but on one occasion three to four patrols were in support of the 199th Brigade. Two patrols were used as listening and observation posts in support of BHTAC from 21 June. A total of 1,652 men were committed on patrol operations during the quarter. These operations resulted in 37 enemy killed with two friendly killed and eighteen wounded. Artillery support was rendered by batteries of the 7/8th, 2/35th, 7/9th, 1/30th, and 6/30th Artillery, firing a total of 62 missions. The company continued to gather large quantities of intelligence.

(i) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF): Missions for the RTAVF during the quarter consisted of security operations near Bearcat, Long Thanh, Binh Son, and along Highway 15. The RTAVF also conducted reconnaissance in force operations throughout its area. Two such operations are worthy of note. On 13 May southeast of Bearcat, the 3/1st Infantry received an attack by an estimated enemy battalion consisting of mortar and rocket fire. Return fire with organic weapons supported by artillery, light fire teams, and Spooky resulted in 87 enemy killed and quantities of ordnance captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 16 June, an enemy attack against the 2/1st Infantry resulted in 212 enemy killed and one prisoner, sixteen small arms, 25 crew served weapons, 823 grenades, and 6 mines captured. Friendly losses were six Thais killed and 34 wounded.

## (2) ARVN:

(a) General: During the 2d quarter CY69 the emphasis on small unit operations increased while the level of large unit offensive operations was comparable to the 1st quarter CY69. Additionally, joint/combined operations with FVMAF and RF/PF have increased. Airmobile operations increased from 137 to 297, a gain of 117 percent over last quarter. The number of enemy personnel losses (which includes all enemy killed, enemy

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captured, and all non-FWMAF Hoi Chanh) for this quarter was 7,128 as compared to a total of 5,201 for the last quarter. The ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost increased from 9:1 last quarter to 10.4:1 this quarter. A total of 2,349 weapons were captured as compared to 227 lost. Last quarter, 2,296 weapons were captured and 254 lost.

(b) 31st Division Tactical Area (25th ARVN Division): Although there was a significant increase in the number of large and small unit operations, airmobile operations, and combined operations from last quarter, there was a slight decrease in the number of enemy contacts. The number of enemy killed and captured this quarter was 678 as compared to 499 last quarter. The minor decrease in contacts for the second quarter as compared to last quarter was attributable to several factors: first, nine of the division's twelve infantry battalions were placed under the operational control of the Long An and Hau Nghia province chiefs to conduct operations in direct support of the pacification program. Consequently, the nature and scope of offensive operations were altered. Second, in further support of the pacification program, seven infantry battalions were moved to new field locations which resulted in a considerable portion of time being devoted to the establishment and improvement of defensive positions and living facilities. Third, there is a continued lack of initiative and offensive spirit on the part of some leaders, especially at the lower levels. This shortfall has inhibited sound operational planning, effective reaction to intelligence, and motivation to make contact with the enemy. The increase in results per contact can be attributed to better fire and maneuver discipline on the part of the individual soldier and more effective utilization of fire support resources. Normally, ARVN forces operate effectively once contact with the enemy has been established. The use of helimobile assets has improved operations, however, more detailed planning is required to insure maximum efficient utilization. Combined operations with US forces were emphasized during the past quarter and in general the results were satisfactory. Although the desired level has not yet been attained, night activities have increased significantly and the tactics employed, primarily night ambushes along suspected enemy LOCs, have often been successful. Kill ratios were higher for night ambushes than for day-light operations though contacts were sometimes avoided as a result of poor small unit leadership.

(c) 32d Division Tactical Area (5th ARVN Division): During the first month of the quarter, the Division demonstrated only limited initiative in carrying the war to the enemy. As May approached, however, enemy activity increased sharply throughout the DTA, and division forces responded with the most consistent aggressiveness they have shown since the 1968 Tet Offensive. From that point until the close of the quarter, Division forces were more effective in carrying the war to the enemy in all three provinces. Interdiction operations are now a regular occurrence in this contested area. Ground and riverine operations during this reporting period were characterized by a large number of joint and combined arms teams under both ARVN and US operational control, while increased emphasis was given to the employment of sustained small unit operations. Of particular importance, politically

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as well as militarily, was the opening of the road from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be, for the first time in five years.

(d) 33d Division Tactical Area (18th ARVN Division): Throughout 2d Qtr CY69 regimental tasks forces of the 18th Division conducted large scale operations in south-central Long Khanh Province. After a period of relative inactivity in April, large enemy units identified as major elements of the 5th NVA Division, moved into the area with intentions of putting pressure on the province capital at Xuan Loc. Reacting well to this threat, 18th Division units reinforced by the 3d Marine and 11th Airborne Battalions initiated a month-long period of heavy contact in which over 600 enemy were killed or captured. ARVN casualties for the same period were 116 killed and 605 wounded. Contact continued with reduced intensity through the first three weeks in June, becoming sporadic at the end of the month as enemy forces, having sustained an additional 200 casualties, withdrew to jungle base areas to regroup and resupply. During the quarter the 18th Division received and used combat support assets on an unprecedented scale. Airmobile assets, for example, were used on 22 days in May, lifting 12,300 troops into 76 landing zones and executing twenty extractions. With these assets the division attained a degree of mobility and flexibility not previously achieved. For a total of 31 days during the quarter, C Troop, 3/17 Air Cavalry operated in direct support of the division. The troop's hunter-killer teams were used primarily for low level visual reconnaissance and were diverted occasionally to provide immediate close support for troops in contact. Immediate ground bomb damage assessments of strikes in this area uncovered mass graves containing a total of 124 bodies, revealed considerable damage to freshly constructed bunker complexes, and led to the capture of large quantities of abandoned arms and ammunition. Division operations in May and June were complemented by operations of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division in southern War Zone D and by operations of the 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment south of Xuan Loc. In combined operations with these units 18th Division troops fought well.

(e) Capital Military District (CMD): The Capital Military District concept of operations was to continue to screen the rocket belt, interdict land and water lines of communications, spoil the enemy's attempts to infiltrate, find and destroy enemy forces and conduct searches for supply caches. US and ARVN troop dispositions remained relatively unchanged during the first half of the reporting period. The troop level remained relatively stable in spite of continuous rotation of airborne units in and out of CMD. During the second half of the quarter one US infantry brigade was withdrawn from the AO. III Corps augmented CMD forces by placing one cavalry regiment (-), two ranger battalions, two airborne battalions and one artillery battalion under CMD operation control. CMD forces were shifted to cover the unoccupied portion of the AO.

## (3) Regional/Popular Forces:

(a) RF/PF units continued to improve, due to the emphasis place on force structure increases, modernization of equipment, and better employ-

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ment of units. During this quarter the RF/PF gained more contacts with the enemy and achieved better results than in the previous period.

(b) Eighty new RF companies were activated and deployed by 30 June as scheduled. One hundred percent of the authorized 375 companies have now been deployed.

(c) There are 879 of 880 authorized PF platoons assigned and deployed in III CTZ. Difficulties in recruiting replacements may inhibit further large scale expansion.

(d) Enemy losses inflicted by RF/PF during the quarter were 1,083 killed and 444 captured as compared to 924 killed and 433 captured for the first quarter. The RF/PF captured 920 individual weapons, 140 more than last quarter.

(e) Currently 73 percent of the 880 PF platoons have the primary mission of providing security for villages and hamlets, and another six percent have a secondary mission of village and hamlet security. Forty-one percent of the 375 RF companies provide village and hamlet security as a primary mission and 16 percent have this as a secondary mission.

(f) The enemy/friendly KIA ratio drop from 3.2:1 to 2.84:1 between the first and second quarters was primarily the result of an ammunition dump explosion at Tay Ninh on 11 April which killed 71 RF personnel. Excluding those losses, the KIA ratio was 3.5:1, indicating a significant improvement in RF operational effectiveness.

(4) Special Forces/Camp Strike Force/Mobile Strike Force (Company A, 5th SFG(A)): During the reporting period Company A conducted 581 company size and 490 platoon-size operations throughout III CTZ. In general, the vast majority of the camps were able to maintain the established goal of 50 percent of combat reconnaissance platoons (CRP) on combat operations at all times. Emphasis was again placed on saturation patrolling. The great increase in company and platoon-size operations attests to the implementation of this program. The reporting period was characterized by small scale ground action, supplemented with attacks by fire on many of the Special Forces camps in the III CTZ. On one occasion during this period the enemy launched a determined, sustained ground attack against a Special Forces camp, Camp Bunard on 20 June. The 3d Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Reconnaissance Company was used extensively in War Zone D to locate high speed supply routes and cache sites and to develop intelligence needed to employ B-52 strikes, preplanned airstrikes, and Sky Spot effectively in support of the 3d MSF maneuver battalions. The CIDG program in III CTZ is continuing its saturation patrolling and reconnaissance in force missions throughout the Special Forces TAOR with goal of maximum surveillance and interdiction. The numerous attacks by fire on CIDG camps, especially Katu, Tong Le Chon, and the B Detachment at Tay Ninh, coupled with the numerous contacts made with enemy units along major infiltration routes, attests to the fact that the CIDG program continues to impede enemy infiltration and resupply capabilities.

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(5) Base Area Neutralization: Offensive ground operations, jungle clearing, heavy bombing, and artillery fire have caused considerable destruction to enemy base camps. Friendly operations conducted in these areas have caused the enemy to shift his activities constantly. While no base area has been completely destroyed or neutralized, all but one have been partially neutralized. Table 25 shows the status of base areas in III CTZ:

TABLE 25

## STATUS OF III CTZ/NVA BASE AREAS

AS OF 30 JUN 69

(See Page 35 for III CTZ VC/NVA Base Areas Schematic)

<u>BASE AREA</u>	<u>PENETRATIONS BY RECON/RECON IN FORCE* 1st Qtr CY69</u>	<u>PENETRATIONS BY RECON/RECON IN FORCE 2d Qtr CY69</u>	<u>PERCENT NEUTRALIZED 2d Qtr 69</u>
302	86/2	123/15	20
303	138/50	74/5	20
350	301/1	548/0	60
351	271/0	454/0	10
352	346/6	541/2	50
353	243/2	240/10	0
354	775/18	839/42	15
355	0/0	635/306	70-75
356	1,905/241	1,905/241	92
357	1,055/131	1,344/194	50
359	1,001/296	2,387/213	25
367	704/1	621/0	75
372	617/75	554/201	60

\*NOTE: Penetrations by reconnaissance include aerial reconnaissance.

### c. New Strategy, Tactics or Techniques:

- (1) Improvements in exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence

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information among GVN and FVMAF are attributed to the establishment of Province Intelligence and Operation Coordinating Centers (PIOCC) and the District IOCC (DIOCC). This has greatly enhanced the exchange of intelligence information and overall level of cooperation between GVN and FVMAF intelligence agencies.

(2) Use of Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT): By direction of the CG, II FFORCEV, a new concept for the use of mobile advisory teams has been developed. Teams now will operate under a committee system at province and district level. Some teams will specialize in marksmanship, others in ambushes or fire and maneuver. Under the concept, teams will move into a RF/PF unit's area, provide it intensive training, and then move to another unit in a few days. Other mobile advisory teams will continue to remain with specific units and on critical bridges as the situation requires.

## d. Major Problem Areas:

(1) The RF/PF effort suffered from a shortage of barrier materials throughout the quarter. The materials being issued for delivery and use in 1969 were requisitioned in Jan CY68; in November 1968 the JGS allocated eighty additional RF companies to III CTZ. Seventy-eight of these companies completed their training and deployed to provinces. This deployment caused a critical shortage of barrier materials, particularly in those provinces which had a significant increase in RF companies, because the number of outposts required for those units was not considered in submitting requisitions for materials in 1969. The problem has been compounded by a continuing lag in deliveries of the materials that were programmed.

(2) Allocation of new RF companies in this quarter created a serious problem of desertions. Because several provinces lacked the manpower to recruit authorized companies, recruiting was done in other provinces and the companies then deployed to provinces where they were needed. The result was an increase in desertions in the units deployed to other provinces.

(3) Recent surveys have revealed that a serious problem exists concerning the storage of ammunition and POL. Provinces store ammunition and POL, without protective berms, too close to each other and too close to housing areas. The seriousness of the problem was graphically demonstrated by the explosion at the Tay Ninh A&DSL Company which ignited the nearby POL and killed company personnel sleeping one floor above the ammunition storage room.

## e. Overall Assessment:

### (1) General:

(a) Two basic objectives motivated all III CTZ actions in CY69: to defeat the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces within the III CTZ and to

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extend the Government of Vietnam's control throughout the zone. Certain broad tasks are inherent in these goals and serve as indicators of the degree of attainment of basic objectives.

(b) ARVN Combat Effectiveness: Results of ARVN combat operations improved over previous quarters. The increase in combined operations promised to enhance combat experience, but III CTZ still was far from attaining satisfactory combat effectiveness.

(c) Enemy Effectiveness and Potential: As a result of losses inflicted this quarter, the enemy's strength and effectiveness was decreased and he spent most of the quarter regrouping and refitting. However, he remained capable of launching attacks by fire. In addition to attacks by fire the enemy continued his terrorist attacks against population centers.

(d) Base Area Neutralization: Many facilities have been destroyed in the enemy's base areas although none have been completely neutralized and one has no percentage of neutralization.

(e) RF/PF Capabilities: RF/PF forces improved but leadership, training and combat effectiveness still lagged in many units.

(f) Progress continues in restoring and securing the lines of communications but the established goals have not yet been met.

(g) Intelligence Capabilities: Progress continued in achieving the goal of maximizing coordinated intelligence and counterintelligence activities and tactical responses continued to increase.

(2) US/FWMAF: Campaign TOAN THIANG III continued throughout the reporting period. It encompassed all II FFORCEV and III Corps units located in III CTZ. The effort against the enemy continued with an emphasis on ground combat operations coupled with air strikes to defeat the enemy, interdict his movement toward the capital, preempt his offensive operations, and extend GVN control throughout III CTZ. II FFORCEV moved out to meet the enemy, to attack his logistical lines, to conduct operations in his base areas, and to react rapidly to hard intelligence to engage the enemy. The effectiveness of these operations is evident in terms of the enemy's losses, his inability to conduct successful attacks against installations and population centers, and the generally low level of his activity.

(3) Army of the Republic of Vietnam: During this quarter the Vietnamese Army continued to conduct offensive operations as part of Campaign TOAN THANG III. There was considerable progress in the overall effectiveness of III Corps ARVN units. Small unit offensive operations increased as did the number of enemy eliminated. ARVN units carried the fight to the enemy during the quarter and because of the redistribution of US assets, combat support increased, resulting in more flexibility, mobility, and

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tactical proficiency. ARVN forces killed 2,481 enemy and captured 433 while losing 706 killed and 3,643 wounded. The 25th Division in the 31st Division Tactical Area (DTA) increased its number of offensive operations. Limited leadership and lack of initiative at lower command levels continue to be serious problems. The maneuver elements of the Division demonstrated their ability to operate efficiently during night or day. The 5th Division's (32d DTA) operations included more road security missions than in the previous quarter due to the enemy's increased activity against convoys especially along Highway 13. The division made progress in eliminating the VC infrastructure and local/main force units. The offensive posture of the division continued to improve and it should be capable of repelling enemy attacks. The 18th Division (33d DTA) overcame the most serious threat to south central Long Khanh Province since Tet of 1968. Units of the 18th Division fought major battles that contained and reduced the enemy threat during the quarter. The results showed that the 18th Division was capable of conducting sustained operations against a major force. The Capital Military District has continued to upgrade its defensive posture and is intensifying its search effort in its area.

(4) Regional and Popular Forces: Most of the planned force structure increase for the first quarter of 1969 was completed. The RF/PF units showed an improvement in operational effectiveness. Total enemy eliminated during the quarter were 1527, with 568 eliminated in June.

(5) Special Forces/Camp Strike Force/ Mobile Strike Force (Company A 5th SFGA): The period was characterized by small scale ground actions. The 3d MSF reconnaissance company continued to develop intelligence for B-52 strikes and the CIDG program in III CTZ continued its saturation patrolling and reconnaissance in force with the goal of maximum surveillance and interdiction.

5. (S) IV CTZ:

a. General:

(1) Enemy:

(a) Enemy attempts to maintain constant pressure on provincial capitals, district towns and friendly installations were sporadic and generally unsuccessful in this quarter. The enemy positioned the bulk of his main force maneuver and combat support units in or near the highly populated provinces in order to exert pressure and exploit the population for taxes, manpower, concealment, and as a food source for his forces.

(b) During each monthly high point the enemy invariably used his economy of force tactics, such as extensive indirect fire attacks, limited ground harassments, ground attacks against isolated outposts, LOC interdiction, and sapper and terrorist activity.

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(c) For the first time enemy forces from elsewhere in Vietnam were introduced into the IV CTZ when the 7, 8, 9, and 10th MF Battalions (Arty) of the 273d Regiment, formerly part of the 9th VC Division, established an AO in VC An Giang Province. The regiment consists of approximately 1200 personnel, of which 60-80 percent are NVA. Previously, only small groups of NVA infiltrated into IV CTZ to reinforce cadre and combat units. The number of NVA in IV Corps is estimated to be between 1400-1800. There is ample evidence of existing VC units moving back and forth across the Cambodian-IV CTZ border to avoid friendly contact, resupply, recruit, and train.

(d) Reports during the quarter indicated the VC were experiencing personnel difficulties. A document stated that recruits were barely adequate to fill losses and replace those guerrillas upgraded or assigned to other units. The document also showed that enemy personnel strength was not adequate to meet combat requirements. The quality and morale of the soldier continued to decline during the quarter due to the loss of cadre and experienced personnel and acquisition of poorly trained replacements. Of the 36 VC infantry battalions in IV CTZ, ten were considered combat effective, 23 were marginally combat effective and three were non-combat effective. Enemy losses throughout the quarter are summarized below.

TABLE 26

IV CTZ ENEMY MONTHLY OPERATIONS/LOSSES

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>QUARTERLY TOTAL</u>
Enemy-Initiated Incidents	800	757	663	2220
Ground Attacks	18	17	35	70
VC KIA	5537	5293	4248	15078
VC PW	1703	1678	997	4378
Hoi Chanh	3301*	2239	2065	7605

\* This was the highest monthly total ever reported for the IV CTZ Chieu Hoi Program

(e) Estimated strength of Viet Cong elements which perform full time military duty is summarized in the following table.

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TABLE 27

## IV CTZ VIET CONG ELEMENT STRENGTHS

### BY NUMBER AND TYPE

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Regimental Headquarters	6	1,290
Main Force Battalions	20	3,530*
Local Force Battalions	16	2,365**
Main Force Companies	12	500
Local Force Companies and Platoons	92	<u>5,309***</u>
TOTAL		12,994

\* This figure does not include four unconfirmed Main Force battalions with strengths as indicated: 301 (150), 341 (170), 273 (150), 2012 (150).

\*\* This figure does not include two unconfirmed Local Force battalions with strengths as indicated: 560 (120), and 580 (140).

\*\*\* This figure includes 84 companies and eight platoons.

#### (2) Allied Effort:

(a) ARVN units maintained combat readiness throughout the quarter and continued to perform all of their assigned missions. As of 30 June 1969 all divisions had an assigned strength in excess of 80% of that authorized, with a combined average of 82%. There were no major equipment shortages that affected combat support units.

(b) During this quarter the 7th ARVN Division authorized strength increased from 12,588 to 12,616, the 9th Division authorized strength increased from 11,855 to 12,149 and the 21st Division decreased from 12,687 to 12,616 due to minor adjustments in regimental authorized strength. Total current authorized strength for the three divisions is 37,381, compared to 37,130 at the end of the previous quarter.

(c) At the end of this quarter the 7th ARVN Division assigned strength decreased to 10,720, or 85% of authorized. Combat effective strength was 6,753, or 63% of assigned. The 9th Division assigned strength declined to 9,741, or 80% of authorized. Combat effective strength was 6,824, or

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70% of assigned. The 21st Division assigned strength declined to 10,385 or 82% of authorized. Combat effective strength was 5,708, or 55% of assigned. Four of the five Ranger battalions had fewer than 450 men available for combat. The Ranger battalions combined authorized strength remained 3,399 and assigned strength declined to 3,103, 91% of authorized.

(d) There were two brigades of the US 9th Infantry Division operating in the Delta during the second quarter (1st and 2d Brigades). Both brigades maintained a combat readiness condition and placed continuous pressure on the enemy. During the latter part of the quarter combat operations were reduced as the two brigades started to prepare to redeploy from the IV CTZ. As of 30 Jun 69 the 1st and 2d Brigades of the US 9th Infantry Division had an assigned strength in excess of 89%. The brigades suffered no shortage of equipment that affected combat or combat support operations. The two brigades conducted special classes in sniper training and starlight scope training in addition to their normal training. This training proved effective to the point that ARVN forces were included in the special classes.

(e) No new RF companies or PF platoons were activated during this quarter.

(f) In addition to the objectives of the QUYET THANG Campaign, advisory emphasis remained on night operations, reaction forces, KBAR operations, security of LOC and support of the 1969 Pacification Program. A summary of IV CTZ operational data follows:

TABLE 28

## IV CTZ OPERATIONAL RESULTS

### 1ST and 2D QTRS CY69

	<u>1st Qtr (69)</u>	<u>2d Qtr (69)</u>
Major Unit Operations	1575	1654
Contact on Major Unit Operations	1000	677
Small Unit Operations	212522	222197
Contact on Small Unit Operations	1383	1170
VC KIA	15912	15078
Friendly KIA	1951	1628
Weapons Captured	4985	4552
Weapons Lost	633	685

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b. Major Operations and Activities: In this quarter 40.9% of major unit operations resulted in enemy contacts compared to 63.5% in 1st Qtr CY69. Thus a small increase in operations saw a substantial drop in contact. Moreover, the KIA ratio improved over last quarter from 8.15:1 to 9.26:1. ARVN units are generally up to strength and well armed throughout the Delta. In April the issue of M16's to the remaining 30% of IV CTZ RF/PF units commenced, a process whose target date for completion was set at 15 Aug 69. A description of important contacts follows:

## (1) RVNAF Operations:

(a) During the period 5-8 April, 44 STZ Operation HQ/QT/BK/44/19 was conducted as a sweep along the border from Cai Cai to Moc Hoa with the 41st and 43d Ranger Battalions, 12th ACR and two troops of 7/1st Air Cav Squadron. Results were: 89 enemy KIA, four captured and 440 weapons captured. There were five friendly KIA and 17 WIA.

(b) From 31 May to 13 June, the 42d and 43d Ranger Battalions and the 12th Armd Cav Regiment conducted 44th STZ Operation HQ/QT/BK 44/29 seventeen km southwest of Chau Doc. Results were: 158 enemy KIA, three captured, three crew served and eight individual weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 29 KIA, ninety WIA, one MIA.

(c) The 12th ACR (-), 42d and 43d Ranger Battalion and one MSF battalion conducted OPERATION HQ/QT/BK/44/32 in the "Seven Mountains" area from 18 to 24 June. While 250 enemy were killed and three weapons captured, only one friendly WIA resulted.

(d) One infantry battalion, one armored cav troop and six RF companies in Cho Moc District conducted 9th ARVN Division Sector Operation QT/AG/113 from 16 to 19 May. In ensuing engagements, 146 enemy were KIA, 22 captured, and there were nine Hoi Chanh. Eight crew-served and 46 individual weapons were captured. Friendly losses were 41 KIA, 99 WIA, one weapon lost and one M-113 destroyed.

(e) 21st ARVN Division Operation HQ QT SD/21/17 was conducted with 1/32, 1/31, 2/9, 21st Recon, five RF companies in Long My on 10 and 11 April. 101 enemy were killed, numerous types of weapons captured along with two maps of Long My Subsector, documents pertaining to Tay Do 2 and 303 VC Battalions. Fifty-four B40 rockets were destroyed along with one drum of machine gun ammo. Eight KIA and 22 WIA were the friendly losses.

(f) On 22 June, the 21st ARVN Division Operation QT/SD/21/26 with 1/32, 3/32, 2/31, 1/31, 2d and 4th Marines, 1/9 and 2/9 Cav produced the following results in Kien Hung: 108 VC KIA, five weapons and a radio captured. Two friendly were KIA and three WIA.

## (2) US Operations:

(a) On 13 Apr 69 the 1st Bde, US 9th Inf Div conducted operations in

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Dinh Tuong Province (Base Area 470). Participating units were the 4/39, 3/39, 6/39, and 2/39. Results were 76 enemy KIA, one VC suspect, and one Hoi Chanh. There were sixteen friendly WIA.

(b) On 28 Apr 69 the 1st Bde, US 9th Inf Div conducted operations in Dinh Tuong Province. Participating units were the 4/39, 3/39, 6/31, 2/39. Results were 78 enemy KIA, two VC captured, three VC suspects and four sub-machine guns captured. Friendly losses were four KIA.

(c) On 1 May 69 the 1st Brigade conducted operations in Dinh Tuong Province. Participating units were the 4/39, 3/39, 6/31, and 2/39. While enemy losses were 82 KIA with three VC captured and sixteen VC suspects as well as five small arms captured, friendly losses were one KIA, three WIA.

(d) On 22 May 69 the 1st Brigade conducted operations in Dinh Tuong Province, five km northeast of Cai Lay. Units engaged were the 3/39, 6/31, and 2/39. Results were 122 enemy KIA, 4 VC captured, six VC suspects and 21 individual weapons captured. Friendly losses were three KIA and thirteen WIA.

(e) On 7 Apr 69 the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div conducted operations in Kien Hoa Province. Participating units were 3/47, and 4/47. These operations produced 65 KIA, one VC captured, five VC suspects, three Hoi Chanh, and 21 individual weapons captured. There were two friendly WIA.

(f) On 13 Apr 69 the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div, conducted two operations in Kien Hoa Province, five and ten km southeast of Ben Tre. Participating units were 3/47, 4/47, and 3/60. Results were 73 enemy KIA, one VC captured, and two VC suspects. Friendly casualties were five WIA.

(g) On 16 Apr 69 the 2d Brigade conducted operations in Kien Hoa Province. The 3/47, 4/47, and 3/60 were the participating units. Results were 65 enemy KIA, two VC captured, and two VC suspects detained. Friendly losses were two KIA and two WIA.

(h) On 24 May 69 the 2d Brigade conducted operations in Kien Hoa Province, seven km northeast of Ham Long and eight km northwest of Giong Trom. The 3/47 and 4/47 conducted these operations. While 102 enemy were KIA and one VC suspect detained and one individual weapon captured, friendly forces sustained eight WIA.

(i) On 29 May 1969 the 2d Brigade conducted operations in Mo Cay district, Kien Hoa Province. The 3/47, 4/47 and 3/60 participated. Results were 69 enemy KIA, eight VC suspects detained and two individual weapons captured. Friendly units sustained two WIA.

## (3) Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas:

(a) The continuing base area goal for CY69 is the neutralization of 80% of enemy base areas in ARVN on a continuing basis.

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(b) Results of second quarter operations in pursuit of this goal were as follows:

TABLE 29

RESULTS OF IV CTZ BASE AREA OPERATIONS  
(See Page 36 for IV CTZ VC/NVA Base Areas Schematic)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
Operations	181	258
VC KIA	2,599	3,947
VC PW	381	513
Weapons Captured	934	1,394

(c) Seventy-seven more operations were conducted in base areas in this quarter and while 52 percent more VC were killed and 32 percent more captured, almost 50 percent more weapons were captured than in last quarter. Due to friendly operations in support of the RVN Pacification Program, enemy activity declined below the minimum Base Area Standard. Base Area 488 was dropped from the MACV Base Area Inventory during the quarter. Base Area 480, a separate entity in first quarter, became part of Base Area 483. All base areas were penetrated in this quarter. Neutralization accomplishments are summarized in Table 30.

TABLE 30

IV CTZ BASE AREA NEUTRALIZATION

<u>BASE AREAS PENETRATED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF NEUTRALIZATION</u>
400	40%
470	50%
482	20%
483	25%
487	55%
488	90%
490	15%
704	5%
478	40%

(4) Restoration of LOC: There has been a significant decrease in enemy attempts to interdict major LOC in the IV CTZ during this quarter.

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There were eighteen reported incidents in June, as compared to 61 in March. This decrease is attributed in part to LOC security operations by ARVN and USN/VNN forces, and a high level of RVNAF offensive operations, denying the initiative to the enemy.

## (5) Defense of Borders and Interdiction of Known Land Infiltration:

(a) During this period, as part of the action to implement the Surveillance and Interdiction Plan for the IV CTZ portion of the Cambodian border, two Border Controls Centers (BCC) became operational at Chi Lang and Moc Hoa. These BCCs conducted border interdiction operations, employing both ground and air assets, to interdict VC infiltration of supplies and personnel. Phantom III, Combat Skyspots, Shadow and Aladdin have continued to maintain pressure throughout IV CTZ in disrupting VC infiltration routes, rear service areas and commo-liaison routes.

(b) Due to the dry season enemy resupply activity during the months of April and May was severely limited throughout the Delta. Twenty-four hour aerial surveillance and ground reaction forces also adversely affected enemy infiltration of supplies to a large extent. Hoi Chanh, PW, and captured documents continued to indicate a dearth of ammunition and other supplies due to allied interdiction operations. Captured documents mentioned a desperate need in MR 2 for additional 120mm and 82mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle, and B-41/40 rocket ammunition, to conduct combat operations. A significant increase in the infiltration of supplies is expected during the remainder of the rainy season.

## (6) Regional Forces/Popular Forces:

(a) There were 532 Regional Force companies, 1,999 Popular Force platoons, fifteen river patrol companies, seventeen mechanized platoons, sixteen intelligence platoons, 92 intelligence squads, and sixteen heavy weapons platoons. This represented an increase of one intelligence squad and one A&DSL company over those reported at the end of the last quarter. JGS authorized IV CTZ to recruit and train 427 additional PF platoons during the next two quarters.

(b) The combat effectiveness of RF/PF at the end of the quarter was considered satisfactory and improving. The receipt of modern equipment and the increased availability of helicopters contributed to the increased aggressiveness of the RF/PF. During the quarter emphasis was placed on in-place training in order to upgrade the combat effectiveness of RF/PF. The 427 new Popular Force Platoons JGS authorized IV Corps during the next two quarters were required to improve local security throughout IV Corps. The present for duty strength for RF was 75,747 and for PF was 66,770.

(c) The Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) continued to improve the combat effectiveness of many RF/PF units. There were 116 MATs deployed in IV CTZ. An additional 220 personnel were authorized to augment 73 MATs to

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enable these teams to operate in two separate locations, increasing their advisory capability.

(d) The RF/PF units were properly deployed. These units conducted sector and subsector operations on a daily basis.

(e) By utilizing a system of temporarily assigning RF/PF companies and platoons to potential trouble areas, many possible enemy moves were thwarted.

(f) Although many indirect fire attacks occurred, the defense of political and economic centers continually improved. Security plans remained the same except for the Soc Trang Airfield. A completely new plan including free fire zones and reaction forces was implemented there.

(g) Traffic on major waterways and highways was free and a number of secondary roads were reopened for the first time in years.

## c. New Strategy, Tactics or Techniques:

(1) VC 107mm Rocket Employment: A significant augmentation of the enemy's indirect fire capability in Chau Doc Province occurred with the introduction of the 107mm rocket. While the enemy's use of the 107mm rocket in IV CTZ was confirmed on at least one previous occasion (the rocket attack against an outpost of the Cai Cai Special Forces Camp on 24 April), the month of May marked its first significant use. It was employed on six separate occasions in Chau Doc Province and also in Dinh Tuong Province with the primary target being Chi Lang Training Centers. One of these attacks resulted in friendly casualties of fifteen killed and 78 wounded. The expanded use of this rocket by the VC in IV Corps will probably continue through the coming months, as the enemy's expertise in using this weapon develops, and as ammunition is stockpiled. The 122mm rocket was also fired on the border on 26 April, but was not used elsewhere.

(2) IV Corps Interrogation Center (CIC): The center became operational on 28 April. The CIC interrogated selected Hoi Chanh, PW and suspects to obtain tactical and strategic information. It has the capability to conduct eight interrogations simultaneously and to house 26 personnel undergoing interrogation. In addition, it can send interrogators to the field to assist subordinate elements in interrogation of detainees. During the short period of time the center has been in existence, it has provided not only timely exploitation of human sources but also has contributed to more systematic control over important sources. With further development of operational procedures, the CIC will provide one of the best intelligence collection agencies in the IV CTZ.

(3) Advisory Effort: The weekly staff visit was expanded to permit advisors to visit four units each week, compared to the previous visits

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to only two units per week, increasing the advisor's ability to get a first-hand view of problem areas.

(4) Mobile Riverine Operations: The 2d Brigade of the US 9th Infantry Division conducted numerous Mobile Riverine Operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. The flexibility of a Mobile Riverine Force proved effective in moving large numbers of combat troops and combat power into areas of operations. The effectiveness of Mobile Riverine for transport operations was enhanced immeasurably when combined with helicopter and air cav operations.

d. Major Problem Areas:

(1) Desertions:

(a) Desertions in IV CTZ totaled 8,684 compared to 7,387 during the previous quarter. The maximum acceptable number of desertions for IV CTZ per quarter was reduced from 6,990 to 4,185. The increase in desertions was attributed to the fact that 12,376 personnel recruited to fill new RF companies activated in the last quarter completed training. It is an established fact that personnel are most prone to desert during the three-month period following completion of basic training. However, it is noteworthy that during June 68 total IV Corps desertions were 2,863 and that there were fewer (2,689) during June 69 in spite of an increase in assigned strength of 37,483 during that period.

(b) Desertions for the three divisions in IV CTZ totaled 3,049 for this quarter, compared to 3,286 for the previous quarter. This represents a decrease of 237, or 7.2%. During this period the 7th Division had 853 desertions, the 9th Division had 980 desertions, and the 21st Division had 1,216 desertions. The quarterly maximum acceptable rate is now 450 for each division.

(c) Desertions within the five Ranger battalions increased from 440 during the previous quarter to 467 during this quarter, which represents an increase of 6%. The maximum acceptable desertion rate for the combined Ranger battalions remained at 240 for the quarter.

(d) The desertion rate for IV CTZ RF companies increased 42 percent from 2,206 last quarter to 3,136 this quarter. PF desertion rates increased 36 percent from 1,480 last quarter to 2,032 this quarter. The maximum acceptable rate was reduced from 3,192 to 1,596 quarterly for the combined RF companies and from 1,998 to 999 for the combined PF platoons.

(e) A survey was undertaken in this quarter by Division and Province Senior Advisors in an attempt to isolate problem areas which contribute to desertions. This survey continues and is intended to encompass tactical problems, if appropriate, to supplement the survey of administrative and logistical problems conducted during the last two quarters.

(2) RF NCO: The most critical RF/PF personnel problem in IV CTZ was a shortage of 3,174 RF NCO.

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(3) RF/PF Equipment: Though the status of RF/PF equipment improved during the quarter, critical equipment shortages existed in one-ton cargo trucks, M-79 grenade launchers and M-60 machine gun ammunition.

(4) The inability of RF units to conduct fire and maneuver and night operations, and to occupy and use night defensive positions remained as major deficiencies requiring extensive training.

e. Overall Assessment:

(1) Initiative in the IV CTZ remained with GVN forces during the quarter. The QUYET THANG Campaign which commenced on 1 January 1969 is continuing at a rapid tempo. The objectives of the campaign are the interdiction of VC infiltration routes, penetration of base areas and pursuit of VC in operational areas. Neutralization of VC infrastructure increased by almost 1000 over that achieved during last quarter.

(2) Friendly operations throughout the quarter lessened to some extent enemy control of vital population and material assets in the rural areas and in some cases forced VC units away from population centers. Operations in Dinh Tuong Province undoubtedly restricted the execution of VC offensive plans in the My Tho/Dong Tam area.

(3) Continued emphasis on the security of urban political and economic centers resulted in an improved defensive posture. Successful interdiction of VC supply and personnel infiltration routes, plus renewed emphasis on conducting operations in base areas and pursuing the VC into the countryside, forced VC units to break into platoon and even squad size elements. This tactic plus high combat losses impaired the ability of the VC to mass troops and launch ground assaults in such areas. This was true for all inland political and economic centers, but the enemy still maintained the capability to launch assaults on towns in the proximity of the Cambodian border at the end of the quarter. Indirect fire attacks conducted against district and province towns continued to be the VC's means of disrupting life in these areas. The QUYET THANG Campaign plus the beginning of a new pacification program should continue to produce significant results in the security of military installations and key economic and political centers.

(4) The combat effectiveness of the Regional and Popular Forces at the end of the quarter was considered satisfactory. During this quarter, emphasis was placed on the overall upgrading of RF/PF units, in-place training, night ambushes and improvement of unit leadership. The major problems encountered were a general lack of participation in civic action, and a shortage of RF NCOs.

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## SECTION IV

### NAVAL OPERATIONS

#### 1. (C) US NAVY/US COAST GUARD:

a. Objectives: The primary objectives of US Naval Forces in Vietnam are to:

(1) Organize, equip, modernize and employ VNN and NAVFORV to achieve a maximum state of combat effectiveness.

(2) Inflict more losses on the enemy than can be replaced.

(3) Increase the number of VNN ships participating in MARKET TIME Operations.

(4) Confuse and disperse enemy troops.

(5) Increase the effectiveness of the MARKET TIME shallow water coverage in heavy weather.

(6) Improve GAME WARDEN coverage of known or suspected enemy commo-liaison lines through the main rivers in the Delta.

(7) Keep the main waterways to Saigon open.

(8) Restore and secure to the greatest extent possible the waterway and land lines of communications.

#### b. Progress Toward Objectives:

(1) The following table summarizes Naval operations in 2d Qtr CY69.

TABLE 31

#### FRIENDLY/ENEMY LOSSES RESULTING FROM NAVAL OPERATIONS

	<u>FWMAF/USN</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
MARKET TIME		2	59		95	24
GAME WARDEN		37	146		469	118
Mobile Riverine Force		42	799		2700	37
GIANT SLINGSHOT		40	330		734	114
BARRIER REEF		12	63		130	34
SEARCHTURN		7	11		3	0

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TABLE 31 (continued)

	<u>FWMAF/USN</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
TRAN HUNG DAO		8	37		32	8
M/T RAIDER		<u>11</u>	<u>97</u>		<u>86</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL		159	1542		4249	351

The high enemy/friendly KIA ratio of 26.7:1 is indicative of large scale losses suffered by the enemy.

(2) Numerous documents captured and interviews with PWs have centralized the theme of naval forces disrupting normal commo-liaison and infiltration routes at the expense of establishing new routes, upsetting the schedule of troop and arms replacement in coordination with enemy highpoints, and denying the enemy large scale use of major waterways in all of Vietnam.

(3) On 1 June, MARKET TIME areas 8 and 9 and the Coastal Surveillance Center at An Thoi were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. The addition of 2 WPBs and 4 PCFs to VNN assets from the USN inventory significantly increased Vietnamese MARKET TIME participation.

(4) During the quarter, MARKET TIME units have concentrated on on-board and search activities on water traffic close to the shoreline in periods of rough weather. Intelligence has proven that the enemy feels he is safe from detection as patrol units will not close the beach to prosecute due to heavy weather and inconvenience of the effort. Wolf-pack tactics utilizing two or three PCFs to board large sampan concentrations have paid dividends resulting in a substantial number of detainees. These efforts have been pursued to the safety limits of the craft and their crews.

(5) Intelligence systems in coordination with all forces in the area of operation (AO) have provided for near real time response to all major and most minor enemy movements. This has been accomplished by the concentration of forces on known enemy supply routes and the utilization of previous experience to position forces in optimum areas. Increased exploitation of off-river targets has been realized with the arrival of OV-10 Bronco aircraft. GAME WARDEN AOs have been expanded to include the upper Saigon River between the cities of Phu Cuong and Tri Tam. To support this added commitment, a new Advanced Tactical Support Base is under construction at Phu Cuong. US Naval forces operating in this AO were originally under the operational command VNN and operated in close coordination with VNN River Assault Group 24, the US 1st Inf Div, and the 5th ARVN Div.

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(6) National Maritime Police are assuming increased responsibility in the GAME WARDEN areas, as they continue to accompany PBR patrols and assist in population and resource control. They have assumed a noticeable share of the patrol responsibility in the upper Bassac River due to the heavy PBR commitment on the Vinh Te Canal interdiction effort. Additionally, National Maritime Police have expressed willingness to assume both day and night patrol duties in certain areas, and this consideration is under study. NAVFORV is now coordinating with US advisors to the National Police, finalizing details for the transfer of responsibility of harbor patrols in the port of Can Tho.

(7) Of the three major waterways providing access to Saigon, the enemy has concentrated his attempts on the Long Tau shipping channel, increasing his efforts during the first three weeks of June. All attempts, which were primarily ship harassments by rocket fire, have been unsuccessful in blocking the waterway. Shipping harassment totals for April, May and June were five, nine and seventeen respectively. Shortly after the last attempt on 21 June, Operation CHUONG DUONG 29-69 commenced. The operation was quite successful as evidenced by the absence of attacks and the death of 50 VC.

(8) All major waterways and coastal port areas have remained open for commercial and military traffic. Navy presence has been effective in thwarting serious attempts by the enemy to interdict the waterborne lines of communication. The canal systems between the Rach Soi and Long Xuyen Canals, originally opened as a result of Operation SEARCHTURN, have remained open and the area is presently being resettled. Sections of highway and bridges adjacent to Navy operating areas have benefited and have remained open in large part due to the presence of units afloat. Particular examples are the bridges at Go Dau Ha, Ben Luc, and Tan An which have not been struck by the enemy during the quarter.

(9) During this quarter there has been only one attempt (unsuccessful) against shipping in coastal harbors within naval areas of responsibility. During the reporting period, vessels spent approximately 4500 ship days in Navy protected harbors. Further, only one mining attempt went unthwarted in the 2d Qtr CY69 on inland waterways. This poor record on the part of the enemy can be attributed to the proper conduct of combat patrols and to poor preparation and clumsy execution by the enemy.

(10) SEALS and Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN), the Vietnamese counterpart to the underwater demolition team, commenced operations with advisors in the Moc Hoa area on 15 April, the Ben Luc area in mid-May, the Rung Sat Special Zone during the mid-June, and in the vicinity of SEAFLOAT on the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula in late June. These operations have significantly contributed to the collection of pertinent intelligence concerning enemy order of battle, enemy staging and base areas and enemy personnel strengths, especially in critical areas of allied operations.

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(11) The joint USN/VNN intelligence venture in operation SEAFLOAT, to which the VNN has assigned seven intelligence personnel, is the most significant improvement of USN/VNN utilization of collection assets.

(12) The Accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV) has proven to be a useful program in equipping and creation of logistical systems for VNN as witnessed by the turnover of 64 TF 117 craft to the VNN on 25 June.

(13) With the establishment of RAIDS 72, 73, 74, and 75, supply support will of necessity become more extensive as these units will also be deployed to advanced areas. It is expected that the new Naval Support Activity Detachment (NSAD) Ben Luc, a combined USN/VNN support activity detachment, will commence operations early in July. The Vietnamese Navy is also providing substantial logistic support to the joint floating PSYOP base in the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula, SEAFLOAT.

(a) US Naval forces received 117 Hoi Chanhs during the quarter, while the joint Army/Navy team of the 9th US Inf Div CTF brought in 640 ralliers. MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS conducted throughout the republic treated over 75,000 people.

(b) During June Naval Forces commenced their first operation in Vietnam with a strictly psychological objective. Operations SEAFLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III began in the area of Old Nam Can City with the purpose of pacifying the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula by establishing a GVN presence and stressing that the GVN is there to help the people. The Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base (MATSB), anchored in the Song Cua Lon, is equipped to support several PCFs to care for and indoctrinate up to 69 personnel. A Vietnamese Navy hospital ship with a POLWAR indoctrination and entertainment team aboard is assisting in the operations.

(c) Many interrogation reports of Hoi Chanh and PWs revealed that almost all of them have been exposed to Allied PSYOPs. Their reaction to leaflets and loudspeaker operations has been as varied as their backgrounds and personalities, but the continuing high Chieu Hoi rate indicates that PSYOPs are hurting the enemy. Concerted enemy effort to counter the "hearts and minds program" is in part indicative of its effect.

### c. Summary of Operations:

(1) General: Naval operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam have continued to expand in scope without significant degradation in any existing commitments. MARKET TIME Fast Patrol Craft (PCF) have been employed in operations SILVER MACE II, SEA FLOAT and SEA TIGER without any degradation of coastal surveillance. In fact, detections and inspections increased over the previous quarter, partially attributable to better weather. Similarly, operations were begun on the Rach Cai Cai, upper Vam Co Dong and the upper Saigon River without noticeable effect on the

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remaining river patrol areas. Naval operations were additionally highlighted by an aggressive Accelerated Turnover (ACTOV) Program, an effort to provide the VNN with the means to assume a greater share of the war effort.

### (2) Task Force 115 (MARKET TIME):

(a) No known infiltration attempts from the sea have occurred during this quarter. In light of the increased number of detections and an inspection rate in excess of 70 percent, it is highly improbable that any large scale infiltration exists.

(b) Intelligence sources have reported the threat of infiltration attempts this quarter in the Dong Bo area south of Nha Trang and in the Cape Batangan area. MARKET TIME units have been positioned and ready for such an attempt but none has materialized. VC/NVA coastal and river shipments continue but not on a significant scale within the MARKET TIME AO.

(c) During the quarter Task Force 115 units detected 207,763 wooden hull contacts and 3,021 steel hull surface contacts. Of these detections, 153,796 (74 percent) wooden hulls and 2,161 (72 percent) steel hull were actually inspected, boarded or searched.

(d) The inshore patrol, which consists of 54 stations, has had fifteen stations assumed by the Vietnamese Navy. All of the 8 area inshore patrol stations were turned over to the VNN along with the Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) at An Thoi on 1 Jun 69.

(e) The following significant operations were participated in or conducted by MARKET TIME forces this quarter:

Operation SILVER MACE II - SILVER MACE II conducted in the Lower Ca Mau Peninsula from 30 Mar to 20 Apr 69 was scheduled as a precursor to Operation SEA WAVE and consisted of a land sweep by the 1st, 4th and 6th VMC Battalions. MARKET TIME forces provided security escort, troop transport and naval gun fire support (NGFS) for the troops ashore, while concurrently conducting SEA LORD operations in the area.

Operation SEA TIGER - This operation commenced on 25 April; the MARKET TIME patrol of the Hoi An/Cua Dai river complex, which had commenced in Feb 69, had progressed to the point where the primary mission was changed to include interdiction of the VC/NVA in the area and opening the river complex to legitimate civilian traffic.

Operation VU NINH/DARING REBEL - On 5 May the combined forces of the Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, ARVN, ROKA, RF/PF, RAG and Americal Division commenced an assault on Barrier Island, a known VC/NVA stronghold south of the Cua Dai River. MARKET TIME units continued Operation SEA TIGER on the Cua Dai River, while other units provided anti-infiltration/exfiltration barriers in the area and NGFS for the troops ashore.

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Operation SNAG TOOTH - Between 21 May and 30 June units of COSDIV 14, IUNG DET Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang, and Coastal Group 25 conducted an interdiction patrol of the Dam Nha Phu between the Hon Heo Peninsula and the mainland to prevent transportation of supplies by vessel to the VC on the Hon Heo Peninsula.

Operation SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III - Previous SEA LORDS operations in the lower Ca Mau Peninsula had exerted pressure on the enemy, making possible the establishment of a GVN presence in the old Nam Can vicinity a positive and comprehensive PSYOP effort. On 27 June a Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base (MATSB) was positioned in the Son Cua Lon to support the operation. No enemy opposition to the MATSB complex has been encountered, though the period of possible activity was only three days in this quarter. A positive PSYOP program announcing the presence and mission commenced on 27 June and some positive response has been shown by the indigenous personnel in the area. Correspondingly the rules of engagement for naval forces have been modified for this area: evasion by personnel or watercraft does not in itself constitute sufficient reason to take evadees under fire.

Operation BOLD PURSUIT - An amphibious operation against the VC/NVA on Barrier Island began on 27 June in reaction to intelligence that the VC/NVA were infiltrating back to the island. MARKET TIME PCFs and WPBs provided transportation and security patrols for the beach survey units, conducted anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrols in the South China Sea and adjacent river systems, and provided NGFS to forces ashore.

## (3) Task Force 116 (GAME WARDEN):

(a) During the quarter, the River Patrol Force has successfully carried out its mission on the waterways of the Delta by successfully interdicting the enemy's commo-liaison routes from Cambodia into South Vietnam, as evidenced by the large number of VC river/canal crossings detected and stopped by units on patrol and in waterborne ambush positions. Units destroyed or damaged 383 sampans/junks and inflicted 340 known personnel casualties (body count, wounded and captured). This has been accomplished through concentration on known enemy supply routes, use of intelligence and through previous experience in positioning forces in optimum areas. The forces have been employed mainly in the canals and rivers bordering Cambodia, the Rung Sat Special Zone, and the Mekong, Rassac, Ham Luong, Co Chien, and My Tho rivers. Helicopter gunships and fixed wing aircraft, in addition to supporting the waterborne units, have been used to patrol large areas of the Delta not readily accessible to waterborne assets.

(b) On 19 April VAL-4 became operational and provided naval forces in the Delta with a quick reaction force of fixed wing aircraft. The detachments fly the OV-10A Bronco which has the range and endurance for long patrols and can effectively cover the Delta area.

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(c) On 10 June the ten PBRs from TF 116 began operations on the upper Saigon River between Phu Cuong and Tri Tam. This new AO was envisioned to perform the same Army/USN/VNN coordinated effort as is taking place in Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. At the outset of the patrol, the USN units were under the operational control of the VNN River Assault Group assigned to the area, RAG 24. This is the first time that USN units have been operationally responsible to a VNN commander in the field.

(d) With seventeen shipping harassments in the first three weeks of June, Operation CHUONG DUONG 29-69, a joint operation involving US patrol craft and SEALs, Vietnamese, Thai and Australian ground units, was conducted in the northern Rung Sat Special Zone. Results were fifty killed and four base camps destroyed. Future operations of this nature are planned to maintain momentum established by this operation.

### (4) Task Force 117 (Mobile Riverine Force):

Operations this quarter have been intensive, aggressive and fruitful. Over 2,700 of the enemy have been killed and vast quantities of weapons, materiel and documents captured or destroyed as a result of joint operations with the US 9th Inf Div. This figure represents roughly twenty percent of the enemy killed throughout IV Corps while the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) employed only six percent of the combat battalions therein. This impressive record is attributable to the commendable spirit of cooperation which exists between the troopers and bluejackets, both US and Vietnamese. In June, three River Assault Divisions (RAD) were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy - RAD 92 on 10 Jun, RAD 111 on 15 Jun and RAD 112 on 21 Jun. After turnover, one USN division remained with GIANT SLINGSHOT/BARRIER REEF, while three USN divisions supported 2d Bde of the 9th Inf Div. The force suffered 42 friendly KIA, resulting in a KIA ratio of 64.4/1. There were also 492 USA, 195 USN, and 112 Vietnamese WIA. Additionally, three river assault craft received major damage and 41 others were damaged to a lesser degree.

### (5) Task Force 194 (SEA LORDS)

(a) MARKET TIME support of Operation SEA LORDS intensified during this quarter, with 169 SEA LORDS missions conducted, an increase of 36 missions over last quarter. Assignment of a OH-6A made force reaction possible before enemy ambushes could be set up. Enemy support bases and infiltration routes previously hidden by triple canopy jungle were located and their positions fixed. Operation SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO was based on the assumption that the SEA LORDS PCF raider concept of operation had accomplished as much as possible towards pacification in the area without the use of dedicated ground troops.

(b) In the Long Toan, Thanh Phu and Binh Dai Secret Zones, SEA LORDS Operations have continued to limit severely the usefulness of these

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once well-established VC base areas. The constant presence of the PCFs has hindered the enemy's mobility and logistic support. Partially as a result of aggressive PCF PSYOP operations, the Chieu Hoi rate has more than doubled over last year in Hoa Tu, Thuan Hoa and Thanh Tri districts.

(c) Border infiltration interdiction along the Cambodian Border continues to be an essential and productive function of Operation SEA LORDS. The continuous chain of barriers, the backbone of this effort, stretches from north of Tay Ninh city, west to Ha Tien, on the Gulf of Thailand and is comprised of GIANT SLINGSHOT, BARRIER REEF and TRAN HUNG SAO. It has effectively cut enemy LOCs from Cambodia to the heart of III and IV Corps.

(d) River patrols continue to find arms and ammunition caches along the waterways in GIANT SLINGSHOT. These caches and frequent VC ambushes along the rivers are strong indications of the importance of this area as a VC LOC.

(e) Near the Cambodian border in Northern IV Corps a need for a more fully coordinated effort of all US/RVNAF forces has become apparent. Consequently, in early May, Border Control Centers were established in Moc Hoa and Chi Lang, each manned by 3 USN officers. Their mission is to function as a liaison and coordination center of all requests for artillery, troop support, air support, AO clearance, and other matters of mutual concern. To perform this mission the centers have secure communications with the naval operations centers and facilities to monitor communications with field forces.

(f) SEAL Operations. The SEALs constitute the primary USN special warfare asset in RVN. The SEAL platoons have continued to perform their missions of intelligence collection and reconnaissance, as well as interdicting VC LOCs with commendable success.

(g) Navy DUFFEL BAG Operations continued to expand by complementing and supplementing naval interdiction missions along the Cambodian border and inland waterways of the SEA LORDS barrier operations. At Tra Cu, a special sensor project was monitored commencing in early June. This project, coded JOHN SILVER, entailed planting forty sensors between the Vam Co Dong River and the Cambodian border along suspected enemy logistics infiltration trails and streams. JOHN SILVER, still in progress, will end after eight weeks of operations. Results will be analyzed to determine the effect sensors have in forcing changes in the enemy LOCs and infiltration routes.

### d. New Equipment, Tactics and Techniques:

(1) The most effective weapons systems to be added to the NAVFORV arsenal during the quarter are the 14 OV-10A, Bronco aircraft. These

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versatile aircraft are capable of 280 knots maximum speed and 100 knots in operational slow flight. They can carry a mixed ordnance load of 3,600 pounds and are armed with four M60, 7.62 machine guns and two 5 inch Zuni rockets on each wing. These aircraft have already proven themselves to be invaluable overhead cover platforms and fast reaction forces.

(2) Evaluation of the prototype Quiet Fast Boat (QFB) was completed in April 1969. With minor modifications the QFB is considered an excellent craft with which to conduct night clandestine, reconnaissance, ambush and intelligence gathering missions. A recommendation has been submitted to procure one QFB for each River Division along with a supporting spare parts package.

(3) Evaluation of the Mark 4, 60mm naval mortar was completed in May 69. The weapon is a very effective addition to the PBR armament and gives the River Patrol Force a stand-off capability for a variety of gun-fire missions. Specific advantages of the weapon are: (a) easy maintenance, (b) can be aimed, (c) can be hand or drop fired, (d) has its own recoil system, and (e) has the flexibility of four firing increments.

(4) Evaluation of the Strike Assault Boat Squadron (STABS) concept of a highly mobile interdiction force was conducted during April and May. The concept proved feasible, but tests were limited by the unreliable boats used: landing SEAL support craft (LSSC). Evaluation of the LSSC in these months was unfavorable due to lubrication problems with the Ford engine and clogging problems with the 12-inch Jacuzzi waterjet pump. The pump difficulty was compounded by inability to clear from inside the boat. Tests substituting Mercruiser engines and outdrives are in progress.

(5) TF 117 employs two ATCs modified to carry equipment which provides high-velocity streams of water from directional nozzles. These boats are used to destroy bunkers on the water's edge using the hydraulic mining principle, to destroy booby traps and to uncover enemy weapons caches.

(6) On river operations PCFs operating with troops aboard have been split into two equal groups with an interval of 300 to 700 yards. The length of the interval depends upon the course of the river, terrain features and whether it is a night or day mission. At night the interval may be reduced to 300 yards to insure that groups can usefully support each other. When ambushed the first PCF group will go through the enemy fire and beach boats to land troops above the ambush, the second group of boats will not run the ambush but will beach and disembark troops below the ambush position. Troops can then move on the enemy while PCFs provide mortar support. Also SEAWOLVES can be utilized to cut off the enemy's retreat by deploying astern of the ambush position.

(7) PCFs on river operations without troops embarked can use the same split-group tactic with variations. The group running the ambush can go through and beach above the decoy position, but on the opposite bank.

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The second PCF group can do likewise below the ambush. Both groups can then mortar the enemy position at will without worry of hitting their own boats.

(8) When aircraft are providing air cover for swift boat river operations, the enemy uses the tactic of delaying fire at the aircraft until it has passed overhead, thus making detection of the fire and reaction by the aircraft more difficult. To counter this tactic, the OTC of the swifts can take positive control of the aircraft. When fire directed at the aircraft is detected, the controller immediately puts the aircraft into a hard-banked turn thus allowing the aircraft to see the firing position and unmask the aircraft weapons. Another tactic developed to aid aircraft to find enemy gun positions is to direct swift .50 cal tracer fire at a known enemy gun position. The aircraft then searches along the .50 cal GTL, and can be further aided by the swift telling the aircraft the clock position, thus providing two intersecting lines to pinpoint the position.

### e. Major Problem Areas:

(1) There were no insurmountable difficulties encountered during the quarter. However, certain problem areas are worthy of note. One problem is posed by the low, flat terrain of the Ca Mau Peninsula coupled with the large range of tides found throughout the coastal regions of Vietnam. These factors force nearly all operations to conform to a tidal timetable, thus limiting the friendly forces ability to surprise the enemy and giving him regular breathing spells when he knows he is safe from attack by water.

(2) Watermines and swimmer attacks continue to be an ever-present threat to the MRB and its river assault craft. On 24 April a 225-pound command detonated mine was discovered attached to APL-26. Fortunately, a base defense sweep boat had severed the detonating wire. That swimmers had planted the mine undetected despite the presence of sentries and patrol boats illustrates the magnitude of the threat.

(3) Prepositioned command detonated mines will be a threat as boats and craft ply the inland waterways. Efforts have been made to provide river assault craft with more effective mechanical sweep gear to augment the minesweeping craft assigned.

(4) The intensive pace of operations required of the ships and boats of naval forces places a constant strain on repair and maintenance facilities and personnel. This is particularly true of the Mobile Riverine Force where assets have been spread thin by existing commitments and the turnover of RAC to the Vietnamese Navy. With the redeployment of elements of the 9th Div, these resources will be somewhat less strained until the remaining 93 craft are eventually turned over.

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(5) The threat of individuals drowning after falling overboard remains very real. Several items are being tried to overcome this risk, one of which is a small, light inflatable packet which can be attached to outer garments. Low-cut, Navy-issue gym shoes for boat crews were also tried to determine if they would lessen the possibility of slipping on a wet deck. They were found to be slightly more comfortable and considerably lighter than the standard combat boot, but have no better traction. Plans are to test the commercial yachting type shoe.

### f. Overall Assessment:

(1) All of the objectives of the Combined Campaign Plan have been addressed and positive results obtained toward each. This is particularly true in the area of increased utilization/modernization of the Vietnamese Navy and the delegation of responsibilities thereto. The Accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV) has proven far more successful than envisioned. VNN River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID) and Coastal Groups have been assigned TAORs and MARKET TIME patrol areas. On one occasion USN units were assigned OPCON to a Vietnamese unit.

(2) Naval units have accounted for 787 confirmed enemy killed or captured, while joint operations with VNN/ARVN/USA accounted for 3,753 more enemy losses. USN losses during the quarter were 34 killed, yielding a USN kill ratio of 23.2:1. Other losses inflicted upon the enemy are listed in para 1-f-(9).

(3) TF 115 has continued to carry out its primary mission of coastal surveillance effectively throughout the quarter. MARKET TIME forces have successfully countered infiltration from the sea and deterred coastal and river transshipment of personnel and logistical supplies in all areas of TF 115 coastal control. The effectiveness of MARKET TIME's offshore reaction force is evaluated as excellent for this quarter.

(4) Losses inflicted upon the enemy by GAME WARDEN forces increased slightly during the quarter while friendly losses were only forty percent of the 1st Qtr figure. These facts have had both a military and psychological value in convincing the enemy and the people that the GVN and the River Patrol Force are present to protect the people and deny the Delta to the enemy.

(5) The Mobile Riverine Force had one of its most successful quarters to date. Enemy kills and captures were up twenty percent, whereas friendly KIA and WIA figures were fifty-four percent and sixty-one percent respectively in comparison to 1st Qtr CY69 results. Enemy capabilities have been substantially reduced in Kien Hoa Province, hopefully to a level which can be contained by ARVN after the redeployment of the MRF.

(6) SEA LORDS operations conducted during the quarter have successfully demonstrated the increasing power of the GVN and FVMAF to deny freedom of movement to the VC and sever the LOCs. In GIANT SLINGSHOT, TRAN HUNG DAO, BARRIER REEF WEST and incursion operations, the pressure

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has been kept on the enemy and has forced him to adopt a defensive posture and continue to evade large scale engagements. SEA LORDS operations have resulted in improved coordination and cooperation among USN and GVN forces in III and IV Corps.

(7) With the establishment of Operation SEAFLOAT, the Navy and the GVN have established a presence in the lower Ca Mau Peninsula. This pacification and concentrated PSYOP effort was just beginning at the close of the quarter.

(8) COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon was able to meet all commitments and provide all the essential support to which tasked. Lack of personnel in critical rates resulted in heavy workloads on remaining personnel. Some relief has been provided in varying degrees as a result of ACTOV turnover.

(9) Table 32 is a statistical summary of naval operations for the reporting period. While these statistics are an indication of effectiveness in the interdiction effort, the true measure of effectiveness remains the enemy's inability to support himself logistically in order to launch an effective offensive campaign.

TABLE 32

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

	<u>MARKET TIME</u>	<u>GAME WARDEN</u>	<u>MRF</u>	<u>SEA LORDS</u>
Firefights	225*	270	97	560
VC KIA/CIA	95/24	469/118	2635/37	990/172
Sampans/Structures/ Bunkers/Destroyed/ Captured	1225	1589	505	4311
Sampans etc. Damaged	819	763	10	1359
Friendly KIA/WIA	2/59	34/176	42/503	78/538
Boat Casualties	14	24	43	111
Ammo. Caches	2	16	15	39

\* Figure includes firefights and coastal engagements.

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### 2. (C) VIETNAMESE NAVY:

a. Objectives: The VNN objectives are those same objectives pursued by USN (See para 1-a above) and most are pursued as joint USN/VNN ventures. Considerable emphasis is naturally placed on the organizing, equipping and modernizing aspects of VNN objectives.

#### b. Progress Toward Objectives:

(1) During the quarter a proposal for an improved organization of the VNN was submitted to JGS for approval. The last 4 Military Assistance Service Funded PCFs (Patrol Craft Fast) were received, and the first 2 WPBs (82-FT Patrol Boats) were turned over to the VNN. On 25 June, 64 river assault craft were turned over, forming 4 new river assault and interdiction divisions (RAIDS). RAIDS 70 and 71 assumed their own tactical areas of responsibility on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers during the quarter.

(2) VNN forces were responsible for 124 enemy KIA and 79 captured during the quarter. These figures do not include results from operations supported by the VNN.

(3) In April, 4 river assault groups (RAGS), 2 LSMs, an LSSL and an LSIL participated in Operations SILVER MACE II, a penetration into the Nam Can area. In May, RAG 32 and Coastal Group 14, in concert with US and ARVN forces, conducted a sweep of the area south of Hoi An, successfully dispersing enemy forces on Barrier Island. Mobile strike force units were deployed to the Rung Sat Special Zone, where they uncovered and destroyed several enemy base camps and caches.

(4) On 1 June MARKET TIME Areas 8 and 9 and the Coastal Surveillance Center at An Thoi were turned over to the VNN. The addition of two WPBs and four PCFs to the inventory significantly increased MARKET TIME participation.

(5) RAG 27 averaged 29 missions per month as a fast reaction force in the Rung Sat Special Zone. This concept resulted in rapid troop insertion after contact was gained by waterborne forces.

(6) VNN PBRs averaged 250 patrols per month, providing security for water traffic, while RAG 91 averaged 150 minesweeping missions per month on the Long Tau shipping channel. There were no successful minings of shipping, again attesting to RAG 91's continued effectiveness.

(7) Operations on the Qua Dai River by RAG 32 and Coastal Group 14, along with USN PCFs, returned the river and adjacent waterways to GVN control. Operation TRAN HUNG DAO III, which commenced in late June, has a similar objective in the Nam Can area.

(8) The LDNN (UDT) teams continued nightly underwater inspections of ships in Saigon Harbor. VNNASPBs, operating on riverine interdiction missions, were 100 percent equipped with chain drag equipment.

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(9) During the quarter 79 Hoi Chanh were received by VNN units. Coastal Group 14 received 56 enemy ralliers during the operations on Barrier Island. Additionally, VNN units averaged 105 PSYWAR missions per month.

(10) An average of 900 enlistees were recruited each month, and the VNN supported its rapid expansion entirely with recruits. During the quarter, personnel strength averaged 97 percent of programmed levels, based on a straight line increase from 21,040 on 1 Jan 69 to 28,700 on 31 Dec 69.

### c. Summary of Operations:

(1) General Summary: Routine coastal patrols accounted for 180,711 junks searched, five enemy vessels destroyed, and ten VC KIA. Routine riverine operations netted 17,913 junks searched, 34 enemy vessels destroyed, and twenty VC KIA. LDNN (SEAL) operations resulted in 26 enemy dead. Forces on the Vinh Te Canal (Operation TRAN HUNG DAO I) killed 21 enemy, while units on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers (Operation TRAN HUNG DAO II) conducted over 270 combat troop lifts, searched 3,099 junks, destroyed eight enemy vessels, and killed seven VC.

### (2) Significant Operations:

(a) 070800H April - 161800H April SILVER MACE II operating in the Ca Mau Peninsula, RAG's 21/33 and 25/29, LSM 403, LSM 404, LSSL 226, and LSSL 331 supported VNNC and US troops ashore, destroying nine bunkers and structures, and obtaining three secondary explosions and one secondary POL-fed fire with accurate NGFS.

(b) 050600H May - continuing VU NINH III  
310900H May - continuing VU NINH V  
020800H Jun - continuing PHI PHUNG 20/69

In these three operations, RAG 32 and Coastal Group 14, operating in the vicinity of Hoi An, killed forty enemy, destroyed 31 enemy vessels, received 56 Hoi Chans and evacuated nearly 4,000 refugees. US and ARVN ground units, as well as US PCFs, are also participating in the operations.

### (c) 27 Jun - continuing TRAN HUNG DAO III

VNN units, including 2 LSMs, and LSM(H) with embarked POLWAR teams, and an LSIL, operating in the Nam Can area with USN forces, are establishing GVN presence and conducting an intensive PSYOP campaign.

### d. New Equipment, Tactics and Techniques:

(1) RAID units have effectively employed nighttime "drifting ambushes" in which the boats secure their engines and drift silently down river with the current, surveying the banks through night observation devices (NODs). This tactic has also been used in conjunction with four-man Army sniper teams, utilizing .50-caliber sniper weapons and NODs aboard a flat-top armored troop carrier.

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(2) Coastal Group 14 discovered that after an enemy-initiated fire-fight, the VC would remain in bunkered positions and use extensive booby traps to inflict losses on the VNN reaction team. The coastal group countered by surrounding the ambush position and attacking the enemy when he disarmed his booby traps and attempted to exit the area.

### e. Major Problem Areas:

(1) Civilian shipyard and repair facility workers continue in short supply, primarily due to low wage scales. In May, the shipyard lost 84 workers, bringing the overall repair activity percentage on-board versus authorized to 58%.

(2) In May, the percentage on-board versus authorized petty officers was 73%, with the percentage on-board in the operating forces at 61%.

(3) A drawdown of experienced personnel to support the ACTOV program has resulted in a loss of skilled repair and maintenance personnel in the river assault groups. Daily preventive maintenance has fallen below standards previously maintained. Overall, the percentage availability of river assault craft has dropped steadily since the beginning of the year.

(4) The An Thoi PCF squadron, which contains 75% of current PCF assets, has been forced to send boats on patrol with material shortages. A lack of adequate spare parts, rotatable components, and consumable items has resulted from the excessive amount of time for requisitions to be filled and material to be transported to the An Thoi area.

### f. Overall Assessment:

(1) Personnel. Although the petty officer shortage remains near critical, overall the VNN is currently at 100 percent of its programmed level and is supporting its expansion entirely with recruits.

(2) Training. With few exceptions, training progresses on schedule. The concept of Boat School and OJT (On-the-Job-Training) was successfully proven by the nearly 120 VNN sailors who have relieved US personnel aboard PCF and PBR craft, as well as the crews for the 64 river assault craft turned over in June.

(3) Maintenance. Although the drawdown of skilled personnel to support ACTOV, and the shortfalls in equipment and logistic support such as at An Thoi, have contributed to a decrease in craft availability, the VNN craft have all exceeded the satisfactory standard for availability as determined by the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Management System (RIMMS).

(4) Employment. All VNN craft have exceeded the satisfactory standard for employment as determined by the RIMMS System.

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## 3. (C) Vietnamese Marine Division:

a. Objectives: As part of the General Reserve of RVN, the Marine Light Division has no assigned operational objectives in the Combined Campaign Plan. The six infantry battalions and two artillery battalions are assigned to the CTZs by the Joint General Staff (JGS) as requested by corps commanders. Assignments are usually based on the enemy threat, the operational requirement, and the availability of non-committed VNM units to meet demands. During the 2d Qtr CY69, five marine infantry battalions were deployed 100 percent of the time, committed to combat operations in III and IV CTZs, and under the OPCON of the ARVN divisions, regiments, provinces or special zones therein. One infantry battalion on a rotating basis remained in base camp as a reserve/reaction force under JGS control.

## b. Significant Operations:

(1) During May the 3d Inf Bn OPCON to the 52d Regiment, 18th ARVN, operating to the west and then north of Xuan Loc, Long Khan Province, in III CTZ, made moderate-to-heavy contact with the enemy in fortified positions. The battalion killed 35 NVA/VC, captured a quantity of individual and crew-served weapons, and uncovered numerous enemy base camps.

(2) On 7 and 8 June, 6th Inf Bn, under the operational control of Tay Ninh Province, made contact with a estimated enemy battalion five kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh City. The enemy suffered 32 killed while the Marines sustained only three killed and 4 seriously wounded.

(3) Again on 19 June the 4th Co (6th Inf Bn), on a combined assault mission, made contact with the NVA south of Tay Ninh City, this time OPCON to 2d VN Airborne Brigade. The battalion killed 32 enemy and captured 18 individual and crew-served weapons while sustaining only one killed and 11 slightly wounded.

(4) Cumulative results for the period were 54 VNM KIA (13 by mines) and 283 wounded (71 by mines). Enemy losses were 181 KIA, 58 captured and 33 surrendered. The enemy lost 47 individual and 22 crew-served weapons.

## c. New Trends, Tactics, and Techniques:

(1) The 6th Inf Bn, VNM, during deployment to the Tay Ninh area, as directed above, conducted three company-size heliborne operations with the 24th US Div (combined combat assaults) with excellent results.

(2) In IV CTZ, the 2d and 4th Inf Bns, under the OPCON of the 21st ARVN Div conducted heliborne operations using VNAF helicopters and crews. This was the first time that air assets were entirely Vietnamese. The operation was conducted with very little assistance from battalion advisors.

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d. Major Problem Areas. An important factor relative to the operational results achieved is that the Marines received their mission and area of operation from the organization to which they were OPCON. During this period, some Marine units were committed into non-productive areas, often with a security mission.

e. Overall Assessment. The operational effectiveness and leadership of the VNMCM continues to improve. The combat results achieved during the quarter decreased from the highly successful results of the previous quarter due to the low enemy density areas assigned.

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## SECTION V

### AIR OPERATIONS

#### 1. (S) US AIR FORCE (7th AF):

a. Objectives and Progress: The objectives of the 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control System remain the optimum application of tactical air power in direct response to ground force requirements in-country and the maintenance and improvement of the interdiction program in the extended battlefield areas. Progress in these areas can be measured best by the effectiveness of the operations cited below.

#### b. Operations and Activities:

##### (1) Fighter/Bomber:

(a) In-country operations under 7th Air Force TACC during the 2d Qtr CY69 showed a rise in total tactical air strikes but a decrease in strikes supporting troops in contact. This increase of more than 3,000 in total sorties (54,615 up from 51,490) compared to a decrease of more than a thousand in strikes supporting troops in contact (5,458 from 6,676) which supports a generally observed downward trend in ground contacts. The weight of effort in strike sorties under the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) was as follows:

<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>RAAF</u>
27,425	15,831	8,165	2,461	733
(50.2%)	(29.0%)	(15.0%)	(4.5%)	(1.3%)

(b) In addition to tactical strike sorties, the ARC LIGHT program flew 4,088 sorties over RVN, expending 99,979 tons of ordnance. This was an increase of 785 sorties over the previous reporting period, averaging 24.46 tons of ordnance dropped per sortie. A significant portion of these B-52 strikes were directed against known and suspected infiltration routes, particularly around the major population areas.

(c) The Ben Het Offensive, an NVA attempt to overrun an exposed CIDG camp near the tri-border area of II CTZ, necessitated an intensive air effort from 7 May through the end of the reporting period. The camp received support from 1,828 tactical air strikes, 107 Shadow (AC-119) and Spooky (AC-47) sorties, 571 forward air controller sorties, and 796 ARC LIGHT sorties. In June alone, B-52's hit 83 targets in the immediate area of the camp with 400 sorties. The ARC LIGHT forces dropped approximately 10,000 tons during June in support of Ben Het.

(d) Several of the operations supported by tactical air during the period were code-named operations, such as IRON MOUNTAIN, GENEVA PARK, QUYET THANG (at Ben Het) SPEEDY EXPRESS and FREDERICK HILL. Thirty-

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five such operations had 13,353 strikes flown in support, with 22,236 tons of ordnance expended, an average of 1.67 tons per sortie.

(e) Among supporting activities during the quarter, USAF, USMC and VNAF Forward Air Controllers flew 17,241 sorties directing strikes.

(f) For the three-month period, close air support and air interdiction missions were reported to have produced the following bomb damage assessment (destroyed only):

<u>ENEMY STRUCTURES</u>	<u>ENEMY VEHICLES</u>	<u>GUNS</u>	<u>CAVES/TUNNELS DESTROYED</u>	<u>STORAGE AREAS DESTROYED</u>
39,540	15	3,721	37,047	14

In addition, 2,455 secondary explosions and 2,729 secondary fires were observed, 1,059 enemy sampans destroyed and 675 roads/trails cut.

(g) A total of 2,002 AC-119 and AC-47 gunship sorties were flown supporting troops in contact, outposts under attack and enemy positions.

## (2) Airlift:

(a) The continued decrease in airlift tonnages reflected the lowered level of activity in the ground war. The July-September 68 tonnage approached 400,000 tons; the October-December decreased to 390,000 tons and the January-March 69 tonnage was down to approximately 360,000 tons. Tonnage carried in the second quarter was 340,934, again down from past quarterly totals. Since cargo generation is indirectly correlated to ground combat activity, the steady decrease is a reflection of the steadily lowered tempo of the war.

(b) The cargo tons delivered per mission reached an all-time high in April 69 (forty tons per C-130 mission). The lower cargo generation was coupled with an increase in short sortie/short field demand and as a result C-123 activities were increased to meet this requirement.

(c) Late in May heavy mortar fire on C-7A aircraft at the Ben Het CIDG Camp caused the resupply there to be shifted from air land to air drop. By 30 June 68, air drop sorties had delivered over 231 tons of supplies and equipment to the camp. Resupply of Kontum required FAC and fighter escort during all low altitude approaches.

(3) Reconnaissance: During the second quarter US/Allied forward air controllers flew 35,058 visual reconnaissance sorties in RVN.

## (4) Special:

(a) UC-123 aircraft of the 12th Special Operations Squadron flew 1,244 sorties, expending 1,199,200 gallons of defoliant. This was sufficient to deny the enemy approximately 400,000 acres of cover.

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(b) During 2d Qtr CY69 units of the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group rescued a total of 256 US military and allied personnel. Of these, 190 were combat rescues and 66 were non-combat. This brought the total number of rescues, since 1 December 64, to 2,682 of which 1,842 were combat rescues and 840 were non-combat.

(c) USAF units (MSQ-77 Radar) and USMC units (TPQ-10 Radar) controlled 10,668 Combat Sky Spot ground radar-directed strikes during night and bad weather conditions.

(d) PSYWAR aircraft flew 5,754 sorties, dropping nearly a billion leaflets (854,906,000) urging VC troops to return to GVN control; they also logged 5,143 broadcast hours.

(e) The Commando Vault operation - instant helipads by using high yield bombs dropped from C-130's - continued with increasing success. As of the end of the period, a total of fifty M-121 (10,000-pound) bombs had been dropped, resulting in 47 usable landing zones. Tests on the CD-1 (15,000-pound) bomb were also conducted, proving highly successful.

## (5) New Developments:

(a) An evaluation of the armed FAC concept was conducted from 4 Apr to 13 Jun 69. Six OV-10A "Bronco" aircraft assigned to support the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (US) in IV CTZ were each armed with four M-60C (7.62mm) machineguns, fourteen 2.75 high explosive rockets and fourteen 2.75 white phosphorous marking rockets. This armed configuration provided the FAC a limited but highly responsive air strike capability to be used in support of friendly troops in contact until tactical air could respond. The FAC was able to expend ordnance on fleeting targets until additional fire support could arrive. A total of 508 armed OV-10A sorties were flown during the evaluation, with 98 occasions developing which required the armed FAC to expend his ordnance. The continuous presence of the armed FAC provided interim firepower until heavier fire support responded. Based on favorable results of the evaluation, the Commander, 7th Air Force, directed that all OV-10 aircraft operating in-country in support of US Army forces be armed.

(b) The first new URC-64 radios were put into service in SEA. These are the first multi-channel survival radios used in the Air Force.

## 2. (S) US Marine Corps (III MAF):

a. Objectives and Progress: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) continued to conduct fixed wing attack, reconnaissance, air defense and aerial counterinsurgency operations against the enemy within I CTZ and other areas on order under the management of Deputy COMUSMACV for Air. The 1st MAW also conducted rotary/fixed wing aerial combat support operations within I CTZ and such other places as directed under operational

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control of CG, III MAF. These operations were conducted on a 24-hour, all-weather basis in support of III MAF, ARVN and other FVMAF.

b. Operations and Activities: The following table provides an overview of 2d Qtr CY69 actions within III MAF purview:

TABLE 33

NUMBER OF TACTICAL SORTIES FLOWN FOR III MAF UNITS &

ASSOCIATED ALLIED ELEMENTS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PREPLANNED SORTIES REQUESTED</u>	<u>PREPLANNED SORTIES ALLOCATED</u>	<u>ACTUAL SORTIES FLOWN</u>
3d Mar Div	9,149	1,411	5,652
101st Abn Div (AM)	7,525	1,298	2,725
HQ XXIV Corps	<u>462</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>379</u>
XXIV Corps TOTAL	17,136	2,735	8,756
1st Mar Div	7,380	1,258	4,976
Americal Div	7,458	1,397	4,248
5th Special Forces	64	28	150
TACC Interdiction	0	0	634
Other (SLF/Project DELTA)	<u>720</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>188</u>
III MAF TOTAL (All Above)	32,758	5,593	18,952
ARVN	2,470	1,142	2,877
2d ROKMC Bde	<u>775</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>470</u>
TOTAL (All Above)	36,003	7,005	22,299

(1) Fighter/Attack Sorties:

TABLE 34

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES FLOWN

In-Country	15,625
Out-of-Country	3,821

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TABLE 34 (cont)

ECM/ELINT	931
7th AF Support	3,315
7th Fleet Support	462

(2) Reconnaissance Efforts and Results:

(a) In-country. 1st MAW OV-10A and O-1C/G aircraft operated in direct support of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and other FVMAF performing basic tasks of visual reconnaissance, hand-held photographic reconnaissance, and Forward Air Control (Airborne) (FAC (A)) missions.

(b) Out-of-country. 1st MAW photo reconnaissance aircraft flew daily photo and IR missions under 7th AF control in North Vietnam, the DMZ and Laos utilizing RF-4B aircraft. Total photo sorties were 529; total IR/SLAR sorties were 111. Additionally, 1st MAW TA-4F aircraft flew visual reconnaissance and TAC (A) missions along road nets in Laos.

(c) All of these missions were directed at pinpointing infiltration routes into northern I CTZ, locating enemy troop concentrations, fortifications and vehicle movement.

(3) Airlift:

(a) Helicopter Airlift. Utilizing the daily available helicopter assets, 157,782 sorties were flown carrying 198,658 passengers and 34,260 tons of cargo.

(b) Fixed Wing Airlift. During this period 1st MAW operated a daily average of four KC-130F, three C-117D, and two C-1A/US-2B aircraft. 65,373 passengers and 75,878 tons of cargo were transported in 3,577 sorties. In addition 1,273 fighter/attack aircraft were air-refueled with 6,921,105 pounds of fuel in 453 sorties; 103.5 tons of supplies were air-delivered in five sorties and 516,799 flares were dropped in 238 sorties.

(4) Special Activities: During the quarter 1st MAW actively entered the field of aerial delivery of sensors utilizing hand delivery techniques from CH-46 helicopters in direct support operations for 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. Five missions were flown emplacing a total of nine strings of sensors.

(5) Aircraft Losses: During the quarter the following aircraft

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losses were reported:

<u>Operational</u>	<u>Direct Enemy Action</u>	<u>Type Aircraft Lost</u>
14	25	seven F-4, one 1A-4E one TA-4F, one KC-130 one OV-10A, one O1G, three UH-1E, two CH-53, 22 CH-46

c. Inventory and Facilities:

(1) During the 1st Qtr CY69 the aircraft inventory of the 1st MAW remained comparatively stable. However, significant changes did occur in the inventory of on-hand operational UH-34 and CH-46 helicopters. With the arrival of HMM-362 from the SLF in early June, the authorized allowance of the UH-34 was increased by 24. During June the allowance of CH-46's was reduced to 105 due to the rotation of HMM-265 to the SLF.

(2) During this quarter major construction efforts were utilized in repairing existing structures damaged by the explosions in ASP-1 at Da Nang AB. Numerous construction projects also have been completed at Chu Lai, Phu Bai and Quang Tri Air Bases.

d. Major Problem Areas: Continuing heavy demands on helicopter assets have necessitated over-utilization. This has resulted in combat losses, insufficient spare parts and shortages of crew members.

e. Overall Assessment: 1st MAW continued to provide tactical fixed wing and helicopter combat air support to fulfill III MAF commitments.

3. (C) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

a. Objective: The objective of the VNAF is to organize, train and equip Air Force units to conduct tactical air operations in support of RVNAF to include air support, interdiction and tactical air reconnaissance operations.

b. Operations and Activities:

(1) Tactical Operations Summary: The following table provides a compendium of 2d Qtr CY69 VNAF activities:

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TABLE 35

## VNAF AIR OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES SUMMARY, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	Flying Hours Vs Programmed		Percent Sorties Operational	In-Commission Rate		A/C Utili- zation (Hrs/Month) 2d Qtr
	1st Qtr	2d Qtr		1st Qtr	2d Qtr	
F-5	91.6%	91.7%	79.1%	74.6%	77.6%	32.1
A-1	94.0%	102.2%	86.7%	81.7%	79.6%	58.9
A-37	75.9%	92.2%	68.1%	63.4%	73.5%	34.4
Fighters	90.1%	97.4%	76.8%	75.6%	77.0%	44.3
Liaison	91.0%	115.8%	66.5%	93.7%	89.3%	88.2
Hel	101.6%	104.1%	75.1%	70.1%	75.1%	57.3
Trans	103.5%	108.1%	86.4%	81.0%	78.0%	73.2
Recon	86.9%	83.3%	82.5%	91.8%	90.5%	70.3

### (2) Strike Aircraft:

(a) The 516th Fighter Squadron (A-37B) continued in refresher training status. The unit was given a HQ VNAF operational readiness (OR) inspection on 26 June 69 and it was expected then that the squadron would be declared OR on 15 Jul 69, two weeks in advance of the target date.

(b) The 524th Fighter Squadron (A-37B) deployed six aircraft to Pleiku on 1 Jun 69. This detachment is fragged for approximately ten sorties/day to provide improved VNAF strike capability for northern I CTZ.

### (3) Transports:

(a) The AC-47 training program continued during the reporting period. Training was accomplished in conjunction with Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) fragged airborne alert missions in III and IV CTZs. The 417th Transport Squadron has progressed to a C-2 aircrew status for the AC-47 gunship mission while maintaining their C-1 aircrew status as a transport squadron.

(b) The 413th Squadron continued the first pilot upgrading training program during the reporting period and has upgraded ten of its co-pilots to first pilots. The objective of this training program is to produce qualified first pilots to upgrade to aircraft commanders, thus bringing the aircrew status to authorized strength.

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(c) During this quarter the VNAF airlifted 77,833 passengers, a 27.8% increase, and 2541 tons of cargo, a 1.4% decrease compared to the previous quarter.

## (4) Helicopters:

(a) The 211th and 217th Helicopter Squadrons of the 74th Wing at Binh Thuy became operationally ready in the UH-1 on 1 May and 16 Jun 69 respectively. They immediately began combat assault operations in IV CTZ and by the end of the quarter had made a good showing in airmobile operations after their conversion from the H-34 to the UH-1H.

(b) The 213th and 215th Helicopter Squadrons each stood down a month during this quarter awaiting receipt of UH-1H aircraft for their conversion. These squadrons conducted extensive training for pilots, other crew members and support personnel.

(5) Liaison: Thirty O-1 aircraft are being reassigned from 7AF to VNAF: ten each during June, July and August. This will bring the liaison squadron to authorized strength in O-1 aircraft. In addition, twelve additional O-1's are to be assigned to VNAF as attrition aircraft at the rate of two per month starting in September. VNAF OPLAN 69-14, recently published, provides for the assignment of additional aircrews to the liaison squadrons, sufficient to bring each squadron aircrew manning to 100% of authorization by August. The squadrons can be expected to attain a C-1 status subsequent to completion of required operational training for these newly assigned aircrews.

## (6) Reconnaissance:

(a) The EC/RC-47 aircraft overflowed their allocated flying time by 23.3% in the quarter. They flew 359 sorties of which 219 were operational missions, the remainder being for training and test purposes.

(b) The U-6 aircraft underflew their allocated flying time by 16.7%. During the reporting period they flew 1226 sorties of which 1085 were operational missions and the remainder training and test missions.

## c. New Trends, Tactics and Techniques:

(1) Transport: Approval for turnover of one squadron of USAF AC-47's to VNAF was received. The first five aircraft were transferred to the VNAF 417th Squadron on 30 Jun 69 and relieved of all transport responsibilities. The new mission of the 417th Squadron is to provide responsive and effective aerial fire and illumination in support of friendly forces.

(2) Helicopters: A decision was made to replace the US Army M-21 armament system on future VNAF UH-1H gunships with the USAF CAU 2B/A pintle-mounted mini-gun and LAU-59 rocket launchers. This significant change will enhance the firepower and capabilities of VNAF gunships in supporting airmobile operations.

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(3) Liaison: Plan 69-14 included a concept of deploying liaison aircraft to detachment sites. These sites were selected based on superior security and aircraft maintenance provisions. Aircraft for operations at forward operating locations (FOLs) are further deployed from the detachment site to the FOLs as required by Direct Air Support Centers.

(4) Reconnaissance: The 716th Squadron is developing a capability to provide aerial mapping. Throughout the quarter photographs were obtained using a fixed mount and camera. Consideration began in the quarter of the feasibility of obtaining and mounting a gyro-stabilized mount in an RC-47 aircraft.

d. Major Problem Areas:

(1) Helicopters:

(a) A shortage of helicopter pilots and flight mechanics continues to exist; however, a reversal of the trend is expected next quarter and a gradual increase in crew manning. Eighty percent manning in the four helicopter squadrons should be achieved by Nov 69.

(b) A lack of current Operator's Manuals, TM 55-1520-210-10, hindered the conversion program somewhat. An initial order for 250 copies of this manual from the US was acknowledged with an EDD of 9 June. A follow-up message was sent 24 June. The manuals were still unavailable at the end of the quarter.

(2) Liaison: Communications equipment on O-1 aircraft is obsolete and unreliable. A SEAOR providing an improved communications system has been made a Flagpole item, requiring a controlled action report to CINCPAC.

e. Overall Assessment:

(1) Strike Aircraft: Fighter aircraft flew 97.4% of programmed flying hours, the remaining 2.6% aborted due to 476 weather cancellations. Weather also caused restrictions to the refresher training schedule for the 516th Fighter Squadron. On days when weather was not a factor, the fighter fleet consistently equalled and frequently exceeded fraggled mission requirements.

(2) Transports: The transport squadrons performed well during the quarter. They overflowed their allocated flying time by 8.2%, increased their overall airlift by 20.2% and maintained training programs to overcome aircrew shortages.

(3) Helicopter: Overall, the helicopter conversion program has progressed very well. Two of the four squadrons became OR as scheduled. The remaining two have received aircraft and are engaged in OR training.

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The 215th Squadron underflew the flying hour program because of shortage of maintenance personnel presently in training. Training is scheduled to be completed in August. By the end of the quarter the 215th had qualified its required number of instructors and most of their pilots had returned from UH-1 transition training with USARV. The squadron is expected to be OR during September 69.

(4) Liaison: The liaison squadrons performed well during the quarter. They overflowed their O-1 allocated time by 16.2 percent, U-17 time by 4.9 percent and flew a total of 10,735 sorties. Ten additional aircraft were received and the number of formed and OR crews again increased.

(5) Reconnaissance: During the quarter, the 716th Squadron did not achieve the desired flying hour standard of seventy hours per month due to a shortage of qualified pilots. Only ninety percent of authorized U-6 pilots were assigned and ten percent of those pilots were either in upgrade training or in duty not involving flying (DNIF) status. Twenty percent of assigned U-6 pilots were TDY to the ALO/FAC school for a portion of the reporting period.

## 4. (C) US ARMY (USARV):

a. Objectives and Progress: The mission of Army Aviation is to augment the capability of the Army to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. In the Republic of Vietnam, Army Aviation provides tactical mobility and logistical supply support to the US Army, FVMAF and to ROK and GVN forces in support of combat operations. Specific functions are maneuver of forces, application of firepower, reconnaissance, command and control, logistical support and medical evacuation. Progress can be measured in terms of comparison of rates of performance shown in paragraph b.

b. Operations and Activities: Army operational statistics for 1st and 2d Qtrs CY69 are as follows:

TABLE 36

### ARMY AVIATION OPERATIONAL STATISTICS, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
Flying Hours	805,449	902,124	12.0%
Total Sorties	1,977,279	2,133,170	7.9%
Combat Sorties	1,627,814	1,738,187	6.8%

Flying hours increased by twelve percent over last quarter. Total sorties increased by 7.9 percent and combat sorties increased by 6.8 percent. The average sortie length increased by four percent to 25 minutes.

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## (1) Armed Helicopters:

TABLE 37

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ARMED HELICOPTER DATA, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>% Increase(Decrease)</u>
Armed Hel Flying Hours	149,072	171,917	15.3
Armed Hel Combat Sorties	254,989	267,822	5.1
VC KBA	8,797	8,794	0
Structures Destroyed	9,870	12,079	22.4
Structures Damaged	3,267	4,762	45.8
Sampans Destroyed	5,091	4,381	(13.9)
Sampans Damaged	564	704	24.8

The average armed helicopter sortie length increased by 8.6 percent from 35 to 38 minutes. The increased flying hours and sortie length are indicative of an increased enemy presence and the performance results attest to the effective and accurate employment of the armed helicopter.

## (2) Airlift:

TABLE 38

ARMY AVIATION AIRLIFT DATA, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
Troops Airlifted	2,755,935	2,953,767	7.2
Cargo Transported (tons)	297,394	304,512	2.4

(3) Rescue/Medical Evacuation: The number of patients moved by US Army helicopter medical evacuation missions increased 9.9 percent from 65,076 in the first quarter to 71,493 in 2d Qtr CY69.

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## (4) Special Activities:

TABLE 39

### SPECIAL ARMY AVIATION ACTIVITIES SUMMARY, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
<u>Support of GVN Forces</u>			
Flying Hours	72,705	83,555	14.9
Sorties	223,969	269,229	20.2
<u>Support of ROK Forces</u>			
Flying Hours	13,046	17,224	32.0
Sorties	55,802	74,938	34.3

Combined support to RVN and ROK forces increased by seventeen percent in flying hours and 23 percent in sorties over the 1st Qtr CY69.

## (5) Inventory and Facilities:

### (a) Aircraft Inventory (as of 30 Jun 69):

<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
4,168	4,196

Total aircraft density increased by 28 aircraft during the quarter.

(b) Aviation Facilities: US Army remained responsible for the operation of 120 airfields within RVN. Of these, 44 have US Army ATC facilities. One radar set (ANTSQ-71) and six non-directional beacons (two GRN-6 and four TRN-25) were destroyed by combat causes during the quarter.

## (6) Aviation Operational and Combat Losses:

TABLE 40

### ARMY AVIATION LOSSES AND ATTRITION RATES, 1ST AND 2D QTRS

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>
Aircraft Lost Due to Operational Causes	124	100
Aircraft Lost Due to Combat	127	136

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TABLE 40 (cont)

	<u>Per 100,000 Flying Hours</u>	<u>Per 100,000 Flying Hours</u>
Operational Attrition Rate	15.4	11.1
Combat Attrition Rate	15.8	15.1
Combined Attrition Rate	31.2	26.2

Aircraft loss figures are only confirmed losses to US Army inventory taken from the Monthly Summary of Aviation Losses and Performances; data is subject to later adjustment. Operational losses decreased and continued also to decrease on a rate basis.

c. Overall Assessment: In 2d Qtr CY69, Army Aviation met the renewed enemy offensive and continued to contribute mobility, flexibility and quick reaction capability to offensive and defensive combat operations. Army Aviation flew almost 100,000 hours more than the previous quarter's total and sharply reduced operational losses by increased emphasis on safety at all levels. Combat losses increased by nine, reflecting an increased intensity of combat during the first two months of the quarter; however, the combat loss rate reversed a previous upward trend in spite of the increased enemy activity and aviation exposure. Army Aviation operational support to GVN forces increased by 10,000 flying hours (fifteen percent) and 40,000 sorties (twenty percent) indicating an average sortie time for RVN of 18.6 minutes, reflecting well planned use of aviation resources.

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## SECTION VI

### PACIFICATION

#### 1. (C) GENERAL:

a. During 2d Qtr CY69, the ABC population of RVN, as reported by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), rose from the 31 Mar 69 figure of 82.1 percent to 85.6 percent. Concurrently, DE and VC population fell from 7.8 and 10.1 percent to 7.5 and 6.9 percent respectively.

b. Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) enrolled figure reached 1,480,934, a 265,904 increase over 31 Mar 69. The Chieu Hoi Program achieved a total of 11,360 returnees, 1,796 more than 1st Qtr CY69. Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) increased in strength by 7 percent and 6 percent respectively. Refugees totalling 249,487 were resettled during the 2d Qtr CY69. Neutralizations of VCI increased from 4,005 to 4,522, during this quarter. This increase was due to increased emphasis on VCI throughout RVN.

#### 2. (C) PACIFICATION STATUS:

##### a. Attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

(1) Recent decreases in number of VCI neutralized can probably be attributed to a decline in emphasis being given to the program by a substantial number of GVN province and district level officials. This may be due to the present political situation and the uncertainties of the Paris negotiations, which seem to have caused some official reluctance to make a concerted attack on the VCI. Emphasis and follow-up from the top government level are needed to induce province and district officials to increase their efforts against the VCI. PHUNG HOANG also lacks aggressive, continuous command emphasis and follow-up by the ARVN. Examples of GVN ambivalence toward PHUNG HOANG are the two orders recently issued to all GVN security agencies. One instruction states that an offender has the right to a defense counsel in every phase of the interrogation, including preliminary investigation. The second instruction orders all GVN security and judicial agencies to refrain from arresting persons on mere suspicion without concrete evidence. All persons detained without "proper evidence" are to be released. Considering its current intelligence base and state of training, the GVN PHUNG HOANG apparatus seems to have reached a plateau in operational intensity and efficiency beyond which it will be difficult to pass.

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## (2) Statistical Summary:

TABLE 41

### INFRASTRUCTURE NEUTRALIZATION

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hamlet	353	274	244	871
Village	1,006	858	732	2,596
City/Other	152	57	72	281
District	233	232	239	704
Province	<u>51</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>147</u>
TOTAL	1,795	1,462	1,342	4,599

b. Territorial Security: The following table depicts HES trends during the quarter.

TABLE 42

### ANALYSIS OF HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM TRENDS

#### Total Population (Percent)

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
ABC	83.3	84.2	85.6
DE	7.6	8.0	7.5
V	9.1	7.8	6.9

#### Rural Population (Percent)

ABC	74.8	76.4	78.9
DE	11.4	11.8	11.1
V	13.8	11.8	10.0

#### Hamlet Status Change

Net-Progression into ABC Category	+181	+225	+313

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## 3. (C) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES:

Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES): The following tables depict mission assignments and operational results for RF and PF units, based on TFES returns:

TABLE 43

RF/PF PARAMILITARY STRENGTH<sup>1</sup>

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
RF	244,840	248,540	251,500
PF	174,927	176,229	177,000

TABLE 44

REGIONAL FORCE MISSIONS (NUMBER OF UNITS)<sup>1</sup>

Hamlet/Village Security	421	471	510
Province/District Town Security	203	201	203
Key Installations Security	105	101	105
LOC Security	216	226	224
Offensive Operations	274	285	288
Intelligence Collection	231	231	235

TABLE 45

POPULAR FORCE MISSIONS (NUMBER OF UNITS)<sup>1</sup>

Hamlet/Village Security	3,300	3,358	3,385
Province/District Town Security	550	542	530
Key Installation Security	88	88	84
LOC Security	568	548	534
Offensive Operations	102	96	93
Intelligence Collection	26	25	26

<sup>1</sup>SOURCE: Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES)

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TABLE 46

REGIONAL FORCE OPERATIONAL RESULTS<sup>1</sup>

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
Friendly KIA	338	399	515
Enemy KIA	1,518	2,020	1,985
Friendly Weapons Lost	228	203	156
Enemy Weapons Captured	876	869	896
Small Unit Operations	80,727	84,228	88,384
With Contacts	2,345	2,127	2,812

TABLE 47

POPULAR FORCE OPERATIONAL RESULTS<sup>1</sup>

Friendly KIA	328	429	323
Enemy KIA	1,357	1,292	999
Friendly Weapons Lost	134	183	137
Enemy Weapons Captured	423	531	461
Small Unit Operations	148,536	153,358	158,265
With Contacts	3,588	2,956	3,318

<sup>1</sup>SOURCE: Territorial Force Evaluation System (TFES).

4. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:

TABLE 48

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) AND TRUONG SON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT  
(TSRD) CADRE STRENGTH

RD Cadre Groups	1,452	1,477	1,472
Strength	46,418	45,649	44,809
TSRD Cadre Groups	108	109	106
Strength	7,312	7,281	7,299

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TABLE 49

RETURNEES, ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APT) AND KIT CARSON SCOUTS (KCS)

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
Hoi Chanh	4,930	3,508	2,922
APT Strength	4,183	4,157	4,246
KCS Strength	1,874	1,993	1,970

During the 2d Qtr CY69, 11,360 individuals rallied; during the 1st Qtr CY69, the total was 9,564, resulting in an improvement of 18.77 percent.

TABLE 50

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT STATISTICS

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Resettlement	30,236	21,922	48,241	110,399
Return to Village	<u>18,765</u>	<u>47,685</u>	<u>28,836</u>	<u>95,286</u>
Totals Reestablished	49,001	69,607	77,077	195,685

5. (C) NATIONAL POLICE:

a. National Police (NP): Total strength of NP (other than Field Forces) is now 62,273, a decrease of 107 from the end of 1st Qtr 69.

b. National Police Field Forces (NPFF): Strength of NPFF has decreased approximately 186 since the 1st Qtr CY69. Its total strength is now 14,546. The effectiveness of this force has continued to increase in operations against the VCI.

6. (C) PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (PSDF): At the beginning of the quarter there were 1,215,030 organized, 741,989 trained and 205,603 armed members of the PSDF. By the end of the 2d Qtr CY69 these figures had risen to 1,480,934 organized, 956,483 trained and 270,527 armed.

7. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT: During the quarter, pacification resources were mostly working in hamlets which had been entered earlier in the campaign. All four CTZs made gains, indicating there was no large area in which the enemy was able to achieve his apparent objective of rolling back the GVN pacification program. Most of the countrywide gains were in IV CTZ, which has top pacification priority.

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## SECTION VII

### LOGISTICS

#### 1. (C) US FORCES.

##### a. Supply:

(1) Stock levels remained stable. The stockage position of all classes of supply remained sufficient to support the mission.

(2) POL: Overall POL consumption has shown a tendency to stabilize at approximately 3,600,000 barrels (bbls) per month. Bulk POL tankage for storage of U.S. military and commercial storage averaged 95.3% of CINCPAC objective. This storage was achieved even though enemy action accounted for the loss of one 10M/BBL diesel fuel, marine, tank and one 10M/BBL JP-4 tank at An Khe and 10 M/BBL DFM tank at Qui Nhon 12 May 1969. Anticipated POL construction completion is expected to total 284 M/BBL in the next quarter. This will cause additional storage capacity to exceed the CINCPAC tankage objective. Inventory positions of all fuels remained satisfactory in all CTZs. Commercial oil contractors at Nha Be terminals have maintained inventories at levels adequate to meet all requirements.

##### (3) Ammunition Status:

(a) Adequate levels of Class V ammunition assets were available for tactical employment and were generally satisfactory except for those items in critical supply (i.e., less than 30 days of supply on hand.)

(b) The status of ammunition items in critical supply this quarter for assets managed by USARV and ARVN remained relatively stable with an average of three items per month for USARV and six items per month for ARVN. A current statistical summary follows:

TABLE 51

#### ITEMS IN CRITICAL SUPPLY AS OF 30 JUNE 69

<u>USARV</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DAYS OF SUPPLY</u>
	CTG, 40mm HE M406	26
	FLARE, A/C Para MK 24	25
ARVN	CTG, 40mm HE M406	16
	PROJ, 155mm HE M107	25

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DAYS OF SUPPLY</u>
GREN, HD Smk Green M18	29
GREN, HD Smk Yellow M18	12
GREN, HD Smk Red M18	17
FLARE, Surface Trip M49	19

(c) Ammunition losses this quarter reached a confirmed 1026 short tons at 2.7 million dollars with initial estimated losses at Da Nang on 27 April of 46,289 short tons at 96.8 million dollars.

(d) Emergency ammunition requirements needing priority airlift support increased last quarter to an all time high of 1,944.5 S/T in March 1969. Tonnage has been reduced this quarter to a June requirement of only 295.8 S/T. The inability of production to provide sufficient assets to establish a pipeline continues to be the primary factor contributing to the airlift requirement.

b. Transportation: Statistical data is summarized as follows:

TABLE 52

<u>PORTS</u>	<u>MILITARY MOVEMENT OF CARGO</u>			
	<u>MAR 69</u>	<u>APR 69</u>	<u>MAY 69</u>	<u>CY69 MONTHLY AVG</u>
Short Tons Handled	1,185,700	1,119,800	1,178,300	1,148,700
Avg. No. Deep Draft Ships in RVN	35.5	30.9	38.4	36.5
Avg. No. Days in Port	7.4	6.3	7.3	7.4
Intra-Coastal Ships Short Tons Handled	615,000	559,000	699,000	543,000
<u>HIGHWAY</u>				
Short Tons Handled	1,417,647	1,276,878	1,168,391	1,284,604
Port and Beach	529,462	444,637	405,559	487,744
Local Haul	633,893	604,671	533,637	572,039

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	<u>MAR 69</u>	<u>APR 69</u>	<u>MAY 69</u>	<u>CY69 MONTHLY AVG</u>
Line Haul	254,292	227,570	209,195	224,821
<u>RAIL SHORT TONS HANDLED</u>	27,590	50,281	64,467*	37,910
<u>AIRLIFT SHORT TONS HANDLED</u>	121,800*	117,000*	117,000*	119,000

\* Tonnage includes an average of 19,000 STON carried by an average of 80.5 USAF C-7A aircraft assigned to Field Force Commands and others on a dedicated use basis.

c. Maintenance: Using the operational readiness (OR) criterion the significant trends may be summarized as follows:

TABLE 53  
AIRCRAFT MONITORED FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>OR OBJ %</u>	<u>MAR %</u>	<u>APR %</u>	<u>MAY %</u>	<u>2d QTR AVG %</u>
<u>7AF</u>					
A-1	71.0	63.0	69.2	71.7	67.9
<u>USARV</u>					
U-1	78.0	71.0	69.0	60.0	66.6
U-6	75.0	70.0	60.0	65.0	65.0
CH-47A	65.0	69.0	67.0	56.0	64.0
<u>III MAF</u>					
F-4	65.0	65.0	65.0	58.0	62.6
EF-10	71.0	56.0	58.0	56.0	56.6
O-1C	75.0	60.0	63.0	69.0	64.0
UH -1E	75.0	68.0	69.0	70.0	69.0
UH-34	75.0	62.0	60.0	66.0	62.6
CH-53	67.0	47.0	47.0	48.0	47.3

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OR rates for the UH-1H, CH-47B, OH-6, CH-54A, the UH-1C, the F-4C/D and the CH-46 A/D were above the OR objective for this quarter. They were deleted from monitored aircraft. The CH-47A remained on the monitored list this quarter due to the problem with the aft rotary blades. This problem has been solved.

## d. Construction:

(1) The status of engineer troops at the end of the 2d Qtr CY69 is indicated in Table 54.

TABLE 54

### ENGINEER UNIT TROOP STATUS BY SERVICE AND CTZ

<u>Engineer Units</u>	<u>Location</u>				
	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Army</u>					
Cbt Bns*	3	5	3	2	13
Const Bns	0	5	6	3	14
<u>Navy</u>					
NMCB	10	0	0	0	10
<u>Air Force</u>					
Red Horse Sqdns	1	3	1	0	5
<u>Marine*</u>					
FMF Bns	3	0	0	0	3

\*Does not include divisional engineer battalions.

(2) Engineer troop units continued to contribute significantly to the overall construction program in RVN during the quarter. Engineer troop effort was distributed in the following categories:

TABLE 55

### ENGINEER CONTRIBUTION TO US SERVICES' CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

<u>Categories of Work</u>	<u>% Army Cbt</u>	<u>% Army Const</u>	<u>% NMCB</u>	<u>% AF</u>	<u>% USMC</u>
Operational Support	52	33	9	0	0
Lines of Communication	22	36	33	0	20
Base Development	26	31	58	100	62

(3) Contractor forces maintained an average of 25,000 men during the quarter. Major projects completed during the quarter are listed in Table 56.

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TABLE 56

## MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS COMPLETED IN RVN

<u>PROJECT NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMPLETION DATE</u>
P-996	Covered Cargo Storage	Da Nang	Jun 69
S-210	Transient Processing Ctr	Da Nang	Jun 69
A-037	Check Point Facility	Cam Ranh Bay	Jun 69
D-753	Rehabilitation of VNNMA Training Facility	Nha Trang	Jun 69
A-418	Aircraft Shelters	Tan Son Nhut	May 69
A-428	Aircraft Shelters	Bien Hoa	May 69
A-001	Criticom Facility	Bien Hoa	May 69
P-773	Covered Storage	Cam Ranh Bay	May 69
A-454	Electric Power Facility	Cam Ranh Bay	May 69
S-280	Sheet Pile Bulkhead	Dong Tam	Jun 69
S-087	Criticom Relay	Nha Trang	Apr 69
A-410	Passenger Terminal	Tan Son Nhut	Apr 69
S-094	Ammo Storage Facility	Cat Lai	Apr 69
S-066	Mess Hall, MACV	Tan Son Nhut	Jun 69

(4) Major projects started by contract during the quarter are listed in Table 57.

TABLE 57

## MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS COMMENCED IN RVN

<u>PROJECT NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST COMP DATE</u>
A-068	Roads and Drainage	Dong Tam	Oct 69
S-024	Mooring Facilities	Cat Lai	Jun 69
S-051	Fire Station	Can Tho	Aug 69
Various	LSA, Phase I	Binh Thuy	Dec 69
Various	Aerial Port Complex	Bien Hoa	Aug 69
D-701	Coast Guard Station	Tan My	Aug 69
D-647	Airfield Pavement	Qui Nhon	Sep 69
A-037	Special Maintenance Facility	Cam Ranh Bay	Aug 69

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<u>PROJECT NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FST COMP DATE</u>
S-080	Equip Cold Stor Whs	Qui Nhon	Sen 69
S-066	Mess Hall, MACV	Tan Son Nhut	Jun 69

e. Hospitalization and Evacuation: The following statistics for US personnel reflect the trends throughout this reporting period:

	<u>MAR 69</u>	<u>APR 69</u>	<u>MAY 69</u>	<u>CY 69 AVG</u>
Total Hospitalized	17,880	17,300	20,871	17,451
Total Evacuated	6,466	5,063	6,306	5,464
Battle Injury	6,628	4,431	6,675	5,336
Disease and Non-Battle Injury	11,252	12,869	14,196	12,135
Malaria Cases	802	907	348	925

2. (C) ARVN/RF/PF: During 2d Qtr, CY69 ARVN provided adequate support to the combat units as reflected in the following significant activities:

a. Supply:

(1) The Quartermaster National Inventory Control Center (NICC) reduced the order and ship time (OST) for CONUS-supplied items from 270 days to 135 days with the result that monies normally tied up in the pipeline have been released for further supply actions. Steps are being taken to reduce the time lag in processing requisitions in the NICC. Due to manual operations, use of mails in requisitioning and laxness in heeding advice from supply sources, many replenishment requisitions were submitted after the item had fallen below the reorder point. This resulted in requests for airlift of critical items to meet requirements. Progress is being made in the requisition/distribution procedures of the QM NICC. Defense Supply Agency (DSA) was requested to furnish additional direct activity address codes for the five Class I, II and IV field depots. With receipt of the new codes items can be requisitioned for direct shipment to the customers, eliminating double handling.

(2) The 30th POL Base Depot was able to reduce the OST for CONUS supplied items from 270 days to 135 days. This has created a temporary excess position that will level off next quarter.

(3) The 10th QM Base Depot under a new commander has made substantial progress. Special classes are being conducted on identifying shipping documents to ensure proper procedures are used in removing them from containers and forwarding them to stock control. Additional material handling equipment has been received, thereby improving operations.

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(4) Office of the Chief Quartermaster (OCQM) RVNAF has developed a greatly improved jungle boot for ARVN. This boot closely parallels the US jungle boot. In order to expedite the availability of this improved footwear MACV proposed to provide MASF support from CONUS sources to supply the imported component. This will reduce the gold flow since the Korean-made version is to be phased out and it will reduce the quantity of MASF support by building up in-country capability to produce jungle boots.

(5) OCQM RVNAF concurred in a plan to conduct a survey of the RVNAF Clothing Production Center with a view towards improving production by correcting deficiencies in layout, work flow and quality control.

(6) Project Density initiated by the Engineer Advisory Section of Team 6 during the previous quarter was completed. This project is completely self-sustaining by ARVN and has been very successful in providing current status of requisitions and expediting repair parts for the 3rd and 4th echelon shops. Project Charge aimed at expediting the issue of new equipment to units, continues as new items are received.

(7) RF/PF units supported by 5 ALCs have all been equipped with the authorized number of radios. The 651st Signal Battalion is presently issuing AN/PRC-25 radios to provinces to replace AN/PRC-10 radios. The quantity of AN/PRC-25 radios on hand in RF units more than doubled during this reporting period. Continued emphasis will be placed on the turn-in and replacement of AN/PRC-10 radios.

(8) Ordnance advisors are placing emphasis on automating supply procedures at the 20th Ordnance Base Depot. A partial review of supply procedures has been completed and detailed requirements were submitted to MACV-DMA on 13 May 69 for automating the requisition status report using magnetic tape processing rather than the punch card system previously used. Further studies are being conducted into several aspects of supply management for further ADP application.

(9) The Engineer International Logistics Center (ILC) made a concerted effort during this quarter to reconcile data on barrier material requisitions outstanding from 3rd Quarter CY68 and earlier. The ILC monthly supply status report contained the following information on open requisitions for this period:

ITEM	<u>NUMBER OF REQUISITIONS</u>	<u>QUANTITIES</u>
Sandbags	27	12,244,000 EA
Barbed Wire	21	148,131 SL
Concertina	19	80,092 CL

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Reconciliation of all above requisitions except four sandbag requisitions provided information that the following were still valid dues in:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NUMBER OF REQUISITIONS</u>	<u>QUANTITIES</u>
Sandbags	2	310,800 EA
Barbed Wire	4	20,000 SL
Concertina	5	11,512 CL

Expedite action has been requested on barrier material to insure the 180-day order/ship time is met.

### b. Transportation:

(1) During the 2d Qtr CY69 inter-ALC shipments by highway increased 4% while intra-ALC shipments increased 19%. Inter-ALC shipments comprised 77,758 metric tons while intra-ALC shipments were 490,186 metric tons. Inter-ALC water shipments increased 26%, while intra-ALC water shipments decreased 2% with 71,443 and 30,563 metric tons shipped respectively.

(2) During the quarter 35,711 metric tons of ammunition were handled at the Binh Trieu, Thanh Tuy Ha, and Newport barge sites. This represents a 36% decrease from the previous quarter. The amount of ammunition discharged and retrograded from these barge sites reflected a marked decrease from previous quarters.

(3) In the 2d Qtr CY69 a total of 4,702 two and one-half-ton trucks and 560 12-ton semitrailers were used to transport 19,208 metric tons of cargo to the 4th ALC. This is approximately the same tonnage hauled last quarter.

(4) Despite the shortage of nine LCM-8 (four TDY to Saigon and five short of authorization), the 101st Med Boat Group continues to perform in an outstanding manner. During this quarter a utilization rate of 95% was obtained and 3178 short tons of cargo were transported.

(5) A total of 21,992 tons of cargo was moved to and within III Corps. Approximately 90% of this tonnage was moved by highway. This is an increase over the previous quarters and for the first time in five years a military convoy moved 1100 tons of supplies by highway to Song Be, Phuc Long Province.

(6) On 1 Jun 69 the Can Tho Terminal Command was activated to provide the nucleus for expanded utilization of waterways within IV CTZ.

(7) The better use of motor transport and the challenging of unreasonable shipper demands has resulted in a marked reduction in the amount of cargo moved by air in the 5th Zone Transportation Center (ZTC). For intra-ALC air shipments the first quarter average was 700 short tons monthly; this has dropped to 65 short tons monthly for the second quarter.

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### c. Maintenance:

(1) Due to increase command interest in supply and maintenance, the 85th Ordnance Field Support Group, in conjunction with the ordnance advisor, has implemented a technical assistance program. This program will include three-day visits to all supported units. It is anticipated that this technical assistance program will assist in accomplishing two important requirements: (1) allow the using units to present their most pressing ordnance problems to the technical experts within the unit, and (2) allow the 85th OFSG personnel personally to present the most current ordnance doctrine to the using unit. This program has the concurrence of the Chief of Ordnance and should greatly enhance 85th OFSG's mission of providing ordnance combat service support to all units of the 5th ALC area.

(2) The USAMECOM Quick Reaction Team (QRT), which arrived in country on 16 Feb 69, is continuing to direct its effort towards reducing the maintenance backlog at the 40th Engineer Base Depot, while concurrently providing on-the-job training for the RVNAF mechanics. Since the last quarter three members of the QRT have returned to CONUS. The remaining members will depart the Republic of Vietnam on 16 Aug 69.

d. Facilities: Construction of new facilities continues particularly through RVN. Many new warehouses, maintenance facilities, ammunition depots, prefab buildings, collapsible POL tanks, among others have been constructed. Much improvement to existing facilities is being realized by the proper application of the "Self Help" program.

### e. Deadline of Critical Items of Equipment:

(1) The deadline rate of M602, 2-1/2 ton trucks, is considered critical due to the non-availability of engines. ARVN now reports 159 vehicles deadlined awaiting engines. Most of these have been deadlined for an extended period. As a result, operational readiness and transportability are seriously impaired. Records indicate that engines are due-in with a supply status indicating that requisitions are backordered or being procured. Some requisitions date back to 1967. Follow-up supply action has been initiated to include a priority message to the CG of the USAMC and the International Logistics Center. The first shipment of 113 engines should be received by the end of July 69.

(2) Seven major items are in a deadline status awaiting repair parts. All required requisitioning action has been taken. A partial listing of major items common to all ALCs includes:

Crane 20 Ton  
Generator, 5, 10, 15, 30, 60 KW  
Compressors 600 CFM  
Tractor FT, Caterpillar D-7, D-4-D  
Loader Scoop  
Graders Road  
Forklift 4000/6000 lb

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f. Equipment Turnover: Equipment turnover from the US 6/77 Field Artillery Bn (105H) to the ARVN 213th Field Artillery Bn (105H) was completed in Jun 69. This unit represents the first ARVN unit to receive equipment from a US unit. The two engineer construction bns and one engineer heavy equipment company completed the transfer of mission essential items in June.

g. Receipt of Equipment: The following table summarizes ARVN equipment transactions in 2d Qtr CY 69:

TABLE 58

## SIGNIFICANT ARVN EQUIPMENT RECEIPTS

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
Truck 1/4 ton M151A1	953	1,567	499
Truck M35A2	557	1,007	901
Water Trailers	1	18	30
M16 Rifles	46,753	60,153	51,317
M79 Grenade Launchers	820	2,541	1,998
M60 Machine Guns	892	89	0
105mm Howitzers	32	39	0
AN/PRC 25 Radios	1,157	2,357	1,574
Tractor Full Trkd	42	3	14

### 3. (C) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

#### a. Supply:

(1) An extensive supply improvement program is in progress at the VNAF Bien Hoa Depot. AFLC rewarehousing, inventory, management and records purification teams have completed VNAF assistance projects.

(2) As a result of aircraft conversion programs, it has been necessary to ship out as well as receive large quantities of spare parts. The delivery of UH-1 and A-37 aircraft spares to the VNAF activities is approximately 90% complete.

(3) CINCPAC recently appointed the Naval Support Activity at Da Nang to manage all fuel resupply there. An agreement has been finalized whereby the US Navy has assumed control, operation and maintenance of four VNAF fuel storage tanks converted for aviation fuel storage and formerly operated by the USAF. VNAF will retain control and operation of three small tanks in the same area that will also be converted to store mogas and diesel. This conversion will eliminate the present VNAF requirement to store large quantities of mogas and diesel in drums. Under the agreement, the Naval Support Activity will furnish the VNAF daily 115/145 and JP-4 requirements. Additionally, there will remain a thirty-day reserve level of both grades of aviation fuels for the VNAF. Copies of the approved agreement have been distributed to all agencies concerned.

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(4) As a part of the VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, the Bien Hoa Depot is being reorganized to improve supply effectiveness.

(5) Major Problem Areas: Support of the crash/battle damaged aircraft continues to be a problem. AFCP-MSS has a continuing project to insure timely support is provided aircraft in an inactive status. Some of these aircraft remain in a work stoppage status considerably longer than is acceptable. Many recommendations have been made to VNAF Headquarters concerning improved support, but progress has been slow.

(6) Overall Assessment: The overall VNAF logistics effort continues to improve. Progress is quite slow in such areas as equipment management and priority supply support.

### b. Transportation:

(1) VNAF continues to carry approximately one-third of the identified RVNAF traffic that is airlifted in country. During this quarter, VNAF transported an average of 850 tons of cargo and 26,000 passengers by air per month.

(2) Initial spares support lists (ISSL) have been distributed for vehicles previously not having had proper spares support established.

(3) Control of 463L system (material handling) equipment has been further improved. Tighter control and reporting procedures have been implemented. Handling is continuously monitored.

(4) Handling of shipments not operationally ready for supplies (NORS) has improved. In general, NORS items are receiving closer attention and the handling/delivery that they warrant.

(5) New vehicle maintenance reporting procedures have been implemented that provide VNAF Headquarters a more accurate representation of the vehicle maintenance situation at the bases.

### (6) New Trends, Tactics and Techniques:

(a) Discussions between VNAF/ARVN/advisor personnel are resulting in clarification of vehicle maintenance concepts and a better definition of responsibilities. In addition, agreement is being reached on matters of inter-service coordination that are essential to satisfactory support in the RVNAF logistical structure.

(b) The need to assess RVNAF airlift requirements suggests a corollary improvement in airlift reporting procedures. At this stage of RVNAF development, future requirements probably can be estimated more accurately from historical data than by any other method. Thus, accurate reporting of current performance is vital. Additional emphasis is needed on

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increasing the amount of air transport capability that is applied to logistic support of RVNAF. The time is at hand to increase the percentage of capability devoted to scheduled operations between selected locations.

(c) A proposed vehicle operations manual is being drafted. Such a directive is needed to establish comprehensive policy and standard procedures and practices in managing VNAF vehicle assets.

(7) Major Problem Areas: The major problem areas are those of inter-service coordination, airlift reporting procedures and standardization of management of VNAF vehicle assets. These are discussed in para 3-b-(6) above.

(8) Overall Assessment: Progress is expected to continue at a modest rate during the early phases of the Improvement and Modernization Program, as thinly-spread skills are stretched further.

### c. Maintenance:

(1) The UH-1H conversion program began 1 April 69. Three squadrons now have their authorization of 20 UH-1H helicopters. The 213th Squadron has 5 UH-1H helicopters in place and the Air Logistics Wing is presently assembling 10 UH-1H helicopters to be delivered to the 213th Squadron.

(2) The 219th Squadron has received its complement of 25 H-34 helicopters. A total of 36 H-34 helicopters are now in country. All H-34 helicopter distribution was completed 6 Jun 69.

(3) Time compliance technical orders (TCTOs) required by the A-1 wing integrity program have been completed on fifteen A-1 aircraft. All high use status (High Time) A-1 aircraft have been completed. Fourteen aircraft are in work for accomplishment of the wing integrity modification.

(4) The delivery of O-1 aircraft has begun. Ten were delivered on 23 Jun 69 with the remaining thirty-two to be delivered July 69 through Feb 70. This shortage of O-1 aircraft remains as a "Flag Pole Report" item at this time, requiring a controlled action report to CINCPAC.

(5) A-1/A-37B conversion portion of the VNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan is now complete. All of the three converting A-1 squadrons have received their complete UE of A-37B jet attack aircraft. Two of the squadrons are combat ready with the third scheduled to become combat ready in the near future.

(6) USAF maintenance augmentees arrived as scheduled to provide over-the-shoulder training and advice to the VNAF mechanics working on the A-37B aircraft. The VNAF mechanics are steadily becoming more proficient and a gradual phasing out of the augmentation has begun.

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(7) Overall Assessment: The VNAF continues to provide adequate maintenance for its aircraft. The conversions to UH-1H and A-37B aircraft are progressing exceptionally well. There is a continuing requirement to improve cannibalization control, OJT, and maintenance management.

### d. Facilities Management:

(1) Facilities Management: A comprehensive VNAF facilities requirements study was completed by the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) during this quarter. The study determined the quantities of various types of facilities required to implement the VNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program. Phase I of the study was the application of austere planning factors to existing and planned personnel to obtain facilities requirements. Phase II was the comparison of VNAF facility assets to facility requirements, resulting in facility deficiencies which must be fulfilled in order to implement the I&M Program. This study has been forwarded to the Seventh Air Force for their evaluation in conjunction with existing and proposed Seventh Air Force aircraft personnel requirements. The VNAF I&M Program will require additional facilities as it progresses, either newly constructed or transferred from Seventh Air Force.

(2) FY71 Military Construction Program (MCP): A total of 56 construction projects with an estimated cost of \$15,825,000 have been submitted by AFGP through channels for inclusion in the FY71 MCP. This action, as emphasized above, will not provide facilities within the time-frame required by the I&M Program. This deficiency in timing of programming is due to the lack of a FY70 MCP and the short leadtime between the I&M Program conception and implementation.

(3) Maintenance, Repair, and Minor Construction (MRMC): A total of \$2,569,000, P-456 funds, force program 10, support of other nations, were obligated for MRMC projects. The type of work funded is \$13,000 for maintenance; \$2,197,900 for repair; and \$358,200 for alteration/minor construction projects. The primary emphasis was on projects to repair or alter facilities to a level commensurate with new VNAF weapons.

(4) Operation and Maintenance of Support Equipment: The extreme need for emphasis on the training of VNAF in the area of power production operation and maintenance was highlighted by the MASF funded power plant at Bien Hoa Air Base. This power plant to be completed shortly will be operated and maintained by USAF (7AF) contract personnel due to RVNAF inability to operate and maintain 500 KW generators. The magnitude of this contract in comparison with the total VNAF program is evident: the estimated annual contract cost for the operation and maintenance of the power plant is 16,638,000\$VN, approximately 41% of VNAF CY69 construction program.

### (5) New Trends, Tactics, and Techniques:

(a) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Major Rehabilitation and Construction Program: The VNAF Headquarters has submitted to JGS a requirement for 254,000,000\$VN for construction under the RVNAF CY70 construction

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program. This is the largest request ever made by VNAF showing a marked improvement in a VNAF efforts toward self-sufficiency. The receptiveness which JGS shows toward this program will greatly influence further programs and VNAF self-sufficiency.

(b) Tent City: The VNAF is presently constructing a tent city at Tan Son Nhut which will provide housing for 4000 new VNAF recruits undergoing English language training. Construction is being accomplished by ARVN engineer companies with the majority of the construction material purchased by RVNAF using funds budgeted under the Government of Vietnam Defense Budget. This project is a milestone in the development of VNAF self-sufficiency resulting from emphasis originating at the JGS level.

### (6) Major Problem Areas:

(a) Personnel Skills: Lack of skilled personnel along with improperly utilized and maintained equipment continues to hamper VNAF progress toward self-sufficiency. An upgrading in proficiency, technical aptitude, and sophistication of procedures within the VNAF is a major need.

(b) Personnel Training: An increase in the skill level of assigned VNAF personnel is required to increase productivity. To achieve this requires that VNAF schedule more OJT and release a greater proportion of man-hours for formal training. The advisory group continued to stress the necessity of placing more emphasis upon civil engineering training.

(7) Overall Assessment: Progress towards the ultimate advisory goal of VNAF self-sufficiency has been slow and sporadic. US direct assistance, which overshadows the advisory effort, should be given only after all RVNAF channels have been exhausted. The assumptions of VNAF inability and inefficient administrative technique are not sufficient reason for providing direct assistance; moreover, patience and understanding by advisory personnel help to demonstrate the invalidity of these assumptions.

### e. Air Munitions:

(1) 9,167 tons of bombs were expended by VNAF during 8,168 strike sorties, an average of 1.12 tons per sortie.

(2) VNAF Headquarters has undertaken the major task of reviewing, evaluating and redetermining the storage area requirements for each base. The ultimate goal is to plan for facilities to maintain a thirty-day stock objective.

### (3) Major Problem Areas:

(a) Lack of proper storage facilities at Nha Trang presents two problems. First, Cam Ranh Bay facilities are currently being utilized for

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VNAF storage; as a result, a considerable burden is placed on ARVN to maintain the resupply of Nha Trang. Second, many personnel are exposed to dangerously high quantities of explosives stored on the base to meet mission requirements.

(b) Excessive delays (sometimes four months or longer) in receiving documentation from ARVN of Military Assistance Program (MAP) transfer of munitions results in the lack of proper control of assets by MAP custodians.

(4) Overall Assessment: VNAF air munitions elements show constant improvement in their control, distribution, and storage of air munitions. Through their initiative they have taken various actions to eliminate some of their problem areas.

#### 4. (C) Vietnamese Navy (VNN):

a. ACTOVLOG: The final section of ACTOVLOG, (the plan to develop sufficient logistic capability within the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) to support their expanding force upon turnover of U.S. Navy (USN) assets under ACTOV) has been completed. The completed ACTOVLOG plan will be promulgated in late July. VNN and USN personnel have developed the basic organization which will be tasked with implementation of ACTOVLOG. The U.S. Navy has reorganized its logistic advisory effort to prepare for the implementation phase of ACTOVLOG and to complement VNN organizational developments. Although the Joint General Staff (JGS) has approved the plan in principle, final approval is forthcoming.

b. The turnover of 64 riverine craft on 23 Jun 69 included two armored LCM-6's configured as refuelers. These craft will provide POL support for the expanded VNN River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID). In addition the VNN shipyard has completed the conversion of two LCM-6's to coastal refuelers. The VNN now has five of these craft supporting operations in the four coastal zones.

c. Development of Vietnamese Navy Training Plan for Craft Maintenance Personnel: Based upon standards previously determined for overhaul and maintenance of VNN small craft, a detailed training plan has been developed which delineates specific types of training for specified numbers of personnel at identified locations. The plan provides for having each base fully manned with trained personnel at least one month prior to the base turnover date.

d. Base Development: The 2d quarter of CY69 saw considerable progress in the "Master Plan for VNN Facilities". In mid-April the final report of the Parsons Engineering Company was submitted. This report delineated a master basing plan for the Vietnamese Navy that will assure adequate operational coverage, supply support, and craft maintenance for the existing and expanding VNN craft inventory. This plan was reviewed by the VNN in coordination with US Navy Civil Engineers and appropriate adjustments made to assure an adequate shore facility.

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e. Procurement of land for new VNN bases proceeds without major difficulties. This effort includes site investigations and conferences with district and province officials. The present outlook is that all required land will be available by the 4th Qtr CY69.

f. Seabee Self-Help Program: During 2d Qtr CY69 the Seabees Self Help program was all but completed. This program encompasses eight existing VNN bases. The object was to construct minor improvement projects while also teaching the VNN sailors skills for future projects. The program was most successful and it is planned for expansion to additional bases.

g. Major Problem Areas: The sixteen VNN PCFs stationed at An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island and responsible for Market Time areas eight and nine are in a poor state of readiness. The capability of An Thoi Repair Facility has not expanded to support the PCF at a rate proportionate to the takeover of operating responsibility. The USS Tutuila has been stationed at An Thoi to assist in bringing the VNN PCFs up to an acceptable level of readiness until the An Thoi Repair Facility can take over. The base at An Thoi is the first scheduled for major construction/rehabilitation under the base development plan. Work on the base is expected to begin by mid-August. During the construction phase there will be a period when the repair facility will be essentially non-operational while concrete decks are being poured in the shop buildings and the hardstand is being installed. USS Tutuila will still be present at this time and will assume the full burden of repair. Maximum effort is now being directed at making this first support base fully operational.

5. (C) Overall Assessment: The logistical situation in RVN remained stable and in most respects satisfactory. US logistics continued to satisfy all requirements. Emphasis continued to be placed on the development of Vietnamese technical proficiency in the various logistical categories. Though various shortages and failures were evident, the Vietnamese logistical system continued to be at least adequate as RVN began to take over responsibilities from US logistics under ACTOV.

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## ANNEX A

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL WARFARE

#### 1. (U) GENERAL:

a. Psychological Operations: The 2d Qtr CY69 marked the revision of the PSYOP summary reporting system, the resumption of operation of Radio Pleiku at 15KW, the start of an accelerated Chieu Hoi campaign known as Nguyen Trai II, the reimplementation of the New Horizons Campaign and revision of MACV Directive 10-1, outlining the PSYOP Single Manager concept.

b. Political Warfare: The mission of political warfare within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) is to:

(1) Create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to its leaders, nation and national ideology.

(2) Gain and maintain the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas.

(3) Destroy the loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation and national ideology.

c. During the past quarter, the "New Opportunities" campaign entered its fourth phase, the first two-year cadet class at the Political Warfare College graduated 168 new second lieutenants, and Montagnard language programming was started over Radio Pleiku.

#### 2. (U) OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS:

##### a. Psychological Operations:

(1) The continuing objective of PSYOP during the quarter was to enhance the image of the GVN sufficiently to persuade enemy forces to rally, surrender, or otherwise cease their resistance. An indication that this objective is being achieved is the greater number of ralliers in the first six months of 1969 than throughout 1968.

(2) The Chieu Hoi Program is closely associated with PSYOP activities in the Republic of Vietnam. One of the major objectives of the PSYOP program is to advertise the existence of the Chieu Hoi program not only to the civilian population but also to VC/NVA troops. A measure of the effectiveness of this effort is that reports from the field show that the number of ralliers knowledgeable of the Chieu Hoi Program has increased from under 80 percent to over 90 percent during the past quarter.

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals: declassified  
after 12 years

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## b. Political Warfare:

(1) NGUYEN TRAI II, an accelerated Chieu Hoi campaign from 16 June to 15 September has a goal of 9,000 ralliers. When this goal is met, the entire 1967 Hoi Chanh figure 27,178 will have been surpassed.

(2) The objectives of the New Horizons Campaign are to improve the administrative, logistical and leadership techniques, and political warfare activities in the RVNAF. This campaign will be a most important step forward for the political warfare system and may determine the future of the concept of political warfare in Vietnam.

## 3. (U) FRIENDLY OPERATIONS:

a. Operations in the Republic of Vietnam may be expressed in terms of the following aggregates:

TABLE 59

### SUMMARY OF PSYOP/POLWAR OPERATIONS IN RVN

<u>Aerial Activities</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Leaflets Dropped In Millions	681.1	836.7	760.9
Leaflet Targets	9917	11155	10925
Broadcast Hours	2009	2093	2258
Broadcast Targets	7372	9033	8165
<u>Ground Activities</u>			
Leaflets Hand-Disseminated in Millions	3.68	5.51	18.9
Broadcast Hours	12211	13967	11914
Face-to-Face Operations	8525	5309	4783
Movies (Hours)	1515	1481	1557
Posters Distributed in Thousands	116.1	88.3	115.3
Newspapers and Magazines in Millions	2.23	2.23	1.16

## b. Leaflet Development:

(1) Significant Trail leaflets (targeted for use in North Vietnam)

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developed during the quarter included the text of President Nixon's 14 May speech (peace proposals), the results of the 8 June Midway conference (troop replacement) and Ho Chi Minh's proposals for protracted warfare. This last leaflet also quoted Vo Nguyen Giap's admission of the loss of over a half million men in the war.

(2) In-country leaflets also exploited President Nixon's peace proposals and the US troop replacement. The latter theme emphasized the ability of RVNAF to replace US forces. The fact that over 100,000 communists have rallied since the Chieu Hoi Program began was also exploited.

c. Radio Pleiku: On 24 March 68, the station was attacked and rendered inoperative. A replacement set having arrived in Vietnam in May 68, installation of the radio equipment and the reconstruction of the site continued throughout the year. On 26 April 69, required repairs and adjustments were made and on 6 May 69, the transmitter ran a test broadcast using 50KW of power. Vietnamese and Montagnard language programming was resumed on 15 May 69 at 15KW broadcast level. The station is now broadcasting daily from 0530 to 0830 and again from 1800 to 2400 hours at 15KW. Upon replacement of a defective directional coupling scheduled for October, the station will be capable of operating at its full power of 50KW.

d. Montagnard Programming at Radio Pleiku:

(1) The purpose of Radio Pleiku is to transmit psychological warfare messages to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) personnel operating in the Central Highlands west of Pleiku. Provision was not originally made to broadcast in the Montagnard dialect. In January 69 the Commanding General, I FFORCEV, requested that the programming target audience include Montagnards.

(2) Montagnard programming in the Jarai dialect was begun on 1 Jun 69. Programs are broadcast daily from 0730 to 0800 hours and repeated from 1825 to 1855 hours. Budget restrictions and limited availability of qualified broadcast personnel impose this restricted schedule on current programming.

e. NGUYEN TRAI II Campaign:

(1) NGUYEN TRAI II is a psychological warfare campaign developed by the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), Joint General Staff (JGS), RVNAF.

(2) The campaign consists of three phases: The preparatory phase from 1 to 15 June; the implementation phase from 16 June to 15 September;

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and the evaluation phase from 16 September to 15 October.

(3) NGUYEN TRAI II complements the Pacification and Development Program and has been timed to exploit the present enemy condition. Loud-speaker operations, leaflets, radio and TV broadcasts, family contact, publicized POW release and civic action are employed.

(4) GPWD is responsible for planning and monitoring the campaign. Corps tactical zones are responsible for execution and reporting. The US is supplying 691 million leaflets for the campaign and assists in distribution of materials.

### f. "New Horizons" Campaign:

(1) "New Horizons" is a campaign developed by GPWD, JGS, and RVNAF aimed at improving administration, logistics and leadership techniques, and political warfare activities in the RVNAF. In this campaign, several units which are poor performers with high desertion rates are undergoing a preplanned political warfare and administrative improvement program. A national level GPWD team travels to pilot units' areas and gives classes and guidance. The team also assists in setting up or improving the units' administrative and logistical machinery and in establishing unit SOPs.

(2) During the first (planning) phase, conducted from 1 May to 30 June, pilot units in the field were visited. Implementation plans were subsequently submitted by the pilot units and these plans were critiqued by GPWD. On the US side, a conference was held on 25 June to assist in getting the campaign started. In attendance were representatives of MACV staff elements and US Senior Advisors to the pilot units. At the conference the role of the US advisory effort in "New Horizons" was explained to the attendees and questions concerning all aspects of the campaign were resolved.

(3) The second (implementation) phase will begin 1 July. Senior advisors to each corps tactical zone will submit progress reports twice a month to the Psychological Operation (PSYOP) Division, J3, on the "New Horizons" pilot units which they advise. A MACV monitoring committee has been established, chaired by the PSYOP Division and composed of representatives of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, Military Assistance, and a representative from the J4 Training Directorate. The monitoring committee will review the reports submitted by advisors at corps tactical zones to determine problem areas being encountered in the conduct of the campaign. Recommendations for eliminating problem areas will then be submitted to appropriate RVNAF agencies. This procedure is in keeping with the US position that its role in the campaign is to make the Vietnamese system work--not to do the job for the Vietnamese.

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(4) The implementation phase will end on 31 October. At that time the evaluation phase will be initiated to last from 1 November to 31 December 69.

g. "New Opportunities" Campaign:

(1) During last quarter, the "New Opportunities" Campaign completed its third phase (1 February - 15 May 1969) and entered its fourth phase. "New Opportunities" was initiated to educate all regular, regional, and popular forces concerning enemy trickery, current government policy, and results of peace negotiations. The Campaign is designed to bolster the Republic of Vietnam servicemen's resolution and morale during a period of complex political developments and intensified propaganda activities.

(2) Following the second (Dien Hong) phase which ended on 31 January 1969, the third phase (unnamed) was conducted from 1 February to 15 May. The themes stressed during the third phase were: the just cause of the military forces and people's anti-communist struggle; the repeated defeats of the enemy and continued success of RVNAF; the communists' deceit in the Paris peace talks; increased public awareness of communist treachery; and the roles of the armed forces and civilian populace in the Campaign.

(3) Vi Dan (For the People), the fourth phase of the Campaign, is currently underway. The basic objectives are (a) to familiarize RVNAF personnel at all levels with the concept that the Army comes from the people, serves the people, and must win the people's allegiance, (b) to establish clearly the role and importance of civic action in the RVNAF and (c) to improve discipline and pursuit of national objectives. The Campaign also incorporates an effort to reduce infractions of public traffic regulations by RVNAF personnel. Vi Dan is being conducted through radio, TV, the press, and the printing of 250,000 specially prepared civic action booklets. Additionally, civic action operations, contests and civilian opinion polls are being conducted.

(4) Vi Dan was initiated on 16 May and was scheduled to end on 15 September 1969. However, due to its success, Vi Dan has been extended until the end of 1969.

(5) GPWD is presently studying the feasibility of adding two additional phases to the "New Opportunities" Campaign.

h. POLWAR College Graduation: On 3 May 1969, the first two-year cadet class at the Political Warfare College graduated 168 new second lieutenants. President Thieu, Prime Minister Huong, US Ambassador Bunker, and General Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, attended the exercise. The majority of the graduates are slated to serve as deputy company commanders/POLWAR officers with RVNAF companies, many of them with pilot units of the "New Horizons" Campaign.

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## i. Preparation Phase of CY70 General Political Warfare Department Budget:

(1) In the past, agencies of the Government of Vietnam began their fiscal year on 1 January, without the Legislature's approval of the Government's budget. A lapse of many months usually transpired before final approval was enacted. Consequently, all agencies proceeded with caution in the execution of financial programs, spending monies only for minimum essential requirements. Once the "green light" was on, agencies accelerated rapidly. But, due to the excessive lead time necessary to complete procurement action, a year-end backlog occurred. To preclude such an eventuality and permit efficient management of funds, the formulation, development, and preparation phase of the CY70 Budget was advanced three months earlier than the CY69 cycle. This would give HQ, MACV and the US Mission Council sufficient time in which to conduct a thorough review and still present the US budget approval to the Ministry of Defense not later than 31 August 1969. The remaining time should be more than adequate to ensure legislative enactment prior to 1 January 70.

(2) A slippage of two weeks in the scheduled plan for budget completion has been experienced but this will not impede attainment of the overall objective.

(3) Total dollar requirements for the CY70 Budget for the General Political Warfare Department are forecast at 843,186,000\$VN, which is 134,712,000\$VN less than the CY69 approved program. US direct support (i.e., Joint Support credits) will be reduced by 22 percent as compared with CY69. In short, the Government of Vietnam is assuming a greater share of GPWD's budget.

## 4. (C) NEW TACTICS, TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES:

a. The revised "Weekly PSYOP Summary Report" system became effective on 1 May 69. The original report was instituted on 1 January 69, but a more comprehensive and detailed report was needed. The revised report form (MACV Form 48) will permit reporting of the entire PSYOP effort in RVN in a computer-compatible format, indentifying the units and agencies that actually conduct psychological operations. The system will continue to tie together the PSYOP effort in Vietnam, storing the data, and retrieving it in geographical overlays. These overlays will be provided monthly to major subordinate commanders for evaluation and planning purposes.

b. On 16 April 69, Chief of Staff, MACV, published an action memorandum directing the implementation of a PSYOP single manager concept. This concept has been spelled out in detail in the new MACV Directive 10-1, which was published on 12 June 69. Under this concept, COMUS-MACV controls and directs, through a single manager, all psychological

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operations and psychological advisory activities conducted by MACV elements. The ACoS, J3, MACV, represented by the Chief, PSYOP Division, coordinates and integrates all US psychological operations conducted at the CTZ/region and lower levels.

### 5. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT:

a. Two recently captured enemy documents provide indications of reduced fighting spirit among VC and NVA troops. One document criticizes enemy troops for being afraid of the sacrifices of fierce war and for lacking the determination to continuously attack allied forces. The document also states: "We are subjective; we rely on the support of the main force and await the negotiations of the Paris Peace Talks." The other document admonishes enemy troops to be vigilant and to avoid illusions about peace or easy victories.

b. Recent attacks by Cambodian military units on VC units withdrawing from Chau Doc Province to Cambodian base areas may damage enemy morale. A VC rallier reported that these Cambodian attacks by indirect and small arms fire, which the VC believe are the result of cooperation between ARVN and Cambodian units, are a severe threat to VC security. Further evidence of enemy concern is apparent in the claim by Liberation Radio (28 May 69) that the clashes were the result of provocations by "US Henchmen" disguised as VC.

c. A number of exploitable sources of friction between VC and NVA troops assigned to the same unit have been reported by several ralliers. The NVA officers feel that the VC officers have had inferior military training, and are tactically incompetent. However, the VC are more familiar with RVN terrain, and feel that NVA troops are of little help in planning operations. This mutual disrespect has resulted in conflicts among the enemy leadership. Also, NVA troops annoy the VC by attempting to "correct" their speech habits to match the North Vietnamese dialect. Finally, NVA troops dislike VC methods of food preparation because VC troops do not always cook their vegetables.

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## ANNEX B

### COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

1. (U) General: The major communications-electronics (C-E) facilities continue to be expanded and integrated into a system which improves the service in the entire SEASIA area. New service was provided to additional customers and planned expansion programs are continuing. Improvements in capacity and efficiency are being realized every month.

2. (U) Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA): The following activities occurred on the major portions of the ICS-SEA during the second quarter CY69.

a. During this quarter there were eleven tactical transportable DCS links that were approved for deactivation. There were four new ICS systems activated during this quarter.

b. Transportable microwave terminals: The Dong Ha and Di An AN/TSC-82 systems were activated. In addition the AN/TSC-82 sites at Dong Ba Thin and Sa Dec will be operational by 31 July. These systems will provide a means of eliminating additional tactical systems.

c. Multiplex Assets Rearrangement, Vietnam (MARV): The equipment installation for MARV was completed on 30 June 69. From the starting date of 25 Feb 69, 1st Sig Bde installation teams completed rearrangement of multiplex assets at 51 ICS sites, consuming 2,198 man hours. Through 21 June there were fifteen thru-groups rerouted, eleven thru-groups established, eleven terminal groups discontinued, twelve terminal groups established. Active DCS circuits rerouted as result of above actions were 380.

3. (U) Dial Telephone Exchange (DTEs and Tandems):

a. The USAF 1000-line DTE at Camp Enari was cutover on 20 April 1969. The USA 1000-line DTE at Plantation was cutover on 18 May 69. The DTE program continues well with five additional offices/expansions scheduled for completion by the end of the 4th Qtr CY70.

b. At the end of the quarter, the following DTE capability existed in RVN:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>DTEs</u>	<u>LINES</u>
Army	19	26,460
Air Force	10	22,500
Navy/Marines	6	6,800
	35	55,760

4. (U) SEA-ATS (Tandem Switch):

a. Construction at all nine locations is complete. Installation has been started at all sites and completed at six sites.

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b. Da Nang switching center (SWC) cutover on 12 April brought the total to four active switches: Ban Pha (30 Nov 68); Can Tho (22 Feb 69); Korat (29 Mar 69); and Da Nang. Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang SWCs are scheduled for activation 12 and 26 July respectively. The remaining three at Vung Chua Mountain, Pleiku, and Warin are progressing well and will be activated in late 69.

c. SEA-ATS management is now active with DCA exercising management control and operational direction over SWCs' tandem trunks, primary and secondary trunks from main distribution frame (MDF) to MDF. DTEs and tributaries are controlled by the responsible component. This is in keeping with the revised paragraph thirteen forwarded by CINCPAC. No resolution of component/DCA differences by JCS has been received. DCA-SAM based on CINCPAC tasking is attempting to gain additional spaces for equipment and traffic engineering personnel. The DCA-SAM management capability will become critical with the phaseout of the Joint Cutover Integrated Working Group (JCIWG) this fall.

### 5. (U) AUTODIN:

a. The Phu Lam Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) switch is now providing service to 32 highspeed leased and lowspeed Mode V teletype terminals. The daily average message traffic through the switch dropped to approximately 35,000.

b. Nha Trang switch is now serving thirty terminals and the daily traffic average rose to 32,000 messages during the quarter. The Cam Ranh Bay NAVCOMSTA was provided with dual AUTODIN access with the installation of a Mode V terminal to Guam Automatic Switching Center (ASC). This action will improve the AUTODIN restoral capability in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

c. A revised interim AUTODIN restoral plan to cover all current AUTODIN subscribers was implemented during the reporting period.

d. The Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) Program continued to slip. Although both USARV and 7AF had called out numerous lowspeed DSTEs none arrived in-country by the end of the quarter. This delay has had serious impact on both the manual teletype relay phaseout plan and the improved AUTODIN restoral concept.

e. The spare AUTODIN drum placed in Thailand to meet Pacific Command (PACOM) contingencies was airlifted to RVN when the Phu Lam ASC was in hazardous operating condition due to a drum failure beyond the scope of the on-site maintenance capability. Fortunately, the one operating drum did not fail prior to the arrival of the contingency drum.

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6. (C) Automatic Secure Voice Communication (AUTOSEVOCOM): There were no new Secure Cord Switchboards (SECORDS) activated during the 2nd Qtr CY69. Construction work is completed at the Nha Trang, Pleiku and Qui Nhon SECORD sites. The power panels which had previously delayed completion of these sites were installed during the quarter. Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM) test and acceptance of these three sites is an accomplished fact; however a shortage of personnel to operate and maintain these sites has precluded their activation. Five narrowband transportable shelters are also pending activation due to shortage of maintenance personnel. During the period 15 May - 22 Jun 69, the Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Evaluation Team performed quality evaluation on the majority of SECORDS, the FTC-31 switch, approximately 40 percent of the subscribers, and trunking interface. An interim report was issued 21 Jun 69.

7. (U) Signal Modernization and Improvement Program:

a. The Signal Modernization and Improvement Program has been developed to provide the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) with modern tactical signal equipment and replacement of obsolete equipment. Deliveries are time-phased based on production input to the RVNAF supply system.

b. The rapid expansion of military activities in the Republic of Vietnam has required a corresponding increase in tactical communications equipment provided by the Military Assistance Program. This equipment is essential to provide effective control of ARVN and RF/PF units in the prosecution of the war. Current status of major items in the program is as follows:

TABLE 60

AUTHORIZATIONS FOR EQUIPMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLETE  
EQUIPMENT UNDER SIGNAL MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AUTH AS OF 16 JUN 69</u>	<u>O/H AS OF 8 JUL 69</u>	<u>D/L AS OF 8 JUL 69</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
<u>Radio Sets:</u>					
AN/PRC -25	34,742	18,080	15,154	1,508	A
AN/GRC -125	427	408	6	13	A
AN/VRC-53	660	472	66	122	A
AN/VRC-46	2,495	753	924	818	A

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AUTH AS OF 16 JUN 69</u>	<u>O/H AS OF 8 JUL 69</u>	<u>D/L AS OF 8 JUL 69</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
AN/VRC-47	2,206	709	1,066	431	A
AN/VRC-49	123	77	46	0	
AN/GRC-106	423	218	205	0	
<u>Radio Terminal:</u>					
AN/TRC-35 L/PWR	217	3	0	214	B
AN/TRC-35 W/PWR	99	101	144	(146)	B
<u>Radio Relay:</u>					
AN/TRC-36 L/PWR	93	40	66	(13)	B
AN/TRC-36 W/PWR	32	6	0	26	B
<u>Telephone Terminal:</u>					
AN/TCC-50	313	165	148	0	
<u>Power Units:</u>					
PU-618	273	441	0	(168)	C
PU-619	43	113	2	(72)	C
<u>Signal Generator:</u>					
AN/GRM-50	359	26	313	20	A
<u>Test Sets:</u>					
AN/VRM-1	243	183	60	0	
<u>RF Voltmeter:</u>					
AN/URM-145	148	70	78	0	
<u>Frequency Meter:</u>					
AN/USM-207	168	4	149	15	A

## NOTES:

- A. Sufficient quantities of substitutes are on hand to satisfy all shortages of preferred items. Quantities reflected in balance column are scheduled for programming as modernization quantities to be supplied during FY70 through FY75.
- B. Authorizations are under review. Subsequent to the completion of review appropriate programming action will be accomplished.
- C. Figures are based upon approved ARVN and RF/PF TOE/TAs.

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c. Excesses will be utilized with AN TRC-35/36's and AN/GRC-122's.

## 8. (U) RVNAF Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam (MTN-V):

a. General: The MTN-V is a program to provide fixed area type communications service for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Facilities installed under the MTN-V are designed to become a part of a single integrated telecommunications system for the Republic of Vietnam. At the end of the 2d Qtr, MTN-V status was as follows:

TABLE 61

### RVNAF MTN-V PROJECT STATUS AS OF 30 JUN 69

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CY65-69</u>	<u>TOTAL PROJECTS</u>	<u>TOTAL PROJECTS</u>
	<u>TOTAL PROJECT</u>		
	<u>PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL*</u>	<u>COMPLETED**</u>
Inside Plant	67	16	17
Outside Plant	79	12	4
Comm Center	53	14 Tape Relay & Fac Control	0
		33 Tape Relay Only	0
Radio	<u>19</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	218	84	21

b. MTN-V Construction Status at the end of 2d Qtr was as follows:

TABLE 62

### RVNAF MTN-V CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS OF 30 Jun 69

<u>TYPE BUILDING</u>	<u>BUILDINGS IN</u>	<u>BUILDING IN</u>
	<u>FY67 (Supp) MASF PROGRAM</u>	<u>FY69 MASF PROGRAM</u>
DCO	3	0
DCO/Comm Center	2	0
Comm Center	22	8
Radio Relay	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>
	41	21

\* An operational project is one having sufficient equipment installed to provide the communications service for which the facility was designed.

\*\* A complete project is one having all items of bill of materials (BOM) equipment on hand and installed.

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<u>TYPE BUILDING</u>	<u>BUILDING IN FY71 MASF PROGRAM (PROPOSED)</u>	<u>BUILDINGS COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR ON CONTRACT</u>
DCO	0	2	0
DCO/Comm Center	0	1	1
Com Center	5	0	13
Radio Relay	$\frac{2}{7}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{8}{22}$

## 9. (U) Overall Assessment:

a. The major communications-electronics (C-E) facilities continue to be expanded and integrated into a system which improves the service in the entire SEASIA area. New service was provided to additional customers and planned expansion programs are continuing. Improvements are being realized every month, resulting in increased capacity and efficiency.

b. Automatic long distance direct dial telephone service in SEA has become a reality with four of the nine tandem switches cut to traffic by the end of this reporting period. Two more, Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang are scheduled to be in operation by mid-July. The remaining three, Vung Chua mountain, Pleiku, and Warin, will be activated in January 1970.

c. Autosevocom: No new SECORDS were activated during this quarter. The sites at Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon continue to suffer from lack of personnel to operate and maintain them, therefore, they are not as yet activated. Relief appears imminent in July 1969.

d. Although power continues as a problem, efforts have been expanded by all concerned and a small but definite improvement has been noted during the past quarter.

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## ANNEX C

### RVNAF PERSONNEL/TRAINING

#### 1. (C) Personnel:

##### a. General Personnel Situation: (See Annex E)

(1) Overall Estimate: The 30 Jun 69 estimated assigned strength of RVNAF is 881,112, an increase of 36,481 from the 31 Mar 69 updated strength of 844,631. The total authorized strength of RVNAF Accelerated Phase II is 875,790 as of 30 June 69. Estimated strength of paramilitary forces (National Police and CIDG) is 117,519 a decrease of 2,425 from 31 Mar 69. Estimated strength of other paramilitary forces (Kit Carson Scouts, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams and Song Tan Cadre) is 59,100. Total strength of GVN forces as of 30 Jun 69 is estimated to be 998,631.

(2) The VNAF personnel strength continues to increase at a rapid rate. As of 30 Jun 69, the overall manning, based on the 1969 UMD authorization of 32,587 was 83 percent. The assigned strength increased by 5,804 from 31 Mar 69 to 30 Jun 69. The current assigned strength of 27,183 versus the assigned strength of 16,921 on 30 Jun 68 reflects the outstanding results of the VNAF recruiting efforts to obtain personnel to meet the requirements of the Improvement and Modernization Program. There remains an urgent need for a mechanized VNAF personnel data reporting system.

##### b. Significant Activities:

(1) Manpower Mobilization: Mobilization actions taken by the Mobilization Directorate during the 2d Qtr CY69 were as follows:

(a) Conscriptees provided by the Mobilization Directorate to RVNAF were as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
JGS Quota	1,500	3,200	13,883	18,583
Conscripted	1,611	772	17,563	19,946

(b) The Ministry of Defense published a letter on 14 Apr 69 which extended the draft deferment period for both Category D personnel (6 months deferment) and Category E (3 months deferment) from 1 May 69 to 31 Jul 69. This was the second extension for Category E personnel.

(c) The Ministry of Defense on 22 Apr 69 authorized the Director General of the National Police to recruit 13,000 uniformed and special

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police during CY69 from among ex-servicemen of all age groups and youths at least 25 years of age. Personnel must be in a legal draft status at the time of recruitment.

### (?) RVN War Veteran Affairs:

(a) The vocational training center at Da Nang began classes in typing, auto mechanics, driver training and English language on 13 Apr 69. A total of 76 students were enrolled in these classes. Instructors are being provided by the Naval Support Activity Da Nang. The supplies and training aids for the classes are provided jointly by the War Veterans Ministry and the Naval Support Activity.

(b) Graduation ceremonies were held on 16 May 69 for 145 students at the Cat Lai Vocational Training Center for the fourth class of graduates from this center. A new class began on 2 June 1969 with an enrollment of 144 students.

(c) The Canadian government provided a 50 bed rehabilitation hospital for war veterans at Qui Nhon. This facility was formally opened on 25 April 1969.

### (3) Prisoner of War Program:

(a) During the period 1 April 1969 to 30 June 1969 a total of 2,177 PW were transferred within the PW camp system. Of this total 1,968 were transferred from mainland PW camps to the Central PW Camp, Phu Quoc (CPWC); 162 youths were transferred to the Bien Hoa PW Camp (Youth Rehabilitation Center); and 47 female PW were transferred to Qui Nhon PW Camp (female camp). The total population at Bien Hoa is 3,382 youths (17 years old and younger) while 799 female PW were included in the total of 1,027 interned in the Qui Nhon facility as of 30 June 1969. These figures do not include deaths, escapes, releases, repatriations and reclassifications, nor do they indicate a capture rate. They merely represent a measure of the camp input.

(b) Construction, grading and clearing operations continue at the CPWC on enclosures #8, #9, #10. The 14th QC Battalion recently arrived at the CPWC to provide increased security for the PW facility.

(c) During the quarter delegates of the International Commission of Red Cross, escorted by a MACJ15 staff officer, visited a total of 17 PW facilities in SVN -- 8 ARVN, 7 US, 1 Thai and 1 Korean.

(d) A 20 Feb 69 postal letter directed agencies concerned to recommend deserving PW for a change of status to Hoi Chanh under the Chieu Hoi Program. However, a 1 Apr 69 MOD letter to JGS/RVNAF stated that on 20 Feb 69 the GVN Cabinet decided that it was not necessary to allow NVA PW into the Chieu Hoi program but rather release or parole, pursuant to Article 21 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention may be approved. JGS/J1 was requested to prepare implementing directives.

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## (4) Desertion Control:

(a) On 26 Feb 69, JGS directed major units of RVNAF to activate permanent desertion control committees as a means to reduce desertions.

(b) On 27 Mar 69, J1/JGS published Memo #0158 outlining the desertion control measures in effect at the 25th ARVN Division. This step was taken because the Division has shown the most positive effort in reducing desertions among major units within ARVN.

(c) On 3 Apr 69, J1 and CLC/JGS activated phase two of the test leave program. Phase two differed from Phase I in that only Common Service Airlift System aircraft were available rather than all space on friendly aircraft as in phase one. Phase two began on 15 April and was completed 17 May. This phase was more successful than phase one though it was determined that some transportation problems still existed and in which the test leave program would become entirely dependent upon Vietnamese aircraft, that phase three would commence in June.

(d) On 17 May, J1/JGS published a directive establishing new desertion control goals for all major units. The goals established are more stringent than those in effect through Mar 69.

(e) JGS held a desertion control seminar at the 25th ARVN Division for the regular force units of III CTZ and IV CTZ on 3 Jun 69. The participants in this seminar were apprised of the control measures instituted by the 25th Division and the success achieved by this unit in reducing its desertion rate.

## (5) VNAF Pilot/Officer Procurement:

(a) In April, JGS directed physical examination of almost 3,000 ARVN officers and reserve officer cadets under 28 years of age at Quang Trung Training Center, Thu Duc Infantry School, and Nha Trang NCO School, who met the educational requirements. This move was directed so that sufficient second lieutenants and aspirants will be available as standbys for non-volunteer VNAF pilot training in the event sufficient volunteers are not recruited.

(b) JGS directed the assignment of an additional 110 officers from ROTC Class 7/68 to VNAF. VNAF was originally programmed to receive only 120 officers from this class.

## c. Problem Areas and Trends:

(1) Desertions are a continuing major personnel problem in RVNAF. March desertions (10,187) rose as predicted but not to the level of January (10,391). April and May figures indicate that the decline in desertions has "leveled off." Increased emphasis is being initiated by MACV and JGS in an effort to resume the downward trend.



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## (2) Promotions:

(a) As a result of MACV recommendations reported last quarter, General Vien announced in April that the original annual promotion board will be reconvened in May to reconsider all personnel previously eligible but not promoted. Further, an additional promotion board will be convened in August to consider for promotion those personnel who become eligible during calendar year 1969. These boards will not be limited by the minimum points requirement.

(b) The actions taken by JGS should permit RVNAF to achieve their calendar year 1969 promotion quotas except for promotions to the grade of colonel. The quota for promotion to colonel appears to be high and MACV has recommended that JGS reevaluate the three year realization plan goals as they apply to this grade.

(3) The current VNAF personnel assignment, classification, and strength accounting systems and procedures are not considered adequate to identify accurately and promptly personnel resources and assess capabilities to support a modern Air Force. Among the inadequacies are the following:

(a) The VNAF Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Personnel does not have full responsibility for these functions. The distribution of personnel is determined to a great extent by functional managers and the policy of attempting to assign personnel to areas near their homes.

(b) Personnel classification is a function of the VNAF DCS/Training, but the VNAF commander must sign the order awarding Air Force Codes Specialty (AFSCs) to VNAF personnel.

(c) The delay in publishing reassignment orders or orders awarding AFSCs, which may take three months from the time the individual reports to a unit or from the time he completes training, results in inaccurate strength accounting.

(d) Since descriptions of each specialty used in VNAF have not been published to prescribe the knowledge, education, experience, and training requirements for award of AFSCs, the technical requirements of authorized positions and qualifications of assigned personnel cannot be determined. In this regard, it is anticipated that the 1969 VNAF Unit Manning Document (UMD), when published, will include authorizations for AFSCs that are not now in the VNAF inventory.

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(e) The attainment of a specified skill level in an AFS is not a requisite for promotion of enlisted personnel. Consequently, the distribution of skill levels has little or no bearing on the distribution of assigned personnel by grade. It is thus conceivable that personnel in charge of sections may have the rank but not the technical knowledge to supervise other personnel in the section. With the assignment of a captain, AFSC 7324, for duty as a personnel classification advisor in July, significant effort will be expended toward improving the VNAF personnel classification system and procedures. Although the advisor will be assigned to the Personnel Advisory Division, he will work with counterpart assigned to VNAF DCS/Training. A copy of the list of AFSs used in VNAF was provided JGS for use by the computer center personnel in preparing data programs that will include VNAF and not be strictly Army-oriented.

### d. Overall Assessment:

Overall strength of RVNAF as of 30 June 1969 indicates that accelerated force goals will be exceeded. However, unless personnel strengths are reduced and desertions brought under control the command will remain understrength. Current manpower estimates indicate that RVNAF will be able to maintain the current force level through CY73.

(2) Continuing to emphasize desertion control measures as a command responsibility. The activation of unit desertion control committees should add impetus to the program to reduce desertions.

(3) VNAF overall strength has risen from 21,579 as of 31 Mar 69 to 27,183 as of 30 Jun 69. With this rapid rate of expansion, VNAF personnel management will soon be incapable of functioning effectively, the performance of the overall VNAF mission will suffer accordingly. It is essential that the problems mentioned above be solved in the near future, and that consideration be given to the implementation of a mechanized personnel system.

## 2. (C) RVNAF TRAINING:

### a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):

#### (1) Objectives and Results:

(a) The objectives and results for 2d Qtr CY69 of major Joint General Staff/Central Training Command (CTC) programs are shown in the following table:

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TABLE 63

## PROGRAMMED/ACTUAL INPUT TO JGS/CTC TRAINING PROGRAMS

<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Programmed Input</u>	<u>Actual Input</u>	<u>% of Program Input</u>	<u>Completed Training</u>
Individual:				
ARVN + RF Recruits	19350	26514	137%	16919
OCS Preparatory	0	0	N/A	2211
NCO Preparatory	1500*	537*	36%	939
PF Recruit	4916	3366	68%	1965
PF Squad Leader	295	944	320%	313
PF Platoon Leader	1183	641	54%	218
Special NCO	2000	2182	109%	975
Unit:				
New Inf Bn	0	0	N/A	1
Inf Bn Refresher	4	4	100%	2
ARVN Recon Co	6	5	83%	6
New RF Co	0	27	N/A	144
RF Co Refresher	4	4	100%	6
New PF Platoon	25	9	36%	64
PF Platoon Refresher	52	19	37%	37

\*Reprogrammed downward to 800 for April and May.

(b) Activation, training and deployment of new units continued with the 16th Armored Cavalry Squadron completing training and deploying to IV CTZ. The 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron was activated and commenced training. Four artillery battalions were activated and commenced training. The 213th Arty Bn was the first artillery unit to be equipped by a transfer of TOE equipment directly from an operational US artillery battalion (6/77th Arty Bn). Procedures for transfer of equipment were satisfactory.

(c) Objectives and results during 2d Qtr CY69 for the 21 military schools controlled by the Central Training Command are set forth below:

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TABLE 64

## PROGRAMMED/ACTUAL INPUT FOR CTC - CONTROLLED MILITARY SCHOOLS

<u>School</u>	<u>Programmed Input</u>	<u>Actual Input</u>
Admin	333	471
AG	530	831
Armor	957	1294
Artillery	150	1521
Command and Staff	200	161
Engineer	706	879
Infantry	2730	3198
Intelligence	385	637
Junior Military Academy	0	0
Language	2709	2723
Dog Training Center	180	131
Music	105	110
Military Police	534	1191
NCO Academy	5750	4894
National Defense College	40	24
Ordnance	1302	892
Quartermaster	177	256
Signal	1261	1490
Transportation	2283	3485
Military Academy (VNMA)	200	400
WAFC	<u>810</u>	<u>334</u>
TOTALS:	21342	24922

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### (2) Significant Activities:

#### (a) RVANF Schools and Academies:

MP School - The main building in Kiet Compound (Vung Tau) was transferred from the MP School to the Armed Forces Language School in May 69. The loss of the building reduced the optimum capacity of the Military Police School to approximately 850 students. Since the programmed student load for much of 3d Qtr CY69 is in excess of 1,000 students, tents were requisitioned and erected to accomodate the student overload.

Signal School - Student input to the RVANF Signal School increased during this quarter to more than 85 percent of the program. A requirement for training cryptographic specialists at the Signal School on the operation and maintenance of the KL-7 was identified in May 69. Self-help renovation of a teaching facility in order to meet physical security requirements was started in May with completion expected on or before 31 Jul 69. A special combined instruction team for sensor devices started training at the Signal School in support of Operation TIGHT JAW.

RVANF Language School - A new requirement for English language training (ELT) was identified in May 69. This ELT requirement is to support the Integrated Communications System (ICS) program. A total of 110 active and 40 listening language laboratory positions were installed at the training facilities of the RVANF Language School. The school now has 195 active and 40 listening positions distributed among the four training facilities in the Saigon/Cholon area. The authorized strength of the RVANF Language School Advisory Detachment was increased from 109 to 500 USA, USAF and USN personnel.

Command and Staff College - Students enrolled in correspondence courses from the Command and Staff College have surpassed the quota of 1,320 applicants. Additional funding and faculty personnel would be required to process the correspondence if more new students are enrolled.

Armor School - The school conducted training for the 3/15, 1/16, 2/16, 3/16, and 17th Cavalry Troops, all newly activated units, and underwent its first CMMI inspection averaging 92 percent.

Music School - The Marine Division Band was activated during the quarter and received two months of intensive training at the school.

(b) New RF Company Training: The new RF company training program input reached 100 percent during May. Considering the difficult recruiting problems involved, this is a significant accomplishment.

(c) New Infantry Battalion Training: The 4th Battalion, 53d Regiment, 23d Division completed training as scheduled on 22 Apr 69. This was the only battalion scheduled for CY69.

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(d) M16 Rifle Marksmanship and Night Training: All training centers are conducting 100 percent of the prescribed Program of Instruction (POI) in the M16 rifle and night training.

(e) Recruit Training: Input of ARVN and RF recruits to the training centers continued to exceed programmed figures for the 2d Qtr CY69. Popular Force recruit input continued to fall short of programmed figures and has remained at a 1 percent increase for April and May over March.

(f) OJT Training: A new On-The-Job Training (OJT) Branch was established in the Service Schools and doctrine division of the Training Directorate to serve as the central MACV agency to coordinate, evaluate, collect data and supervise the MACV OJT program for RVNAF personnel. OJT is seen as one of the prime training vehicles for the improvement and modernization of RVNAF.

(g) Training Development Plan: JGS has directed CTC, service schools and training centers to forward their comments and plans for implementation of the new Training Development Plan for 1969 to 1974. Replies are required NLT 15 Jul 69.

### (3) Problem Areas and Trends:

(a) Enemy Activity Against Training Centers: A total of 27 training center locations were the objects of enemy activity during the reporting period. These attacks ranged from sniper fire to a ground attack by a VC company. There were two such attacks in April, five in May and twenty in June. In only three instances was training interrupted. There were all total 58 friendly KIA and 241 WIA. In fifteen instances there was no damage to training facilities; in another seven there was only light damage.

(b) Shortfalls in Training Programs: During the 2d Qtr CY69, significant shortfalls continued in three individual training programs and two unit programs. In addition, an extremely high attrition was experienced in VNAF Airman Classes at the RVNAF Language School. The three major contributors to the problem of shortfalls in individual and unit training programs were the competition for personnel with qualifications for several programs, the reluctance of field commanders to release units for refresher training and the security and pacification requirements.

NCO Preparatory Training - As of 31 May 69 the NCO preparatory training program was at 52 percent of planned input. To compensate for this shortfall, other NCO source programs were expanded with the emphasis shifting more to in-service personnel.

PF Platoon Leader Training - This program was at 54 percent of programmed input as of 31 May 69. JGS/CTC directed each corps to revalidate training requirements for replacements for PF units by 30 Jun 69.

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PF Recruit Training - Input was 69 percent of program in May 69. JGS/CTC has additionally directed the corps to revalidate replacement training requirements for current PF units by 30 Jun 69.

ARVN Reconnaissance Company Training - Actual input to this ARVN program was 100 percent of scheduled input for May; however, earlier shortfalls that were rescheduled for May were not input due to operational requirements. To increase the reconnaissance capability within RVNAF, one RF company per province will undergo reconnaissance company training at training centers. This training is a slightly modified version of ARVN reconnaissance company training. By the end of May, five RF companies were receiving this training. This input exceeds the cumulative shortfall in the ARVN reconnaissance company training program

PF Platoon Refresher Training - During 2d Qtr CY69 only 37 percent of the scheduled program was achieved.

(c) Lack of equipment, vehicles, radios, fire direction equipment and aiming circles continues as a problem. Units are still being required to deploy to operational areas without mission essential items. This problem might be alleviated by a reevaluation of issue priorities.

(4) Overall Assessment: Increased student loads were taxing the facility and/or instructor resources at several schools and in the 2d Qtr CY69 there was a significant improvement in the actual student input to service schools, (from 81 percent in 1st Qtr, CY69 to 117 percent in 2d Qtr, CY69). Nevertheless, the shortfall in other training areas continued. It is expected to continue in unit refresher training programs due to the need to employ all available units in support of the pacification effort. A revalidation of the training requirements for PF replacements could result in a more favorable input ratio.

### b. VNN/VNMC:

#### (1) Objectives and Result:

(a) VNN: The ultimate goal of the joint USN/VNN training program is to increase the professional knowledge and competence of VNN trainees to the end result of complete US craft turnover and manning by the Vietnamese Navy.

(b) VNMC: The overall objective of the Vietnamese Marine Corps training program is to increase the level of combat readiness and combat proficiency through individual (in-country and offshore) training and unit training. In-country and offshore training continues to progress satisfactorily. The VNMC Training Command, located at Thu Duc, continued to improve and expand its training facilities and to upgrade the quality of instruction. Offshore training of selected individuals has been instrumental in upgrading the quality of instruction.

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## (2) Significant Activities:

(a) VNN: TF 115, TF 116, and TF 117 are actively engaged in training Vietnamese sailors and officers in such programs as engine school, boat school, English language training program, and on-the-job training. The 64 TF 117 craft turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 25 Jun have been manned by graduates of these programs and are indicative of the high level of training being administered.

(b) VNMC: A two week sniper school was initiated during the last quarter at the VNMC Training Command. Five courses have been completed to date with 65 marines having completed the instruction. Instructor personnel were trained by the First US Army Infantry Division. The syllabus of instruction and lesson plans were developed, based primarily on the 9th US Army Division and 1st US Army Division Sniper Schools. Both daylight and night techniques are taught using the M1 rifle with M84 scope and the M16 rifle with starlight scope. A 600 meter rifle range is now under construction. Sixty-four marines are presently attending VNMC NCO School at Thu Duc. The nine week course emphasizes small unit tactics, leadership, and weapons refresher training. Fourteen newly commissioned officers completed a one week VNMC Officer Indoctrination Course. The infantry battalions that returned to their base camps during the quarter conducted unit training at the Training Command during brief periods between deployments. Weapons refresher training and small unit tactics were stressed. The Division Reconnaissance Company conducted a five week unit training program at the National Training Center, Van Kiep. The two newly formed 105mm howitzer batteries completed an eight week individual and unit training program at the National Training Center, Duc My. The batteries became operationally ready on 15 June, as scheduled.

(3) Problem Areas and Trends: No problem areas have been isolated in either VNN or VNMC activities/objectives in 2d Qtr CY69.

## (4) Overall Assessment:

(a) VNN: The professional pride, aggressive nature, and desire to learn displayed by all trainees has been of the highest level and have directly resulted in the ability of the Vietnamese Navy to outfit and establish RAIDS 70-75.

(b) VNMC: Great strides have been made in improving the VNMC Training Command. The combat proficiency of the individual marine is a reflection of the high caliber of training received.

## c. VNAF Training:

(1) Objectives: The AFGP-PTR objective is to insure that necessary training is accomplished to provide the flying, technical, and support

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personnel essential to the mission. This objective is accomplished by a combination of in-country and off-shore training by US personnel and by development or expansion of VNAF training capability.

### (2) Significant Activities:

(a) UH-1H Maintenance Transition Training Status: The training requirements for the 211th and 217th Squadrons have been completed. The programmed Contract Engineering Technical Support Personnel (CETSP) are all in country and the training is being conducted in the 213th and 215th Squadrons. Progress of training is satisfactory. A total of 114 personnel have been trained, 41 from the 213th and 73 from the 215th. Fifty-one are now in training and 143 are awaiting training in the 213th and 215th Squadrons.

(b) The A-37 Mobile Training Team (MTT) completed all training requirements in an excellent manner and departed Vietnam on 2 May 69. A total of 1,573 personnel were trained: 80 officers and 1,493 enlisted.

(c) VNAF reported monthly averages of airmen on OJT as follows: April - 2,957; May - 1,223; June - figures unavailable at this time. A total of 216 airmen were upgraded: 82 to the 3 level; 11 to the 5 level, 123 to the 7 level. Twenty-two airmen and 33 officers completed MAP OJT in this period, and a total of 130 personnel remain in Military Assistance Program (MAP) OJT: 28 officers and 102 airmen. A total of 28 VNAF officers are presently receiving UH-1 transition training with US Army units (145 Avn Bn, Bien Hoa, and 13th Avn Bn, Soc Trang).

(d) During this reporting period, VNAF averaged 4,000 students per month in formal in-country training. A total of 5,147 students were graduated from training during this period. Training areas are outlined below:

TABLE 65

#### VNAF Training Program Summary

<u>School</u>	<u>No. In Training</u>	<u>No. Graduated</u>
Flying	67	0
ALO/FAC	64	64
General Services	158	70
Technical	294	85
Comm & Elect	202	12

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<u>School</u>	<u>No. In Training</u>	<u>No. Graduated</u>
VNAF English Language	347	115
RVNAF English Language	3,885	221 (649 Elim)
33d Wing	118	64
VNAF Hq	112	29
23d Wing	363	62
Air Log Wing	235	113
74th Wing	150	101
Military Basic, Enlisted	3,813	3,104
Officer Basic Tng, Phase I	626	228
Officer Basic Tng, Phase II	513	313
NCO Training	741	446
ARVN Formal Training	361	120
TOTAL	12,049	5,147

(e) Hq VNAF, DCS/Training, moved 200 air cadets to the Air Training Center on 19 May 1969 to undergo Phase II Officers Basic Training. After 12 weeks of training, the cadets will become warrant officers and subsequently enter language school in Saigon. This training was necessitated by VNAF's having more cadets available to enter language training than the input schedule required. The scheduled input to the language school cannot be changed to absorb these personnel since the school is at maximum capacity. Previously, all Phase II Basic Training was conducted by ARVN.

(f) During Jun 69, a survey of billeting space available at the Air Training Center was conducted to ascertain how many language students could be diverted from the Saigon RVNAF Language School to the VNAF school. The Hq VNAF proposal was to enter 500 language students immediately at ATC. It was decided that 300 could be accepted immediately. All billeting facilities available will be surveyed; Hq VNAF will be notified if/when the additional 200 students programmed for the Language School can be accepted. Based on billeting available, Hq VNAF moved 360 students to Nha Trang at the end of Jun 69 to begin language training in early Jul 69.

(g) The scheduled training flow for the VNAF instructors at the Technical Training Centers has been approved, permitting the establishment of firm in-country commencement dates for the training courses. The first

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of the 17 courses begins in March 1970, and the last in September 1970. The representatives from Air Training Command (ATC) and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) indicated that they would be able to support the in-country commencement dates with the necessary training and trainers. As a result of this agreement definite target dates for beginning the courses were established. Any deviations from these dates will now be considered to be slippage. The schedule for the 64-man basic course mobile training team has accordingly been determined and approved. The team will arrive in-country 60 days before the scheduled class starting dates. In addition, the members of the MTT will be paired with the VNAF instructors at the beginning of the training for the VNAF personnel. Where possible, the instructors of the VNAF personnel in a given basic course will constitute the membership of the MTT element for that particular course.

(h) The complete maintenance expansion training program is now well defined into three functional areas. They are: Material/Supplies, Facilities, and Personnel. The area in which the greatest amount of work still remains is the ordering and monitoring of the shipment of thousands of items (tools, equipment, publications, furniture, visual aids, and bench supplies) which must be requisitioned through normal supply channels. This, plus the continuous surveying of assets in-country that may be usable as training equipment, will require constant attention.

(i) The final concept for an in-country fixed wing Upgrade Pilot Training (UPT) program and a rotary-wing UPT program is complete, has been reproduced in limited quantity, and has been submitted to AF Group staff agencies for comments.

(j) A total of 452 students are currently training in CONUS and PACAF. Four hundred twenty-three of this number are in the FY69 training program. Departees during the 2d Qtr CY69 totalled 282. Returnees in this period totalled 139.

### (3) Problem Areas and Trends:

(a) The VNAF technical training capability will have to be considerably enlarged to support the Phase II VNAF force structure. It is estimated that there must be approximately 2,500 students in technical training throughout the year to support the force. This is an increase of approximately 1,500 students over the current VNAF technical training capability. A joint VNAF-AFGP working group has been established to plan and oversee the expansion of the technical training program. It is presently planned to expand the training capability at Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. Although the requirements have been known for several months, no progress has been made in turning over any existing facilities or in planning for new construction. Because of the long leadtime required for construction, the lack of facilities may well be the critical factor causing slippage in the expansion of the in-country training program.

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(b) A total of 294 classes were not offered in 2d Qtr CY69 as a result of the lack of language-qualified trainees. Among these were 159 in helicopter repair, nineteen in aircraft electric repair and eighteen each in instrument repair and aircraft pneudralic repair. The remainder were distributed over a wide array of subjects.

(4) Overall Assessment: CONUS and in-country training are being programmed to meet the regular VNAF requirements, plus the additional requirements for the Phase II expansion. The capabilities and resources of VNAF are being extended to their limits to meet these requirements.

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## ANNEX D

### SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

1. (C) FRIENDLY INITIATED OPERATIONS: During the quarter there was a total of 149 friendly operations resulting in 30 or more enemy/friendly KIA/WIA; 48 in I CTZ, 26 in II CTZ, 21 in III CTZ, and 54 in IV CTZ. Results included 37,176 enemy KIA and 3,094 friendly KIA for an overall enemy/friendly KIA ratio of 12.02:1. A total of 11,727 enemy weapons were captured while friendly forces lost 180 weapons for a ratio of 65.15:1. (Appendix 1)

2. (C) ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: During the quarter as a total of 173 enemy initiated attacks in two categories of scale significant, and significant; 42 in April, 70 in May, and in June. Results included 4,791 enemy KIA, for enemy/friendly ratio of 6.67:1. The criteria used in assessing the significance of enemy attacks at Appendix 2.

a. LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT: During the quarter there was 5 enemy initiated attacks classified as large scale significant; one in I CTZ and 14 in III CTZ. Results included 1601 enemy KIA for an overall enemy/friendly kill ratio of 21.07:1.

b. SIGNIFICANT: There were 158 enemy initiated attacks classified as significant: 62 in I CTZ, 43 in II CTZ, 39 in III CTZ, and 14 in IV CTZ. Results included 3190 enemy KIA and 643 friendly KIA, an enemy/friendly kill ratio of 4.96:1. (Appendix 2)

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOST
<u>I CTZ</u>								
10 SEPT 68 24 APR 69	LAMSON 261	ARVN	QUANG TRI	43	65	0	2	0
15 OCT 68 24 APR 69	LAMSON 271	ARVN	QUANG TRI	54	36	25	36	2
27 FEB 08 MAY 69	PURPLE MARTIN	USMC	QUANG TRI	202	128	55	189	0
27 FEB 27 MAY 69	LE LOI 4	ARVN	QUANG TRI	266	66	45	176	0
28 FEB 08 MAY 69	MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER	USA	THUA THIEN	31	763	21	75	0
01 MAR 30 APR 69	VICTORY DRAGON X	ROK	QUANG NAM	268	160	8	46	0
14 MAR 02 MAY 69	MAINE CRAG	USMC	QUANG TRI	94	67	9	52	0
19 MAR 01 APR 69	QUYET THANG 25	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	244	29	0	31	5
20 MAR 24 APR 69	LAMSON 272	ARVN	THUA THIEN	62	37	0	10	0
22 MAR 03 APR 69	MONTANA MAULER	USMC	QUANG TRI	271	29	35	218	0
30 MAR 07 APR 69	QUYET THANG 604 II	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	30	5	2	9	0
30 MAR 29 MAY 69	OKLAHOMA HILLS	USA/ARVN	QUANG NAM	596	210	53	449	0
30 MAR 26 MAY 69	VI NINH II	ARVN	QUANG NAM	24	13	9	33	0
31 MAR 08 APR 69	QUYET THANG 829	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	23	1	9	36	6
06 APR 20 APR 69	MUSKOGEE MEADOWS	USMC	QUANG NAM	118	20	13	112	0
19 APR 21 APR 69	PHI PHUNG 16/69	ARVN	QUANG NAM	32	12	2	8	0
25 APR 15 MAY 69	BRISTOL BOOTS	USA	THUA THIEN	9	16	5	26	0
30 APR 01 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 715	ARVN	QUANG TIN	38	15	0	4	0
30 APR 31 MAY 69	VICTORY DRAGON XI	ROK	QUANG NAM	63	18	7	33	0
04 MAY 21 MAY 69	DARING REBEL	ROK	QUANG NAM	66	45	8	20	7
11 MAY 12 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 464	ARVN	TAY NINH	115	0	2	10	1
14 MAY 20 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 813	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	45	4	3	8	1
21 APR 13 JUN 69	LAMSON 274	ARVN	THUA THIEN	112	51	7	58	0
24 APR 07 JUN 69	LAMSON 278	ARVN	THUA THIEN	224	437	22	106	0
20 JUN 21 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 740	ARVN	QUANG TIN	37	4	4	8	0
20 JUN 21 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 850	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	24	2	3	5	0

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOST
I CTZ (CONT)								
06 MAY 18 JUN 69	MASSACHUSETTS BAY	USA	QUANG TRI	54	32	6	75	0
09 MAY 07 JUN 69	APACHE SNOW	USMC	QUANG TRI	786	316	113	631	0
29 MAY 23 JUN 69	CAMEFON FALLS	USMC	QUANG TRI	123	95	24	137	0
12 JAN 69	RUSSELL BEACH	USA/ARVN	QUANG NGAI	15	3	10	49	0
1 MAR 69	KENTUCKY JUMPER	USA	THUA THIEN	303	298	58	337	0
17 MAR 69	FREDERICK HILL	USA	QUANG TRI	1574	307	148	854	0
17 MAR 69	GENEVA PARK	USA	QUANG NGAI	360	156	78	400	0
17 MAR 69	IRON MOUNTAIN	USA	QUANG NGAI	992	231	99	555	0
08 APR 69	LIEN KET 45	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	271	23	50	80	0
18 APR 69	LIEN KET 63	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	214	25	25	24	11
19 APR 69	LIEN KET 54	ARVN	QUANG TIN	166	13	20	54	3
21 APR 69	LAMSON 277	ARVN	THUA THIEN	403	131	46	123	0
24 APR 69	LAMSON 276	ARVN	THUA THIEN	140	221	22	58	0
30 APR 69	VIRGINIA RIDGE	USMC	QUANG TRI	525	171	99	254	0
05 MAY 69	VU NINH III	ARVN	QUANG NAM	179	23	36	92	0
08 MAY 69	HERKIMER MOUNTAIN	USMC	QUANG TRI	105	22	35	182	0
16 MAY 69	LAMAR PLAIN	USA	QUANG TIN	305	104	78	270	0
25 MAY 69	PIPESTONE CANYON	USA/ROK	QUANG NAM	315	99	34	219	0
07 JUN 69	MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS	USA	QUANG TRI	115	78	23	149	0
02 JUN 69	VICTORY DRAGON XII	ROK	QUANG NAM	54	19	0	9	0
03 JUN 69	PIPESTONE CANYON	USA/ROK	QUANG NAM	265	181	1	18	0
11 JUN 69	UTAH MESA	USMC	QUANG TRI	202	106	31	113	0
			TOTAL:	10,557	4,887	1,386	6,466	36
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	7.62:1				
II CTZ								
03 FEB 15 APR 69	DARBY TRAIL II	USA	BINH DINH	181	0	5	28	0
01 MAR 14 APR 69	WAYNE GREY	USA	KONTUM	608	115	99	357	0
26 MAR 04 APR 69	DONG BO 5	ROK	NINH THUAN	124	42	0	0	0
26 MAR 25 APR 69	DO KAE BI 12	ROK	PHU YEN	138	58	0	11	3
09 APR 24 APR 69	BAK JEE 21	ROK	KHANG HUA	52	14		2	
23 APR 06 MAY 69	GREENE QUEEN	USA	DARLAC	37	0		0	
03 MAY 14 MAY 69	DO KAE BEE 2/7	ROK	PHU YEN	47	12	1	0	
06 MAY 14 MAY 69	DAN QUYEN 38	ARVN	KONTUM	210	0		100	13

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS-LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS-LOST
II CTZ (CONT)								
09 MAY 18 MAY 69	DONG BO 7	ROK	NINH THUAN	80	29	1	2	0
10 MAY 14 MAY 69	BAK JEE 2/7	ROK	K'NANH HOA	27	9	1	4	0
14 MAY 31 MAY 69	DAN QUYET 57A	ARVN	KONTUM	945	27	79	455	97
03 JUN 08 JUN 69	DAN QUYEN 40	ARVN	KONTUM	49	4	13	53	0
19 JUN 20 JUN 69	DAN QUYEN 42	ARVN	KONTUM	26	10	18	54	6
22 JUN 25 JUN 69	DAN QUYEN 43	ARVN	KONTUM	214	18	17	94	1
31 JAN 21 JUN 69	POTNAM PANTHER	USA	KONTUM	60	41	8	42	0
05 MAY 21 JUN 69	GREENE TYPHOON II	USA	PLEIKU	21	1	0	26	0
16 MAY 21 JUN 69	GREENE BASKET	USA	PLEIKU	97	0	0	14	0
04 JUN 20 JUN 69	BAEK MA 10	ROK	HA. HOA	170	73	4	12	0
07 JUN 20 JUN 69	BEE HO 23	ROK	BINH DINH	186	81	3	21	0
08 JUN 28 JUN 69	DAN QUYEN 41	ARVN	KONTUM	383	54	35	135	7
13 APR 69	WAYNE JAVELIN	USA	BINH DINH	160	16	9	47	0
15 APR 69	WASHINGTON GREEN	USA	BINH DINH	112	28	27	355	2
18 APR 69	DAN THANG 69	ARVN	BINH DINH	58	3	41	144	0
22 APR 69	POTNAM TIGER	USA	PLEIKU	518	47	58	204	0
22 APR 69	DAN PHU 47/10	ARVN	PHU YEN	32	3	4	47	0
05 MAY 69	GREENE ORANGE III	USA	PLEIKU	73	4	0	10	0
			TOTAL:	4,608	725	456	2,235	129
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	10.12:1				
III CTZ								
02 APR 03 APR 69	TOAN THANG 3/A/50	ARVN	LONG AN	36	8	2	3	0
02 APR 14 APR 69	TOAN THANG 199/1958/TTV/ II	ARVN	TAY NINH	103	31	25	167	1
03 APR 08 APR 69	TOAN THANG 01/81	ARVN	BINH DUONG	1	0	1	43	0
03 APR 08 APR 69	TR LAI THIEU	ARVN	BINH DUONG	5	2	4	38	0
11 APR 12 APR 69	TOAN THANG 17/A	ARVN	LONG AN	34	0	0	0	0
15 APR 01 APR 69	TOAN THANG 399/116	ARVN	LONG KHANH	174	55	18	127	0
03 MAY 04 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 130/1 EN/TTV	ARVN	AN NGHIA	24	4	4	0	0
06 MAY 10 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 90/117 TTV	ARVN	LONG KHANH	14	1	21	127	0



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DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOST
III CTZ (CONT)								
09 MAY 12 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 3C/43/ CTD 2	ARVN	LONG KHANH	130	0	3	11	0
10 MAY 12 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 10C/18	ARVN	LONG KHANH	9	0	10	19	0
10 MAY 18 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 8B/9	ARVN	BINH LONG	0	0	5	26	0
12 MAY 25 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 14C/18	ARVN	LONG KHANH	57	15	5	50	0
17 MAY 23 MAY 69	TRUY KICK	ARVN	LONG KHANH	23	0	0	16	0
22 MAY 23 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 44C	ARVN	LONG KHANH	40	1	21	40	0
23 MAY 25 MAY 69	TOAN THANG 45C/43	ARVN	LONG KHANH	40	1	34	68	0
11 MAY 02 JUN 69	TOAN THANG 13C/18	ARVN	LONG KHANH	9	2	7	28	0
08 JUN 09 JUN 69	TOAN THANG 77B/ LD2ND	ARVN	TAY NINH	30	6	6	14	0
15 JUN 16 JUN 69	TOAN THANG 319/A/ HN	ARVN	HAU NGHIA	30	2	2	6	0
18 JUN 20 JUN 69	TOAN THANG 885/A/ LD2ND	ARVN	TAY NINH	160	52	14	117	0
16 FEB 69	TOAN THANG III	US/FW ARVN	III CTZ	13078	4219	708	4681	0
03 JUN 69	TOAN THANG 22C/18	ARVN	LONG KHANH	32	11	4	18	0
			TOTAL:	14,027	4,410	896	5,574	2
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	15.66:1				
IV CTZ								
30 NOV 68 31 MAY 69	SPEEDY EXPRESS	USA	IV CTZ	4518	287	50	626	0
15 MAR 07 APR 69	QUYET THANG C4/ LLDB/2	ARVN	CHAU DOC	15	77	19	81	0
23 MAR 01 APR 69	QUYET THANG 9/9	ARVN	VINH LONG	16	3	6	40	0
30 MAR 01 APR 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	KINH TUONG	11	9	2	38	0
30 MAR 01 APR 69	QUYET THANG CD 32/25	ARVN	BAC LIEU	55	14	4	25	0
01 APR 03 APR 69	QUYET THANG 31/ 68	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	10	5	6	32	0
04 APR 09 APR 69	QUYET THANG BK/ 44/19	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	102	428	5	17	0
05 APR 12 APR 69	QUYET THANG 16/20	ARVN	VINH LONG	41	9	2	5	0
06 APR 08 APR 69	QUYET THANG 9/10	ARVN	VINH BINH	5	0	5	42	0
06 APR 19 APR 69	QUYET THANG 21/ 16	ARVN	AN XUYEN	50	43	5	39	0
09 APR 10 APR 69	QUYET THANG CD/56	ARVN	CHAU DOC	18	0	3	11	0
09 APR 10 APR 69	QUYET THANG 7/25	ARVN	DINH TUONG	10	5	3	29	0

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(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOST
IV CTZ (CONT)								
09 APR 11 APR 69	QUYET THANG 21/7	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	106	22	4	21	0
14 APR 18 APR 69	QUYET THANG 7/11/ 44 (DT)	ARVN	DINH TUONG	5	3	2	30	0
16 APR 22 APR 69	QUYET THANG 21/18	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	57	14	21	114	0
20 APR 27 APR 69	QUYET THANG 9/13 (VL)	ARVN	VINH LONG	26	3	2	46	3
21 APR 24 APR 69	QUYET THANG 21/19	ARVN	BA XUYEN	45	69	3	11	0
23 APR 01 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 21/20 (CT + KG)	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	42	10	16	52	0
25 APR 26 APR 69	TRUY KICH/TRD 10	ARVN	KIEN HOA	10	3	3	28	0
27 APR 05 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 44/25	ARVN	KIEN TUONG	31	1	1	13	0
28 APR 06 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 7/11 49	ARVN	DINH TUONG	50	0	2	32	0
01 MAY 12 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 21/21	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	38	169	11	52	0
04 MAY 15 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 21/22	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	39	82	18	46	1
07 MAY 12 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 15/45	ARVN	VINH LONG	13	15	4	14	0
10 MAY 20 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 44/28	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	22	11	0	0	0
10 MAY 15 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 44/27	ARVN	CHAU DOC	71	28	0	1	0
14 MAY 15 MAY 69	QUYET THANG AG/ 111	ARVN	AN GIANG	0	0	10	30	7
15 MAY 16 MAY 69	QUYET THANG AG/ 112	ARVN	AN GIANG	56	16	5	28	0
16 MAY 18 MAY 69	QUYET THANG AG/ 113	ARVN	AN GIANG	84	38	7	12	0
17 MAY 19 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 7/10 40	ARVN	KIEN HOA	6	2	4	21	0
19 MAY 21 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 14/24	ARVN	VINH BINH	30	9	0	1	0
21 MAY 22 MAY 69	QUYET THANG KP/ 113	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	32	4	1	15	0
21 MAY 23 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 44 + BL/107	ARVN	BAC LIEU	29	7	0	0	0
23 MAY 24 MAY 69	QUYET THANG CT/ 210	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	5	0	6	20	0
23 MAY 24 MAY 69	QUYET THANG CD/ 85	ARVN	CHAU DOC	45	1	0	15	0
30 MAY 31 MAY 69	QUYET THANG KB/ 109	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	57	5	1	0	0
12 MAY 13 MAY 69	QUYET THANG 44/29	ARVN	CHAU DOC	132	19	0	0	0
01 JUN 05 JUN 69	QUYET THANG KP/ 120	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	21	3	0	0	0

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNS LOST
IV CTZ (CONT)								
02 JUN 03 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 32/48	ARVN	BA XUYEN	17	4	9	5	0
04 JUN 06 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 9/17	ARVN	VINH LONG	18	2	1	14	0
01 JUN 02 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 14/91	ARVN	VINH BINH	0	0	10	20	0
03 JUN 05 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 33/66	ARVN	PHONG DINH	21	60	3	12	0
08 JUN 10 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 21/25	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	32	1	3	8	0
09 JUN 12 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 9/18	ARVN	VINH LONG	40	3	4	13	0
13 JUN 15 JUN 69	QUYET THANG SD/ 142	ARVN	SA DEC	25	8	1	12	0
13 JUN 17 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 44/31	ARVN	CHAU DOC	43	10	6	47	0
15 JUN 18 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 7/37	ARVN	DINH TUONG	13	7	0	18	0
16 JUN 28 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 21/26 (C THIEN)	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	216	37	23	67	0
17 JUN 18 JUN 69	QUYET THANG AX/ 142	ARVN	BA XUYEN	43	10	0	0	0
17 JUN 20 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 35/71	ARVN	PHONG DINH	15	2	0	18	0
17 JUN 24 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 44/32	ARVN	CHAU DOC	250	3	0	1	0
23 JUN 26 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 9/19	ARVN	VINH BINH	22	3	4	24	0
24 JUN 25 JUN 69	QUYET THANG 7/12/ 70	ARVN	DINH TUONG	31	3	0	0	0
01 JUN 69	RICE FARMER	USA	IV CTZ	1294	135	30	294	1
			TOTAL:	7,984	1,705	356	2,267	13
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	22.43:1				

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## ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS\*

1. (U) The following criteria are used as a guide in assessing the significance of enemy initiated attacks.
  - a. Size: When the enemy force is estimated to be a battalion or larger, or
  - b. Casualties: When the attack results in a total enemy and friendly KIA and MIA of 30 or more, or
  - c. Objective: When the enemy has attacked a major installation such as a base camp, airfield, a logistical installation or political/military command and control installation, or
  - d. Damage: When there is a loss of a substantial amount of equipment, destruction or damage to aircraft or weapons systems or a large quantity of enemy material, supplies or equipment has been captured, or
  - e. New Weapons, Tactics or Techniques: When the enemy introduces a new weapon or employs a new tactic or technique.
2. (U) Attacks are reported in three categories:
  - a. Large Scale: Attacking force consists of a battalion or more (criteria 1a above).
  - b. Significant: Meets one or more of the criteria, 1b through 1e above
  - c. Large Scale Significant: Meets the criterion of size plus one or more of the other criteria, 1b through 1e.

\* Reference MACV Dir 335-4, 15 Apr 69 (page 14 of Appendix 1 to Annex B).

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D

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**ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<u>I CTZ</u>					
11 JUN	Quang Nam	1/5th (USMC)	70 BN 90TH NVA	<u>2</u>	<u>35</u>
			TOTAL:	2	35
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	17.5:1	
<u>III CTZ</u>					
30 MAR	Tay Ninh	5th Abn Bn (ARVN)	271st NVA Regt	1	35
05 APR	Tay Ninh	FSB Diamond (US)	EN BN	4	81
15 APR	Tay Ninh	FSB Diamond (US)	2 EN BNs	13	198
26 APR	Tay Ninh	FSB Frontier City (US)	Est EN Poss elms 271 + 272 NVA regts	0	213
27 APR	Hau Nghia	B/2/12 Inf (US)	Est EN Poss K-1 Bn 268 NVA Regt	10	100
06 MAY	Tay Ninh	LZ Carolyn (US)	Est NVA Regt	9	101
18 MAY	Long Khanh	FSB Husky (US)	Bn 5th VC Div	18	54
23 MAY	Tay Ninh	NDP 6th Abn Bn (ARVN)	Est Bn	3	36
23 MAY	Binh Long	781st RF Co	141st NVA Regt	2	53
07 JUN	Tay Ninh	FSB Cook (US)	2&3 Bn 88 NVA Regt 9th VC Div	0	323
12 JUN	Binh Tuy	LZ Joy (US)	Bn Poss 275 NVA Regt	3	35
16 JUN	Bien Hoa	A/D/2/1st Inf (RTAVF)	Poss 3d Bn, 274th NVA Regt	4	212
20 JUN	Tay Ninh	LZ Ike (US)	1ST Bn	7	90
19 JUN	Tay Ninh	FSB Washington (US)	3Bn 88 Regt, 9 VC Div	<u>0</u>	<u>35</u>
			TOTAL:	74	1566
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	21.16:1	

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>I CTZ (CONT)</b>					
07 JUN	Quang Nam	K/3/1/ (USMC)	UNK	9	35
07 JUN	Quang Nam	AN HOA CBT BASE (USMC)	UNK	5	12
07 JUN	Quang Nam	H/5/1/5 (USMC)	UNK	3	10
07 JUN	Quang Nam	DANANG AFLD	UNK	4	0
08 JUN	Quang Ngai	2/6th Regt (ARVN)	UNK	2	4
08 JUN	Quang Ngai	Prov Capital	UNK	1	6
08 JUN	Quang Nam	H&S 1/5 (USMC)	UNK	1	10
11 JUN	Quang Ngai	B/1/20 Inf (US)	UNK	1	14
11 JUN	Quang Tin	A/3/12 Inf (US)	UNK	14	27
12 JUN	Quang Nam	1/5 (USMC)	UNK	1	23
14 JUN	Thua Thien	FSB Berchtesgarden	UNK	7	18
15 JUN	Quang Ngai	174th PF Plat	UNK	1	10
15 JUN	Quang Ngai	422 RF Co	UNK	0	16
15 JUN	Thua Thien	FSB Carrahee (US)	UNK	0	51
17 JUN	Quang Nam	1/5 (USMC)	UNK	1	31
17 JUN	Quang Tri	2/1 & 3/11 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	0	58
18 JUN	Quang Tri	B/1/61ST INF (US)	UNK	10	35
19 JUN	Thua Thien	FSB Tomahawk (US)	UNK	10	10
20 JUN	Quang Tri	B/1/61 INF (US)	UNK	2	25
20 JUN	Quang Ngai	2/6 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	7	25
24 JUN	Quang Tri	K/3/9 (USMC)	UNK	3	20
26 JUN	Quang Tri	K/3/9 (USMC)	2 Plats (EST)	0	12
28 JUN	Quang Tri	2/2 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	9	17
		TOTAL:		264	1230
		RATIO: (EN/FRD)		4.66:1	
<b>II CTZ</b>					
07 APR	Lam Dong	Plat B/3/503d Abn (US)	UNK	11	0
07 APR	Darlac	SF Elm	UNK	1	20
07 APR	Pleiku	Camp Holloway AFLD US	UNK	0	0
18 APR	Tuyen Duc	Can Li AFLD	UNK	2	2
19 APR	Kontum	Dak Dem Hamlet	(100 EN)	4	0
16 APR	Binh Thuan	2/8th Cav (US)	UNK	1	24
21 APR	Khann Hoa	Lam Son Tng Ctr	UNK	16	2
21 APR	Khann Hoa	Ma Trang AFLD	UNK	2	1
25 APR	Binh Dinh	75th PF Plat (ARVN)	UNK	10	0
30 APR	Kontum	4/41st Regt (ARVN)	Est En Co	1	9
08 MAY	Kontum	4/42d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	5	10
09 MAY	Pleiku	B/3/8th Inf (US)	UNK	3	31
11 MAY	Kontum	57th AHC (US)	UNK	0	0

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<u>I CTZ</u>					
04 APR	Quang Tri	E/2/3D (USMC)	UNK	2	15
05 APR	Quang Nam	CAP 2/1/5th (USMC/PF)	UNK	3	7
05 APR	Quang Nam	L/3/1st (USMC)	UNK	0	13
06 APR	Quang Nam	C/1/5th (USMC)	UNK	1	6
07 APR	Thua Thien	A/1/50RD Abn (US)	UNK	1	5
12 APR	Quang Tri	FSB Torch (ARVN)	UNK	14	16
15 APR	Quang Nam	116th RF Co	UNK	13	12
16 APR	Quang Ngai	DUC PHO Dist Town	En Co	2	19
18 APR	Thua Thien	3/5th CAV (US)	UNK	11	13
21 APR	Quang Tri	G/2/9 USMC	UNK	8	35
21 APR	Quang Nam	97th PF	UNK	3	10
24 APR	Quang Tri	5/2d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	4	8
25 APR	Quang Tri	C/1/40 Arty (US)	UNK	12	30
27 APR	Quang Tri	4/2d Regt (ARVN)	Est EN Co	1	9
23 APR	Quang Tri	T/F Remagen (US)	EST 150 EN	5	34
12 MAY	Quang Nam	1/5th (USMC)	UNK	0	15
12 MAY	Quang Nam	Thanh Tan RF Post	UNK	4	7
12 MAY	Quang Ngai	1/82d Arty (US)	UNK	0	23
12 MAY	Quang Ngai	34th RF Co	UNK	1	20
12 MAY	Quang Nam	CAP 2-9-1 (USMC/PF)	UNK	0	19
12 MAY	Quang Nam	114th PF Plat	UNK	3	14
12 MAY	Quang Nam	707th RF Co	UNK	6	10
12 MAY	Quang Nam	2/1st Inf (US)	UNK	4	36
12 MAY	Quang Nam	2/1st USMC	UNK	2	18
12 MAY	Quang Nam	21-39 RGR BNs (ARVN)	UNK	6	112
13 MAY	Thua Thien	FSB Airborne (US)	UNK	25	31
13 MAY	Quang Tin	1/46th Inf (US)	UNK	0	22
14 MAY	Quang Tin	721st RF Co	UNK	0	15
15 MAY	Quang Tin	3/21st Inf (US)	UNK	5	5
15 MAY	Quang Ngai	99th PF Plat	UNK	11	0
16 MAY	Thua Thien	C/3/187th Inf (US)	UNK	0	14
19 MAY	Quang Nam	H/3/11th Arty (USMC)	UNK	0	18
19 MAY	Quang Nam	H/2/5th (USMC)	Est EN Plat	0	12
20 MAY	Quang Nam	21st Rgr Bn (ARVN)	UNK	6	59
20 MAY	Quang Tri	C/1/3d (USMC)	Est 20 EN	3	13
28 MAY	Quang Tri	HQ 1st Regt (ARVN)	UNK	13	8
31 MAY	Quang Tin	CAP 1-1-7 (USMC/PF)	UNK	0	15
31 MAY	Quang Ngai	E/1/1st Cav (US)	UNK	1	17
01 JUN	Quang Tri	3/2/9 (USMC)	UNK	4	17

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>II CTZ (CONT)</b>					
11 MAY	Pleiku	3d Bde 4th Div (US)	UNK	11	45
11 MAY	Kontum	FSB 6 (US)	UNK	0	19
11 MAY	Ninh Thuan	1/30th Regt (ROK)	UNK	0	19
12 MAY	Pleiku	Camp Enari (US)	UNK	0	0
12 MAY	Kontum	22d Rgr Bn (ARVN)	UNK	0	22
12 MAY	Pleiku	C/2/8th MECH (US)	UNK	5	19
13 MAY	Kontum	3/42d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	0	67
13 MAY	Tuyen Duc	305th RF Co	UNK	2	13
16 MAY	Kontum	4/42d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	1	13
16 MAY	Kontum	2/42d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	0	22
22 MAY	Darlac	155th AHC (US)	UNK	0	0
23 MAY	Kontum	Plei Klor Hamlet	UNK	1	9
23 MAY	Kontum	22d Rgr Bn	UNK	2	134
02 JUN	Kontum	3/3 CAV (ARVN)	UNK	3	10
06 JUN	Binh Thuan	233d RF Co	UNK	1	10
06 JUN	Ninh Thuan	RKT on AFLD	UNK	0	0
07 JUN	Kontum	4/42d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	9	32
08 JUN	Pleiku	85mm Arty SF	UNK	0	0
09 JUN	Binh Dinh	185 RF Co	UNK	0	15
10 JUN	Kontum	Tu Mrong Hamlet	UNK	0	7
11 JUN	Pleiku	4th Div Convoy	UNK	1	42
15 JUN	Kontum	2/47th REGT (ARVN)	UNK	0	23
17 JUN	Binh Dinh	LZ ENGLISH (US)	UNK	0	0
18 JUN	Kontum	CSF ELM	UNK	2	5
19 JUN	Tuyen Duc	47th RF Plat	UNK	6	0
19 JUN	Binh Dinh	208th PF Plat	UNK	17	0
21 JUN	Kontum	Ben Het SF Camp	UNK	3	0
21 JUN	Kontum	2/47 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	3	0
23 JUN	Kontum	2/42 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	1	22
23 JUN	Kontum	Ben Het SF Camp	UNK	2	11
TOTAL:				154	661
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				4.29:1	
<b>III CTZ</b>					
30 MAR	Binh Duong	B/1/4th Cav (US)	UNK	9	38
02 APR	Hau Nghia	L/2/12th Inf (US)	UNK	0	19
03 APR	Tay Ninh	7th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	1	19
03 APR	Tay Ninh	6th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	3	20
11 APR	Tay Ninh	MACV Compound	UNK	2	0
14 APR	Long An	L/50th Regt (ARVN)	UNK	13	27
27 APR	Tay Ninh	FSB Frontier City (US)	UNK	0	13



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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>III CTZ (CONT)</b>					
28 APR	Binh Long	1st Div Convoy	Est En Co	2	11
01 MAY	Tay Ninh	6th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	7	47
05 MAY	Hau Nghia	Convoy 25th Inf (US)	UNK	1	11
06 MAY	Binh Long	LZ Joe (US)	UNK	4	8
10 MAY	Long Khanh	43d I&R Co (ARVN)	UNK	3	19
09 MAY	Phuoc Long	1st MSF BN (ARVN)	UNK	0	17
11 MAY	Go Cong	Thoi Thuan Hamlet	UNK	9	1
12 MAY	Bien Hoa	C/3/1st Inf (RTVAF)	UNK	0	41
12 MAY	Binh Duong	FSB Gelda (US)	UNK	2	28
12 MAY	Tay Ninh	FSB Jamie (US)	UNK	7	73
12 MAY	Tay Ninh	LZ Grant	UNK	7	45
12 MAY	Phuoc Long	LZ Buttons (US)	UNK	0	33
12 MAY	Tay Ninh	3 & 6th Abn Bns (ARVN)	UNK	12	159
13 MAY	Bien Hoa	C/3/1st Inf (RTVAF)	UNK	1	87
14 MAY	Binh Duong	A/4/23d MECH (US)	UNK	2	51
22 MAY	Gia Dinh	531st RFC Ammo Dump	UNK	0	0
22 MAY	Long Khanh	4/43d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	0	23
24 MAY	Binh Long	B/2/2d Inf (US)	UNK	2	96
25 MAY	Binh Long	B/2/2d Inf (US)	UNK	2	32
27 MAY	Binh Duong	Dau Tieng Base Camp US	UNK	0	0
23 MAY	Binh Long	781st RF Co	UNK	0	31
06 JUNE	Tay Ninh	5th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	3	60
06 JUNE	Tay Ninh	8th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	6	26
06 JUNE	Tay Ninh	FSB Crook (US)	UNK	1	49
09 JUNE	Tay Ninh	5th Abn Bn (ARVN)	UNK	3	35
12 JUNE	Binh Tuy	LZ JOY	UNK	3	35
12 JUNE	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa AB	UNK	15	0
16 JUNE	Long Khanh	326th RF Co	UNK	3	0
17 JUNE	Long Khanh	A/1/8 CAV (US)	UNK	0	9
19 JUNE	Long Khanh	3/52 REGT (ARVN)	UNK	5	0
20 JUNE	Phuoc Long	Bunard SF Camp	UNK	4	8
28 JUNE	Binh Duong	B/2/2 Mech (US)	UNK	1	0
TOTAL:				146	1200
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				8.22:1	
<b>IV CTZ</b>					
25 MAR	Dinh Tuong	9th Div Ammo Dump	UNK	0	0
11 APR	Dinh Tuong	Phu Loi RF Post	UNK	7	9
17 APR	Bac Lieu	1/4/32d Regt (ARVN)	UNK	25	11
18 APR	Vinh Long	Vinh Long AFLD	UNK	0	0

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>IV CTZ (CONT)</b>					
02 MAY	Chuong Thien	ARVN Compound	UNK	0	0
10 MAY	An Xuyen	Cai Keo PF Post	UNK	0	10
13 MAY	Chau Doc	Chi Lang Tng Ctr (ARVN)	UNK	19	14
19 MAY	Chau Doc	MSF Elm	Est Plat	8	6
20 MAY	Vinh Binh	SA Chau RF Post	UNK	1	10
21 MAY	Ba Xuyen	Vinh Thuan PF OP	UNK	10	0
21 MAY	Vinh Binh	PF Camp	Est 2 EN CO's	2	10
06 JUN	Chau Doc	816th RF Co	UNK	3	9
15 JUN	Chau Doc	42 Rgr BN (ARVN)	UNK	0	13
16 JUN	Chau Doc	816 RF Co	UNK	4	7
TOTAL:				79	99
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				1.25:1	

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## ANNEX E

### STATISTICS

#### 1. (C) FRIENDLY PERSONNEL DATA:

##### a. Strength:

##### (1) Free World Forces:

	END PREVIOUS QUARTER	APR	CURRENT QUARTER MAY	JUN*
Australia	7,493	7,701	7,745	7,649
China	30	30	28	31
Korea	50,759	50,757	50,279	50,289
New Zealand	549	568	560	556
Philippines	1,586	1,562	1,556	1,506
Spain	12	12	12	12
Thailand	11,553	11,231	11,545	11,596
United States	<u>538,170</u>	<u>543,482</u>	<u>540,429</u>	<u>538,933**</u>
TOTAL	610,152	615,343	612,154	610,572

##### (2) GVN:

##### RVNAF:

Regular Force	432,450	436,925	444,877	452,612
Regional Force	237,814	244,840	248,540	251,500
Popular Force	174,367	174,927	176,229	177,000

##### PARAMILITARY:

National Police	77,120	76,650	77,175	76,819
CIDG	<u>42,824</u>	<u>41,944</u>	<u>41,174</u>	<u>40,700</u>
GVN TOTAL	964,575	975,286	987,995	998,631

\*Not Confirmed.

\*\* (Army - 360,899; Navy - 35,872; Marines - 81,255; Air Force - 60,489; Coast Guard - 418).

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GROUP 4  
Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

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## b. Casualties:

		PREVIOUS QUARTER*	APR	CURRENT QUARTER		TOTAL
				MAY	JUN	
RVNAF	KIA	5,520	1,575	1,963	1,238	4,776
	WIA	17,258	5,098	5,683	5,098	15,879
	MIA	222	62	120	79	261
US	KIA	3,184	847	1,209	958	3,014
	WIA	5,642	1,331	1,894	1,713	4,938
	MIA	197	32	57	24	113
FWMAF	KIA	241	49	99	72	220
	WIA	505	156	266	269	691
	MIA	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	KIA	8,945	2,471	3,271	2,268	8,010
	WIA	23,405	6,585	7,843	7,080	21,508
	MIA	419	94	177	103	374

\*Corrected Figures.

## c. RVNAF Desertions:

	REGULAR FORCE	REGIONAL FORCE	POPULAR FORCE	RVNAF TOTAL
Mar 69 Total	5,802	3,143	1,242	10,187
Rate/1000	13.4	13.2	7.1	12.1
Apr 69 Total	6,439	3,268	1,257	10,964
Rate/1000	14.7	13.3	7.2	12.8
May 69 Total	5,484	3,833	1,231	10,548
Rate/1000	12.3	15.4	7.0	12.1

## 2. (C) ENEMY PERSONNEL DATA:

### a. Estimated strength:

	END PREVIOUS QUARTER*	APR*	MAY**	JUN**
VC	171,096	166,742	162,581	163,060

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	<u>END PREVIOUS QUARTER*</u>	<u>APR**</u>	<u>MAY**</u>	<u>JUN**</u>
NVA Unit	<u>79,465</u>	<u>78,289</u>	<u>77,016</u>	<u>76,346</u>
SUB-TOTAL	250,561	245,031	239,597	239,406
Unascribed Losses	<u>22,004</u>	<u>18,844</u>	<u>23,920</u>	<u>34,529</u>
ESTIMATED TOTAL	228,557	226,187	215,677	204,877

b. Losses:

	<u>PREVIOUS QTR*</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VC/NVA/KIA	48,591	15,795	18,726	18,885	53,406
DOW/DIS	17,007	5,528	6,554	6,610	18,692
PW	2,210	350	320	50	720
Non-Battle	6,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	6,000
Military Returnees	<u>5,468</u>	<u>3,036</u>	<u>2,328</u>	<u>1,908</u>	<u>7,272</u>
TOTAL	79,276	26,709	29,928	29,453	86,090

3. (C) GENERAL STATISTICS:

a. VC Incidents:

Attacks-by- Fire	631	201	262	276	739
Assaults/ Ambushes	352	120	192	188	500
Terrorism/ Harassment	4,947	2,104	2,051	2,058	6,213
Sabotage	61	21	15	10	46
Antiair- craft	3,417	1,089	1,169	1,214	3,472

\* Updated Figures.

\*\* In addition to NVA in NVA units there are approximately 17 to 19,000 NVA in VC units.

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	<u>PREVIOUS QTR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Propaganda	<u>19</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	9,427	3,538	3,690	3,747	10,975

## b. Weapons:

Lost (Friendly)	1,008	288	526	317	1,131
Captured (Enemy)	20,952	8,593	6,929	6,720	22,242

## c. Operations (Bn or Larger/With Contact):

GVN	2,335/1,009	833/355	799/330	793/332	2,425/1,017
US	68/66	24/21	28/27	25/23	77/71
Other FW	46/41	8/7	19/15	11/6	38/28
Combined	<u>74/57</u>	<u>12/5</u>	<u>9/6</u>	<u>8/4</u>	<u>29/15</u>
TOTAL	2,523/1,173	877/388	855/378	837/365	2,569/1,131

## d. Battalion Days on Large Operations:

GVN	9,211	2,830	3,673	3,229	9,732
US	4,842	2,358	4,028	1,950	8,336
Other FW	1,152	279	274	242	795
Combined	<u>14,049</u>	<u>3,183</u>	<u>5,535</u>	<u>2,863</u>	<u>11,581</u>
TOTAL	29,254	8,650	13,510	8,284	30,444

## 4. (C) SECURITY STATUS OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC):

### a. Definitions of LOC Security Terms:

GREEN (SECURE): Travel permissible during daylight hours without armed escort. Isolated incidents may occur.

AMBER (OPEN): Travel permissible during daylight hours. Armed escort is required. Frequent incidents may occur.

RED (CLOSED): Travel impossible because of VC/NVA control of area or physical condition.

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## b. Railroad:

GREEN (SECURE): Rail line is physically open. Security of area permits operation during daylight hours without escort.

AMBER (OPEN): Rail line is physically open. Security of area permits operation during daylight hours only with armed escort. Frequent incidents may occur.

RED (CLOSED): Rail line is unusable because of VC/NVA control of area or physical condition.

## c. Essential Military Roads (as of 30 Jun 69):

<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>I CTZ</u>				
	<u>Route QL 1</u>				
24.0	DMZ to Dong Ha		24.0		24.0
39.0	Dong Ha to Quang Tri	15.0			15.0
101.0	Quang Tri to Hue	62.0			62.0
205.0	Hue to Da Nang	104.0			104.0
244.0	Da Nang to Thang Binh	39.0			39.0
334.0	Thang Binh to Quang Ngai	90.0			90.0
372.0	Quang Ngai to Duc Pho		38.0		38.0
396.0	Duc Pho to Tan Loc		24.0		24.0
399.0	Tan Loc to I-II CTZ Boundary		3.0		3.0
	<u>Route S 540</u>				
440.0	Da Nang to An Hoa		41.0		41.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route QL 9</u>					
465.0	Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam		25.0		25.0
477.0	Thon Son Lam to Ca Lu		<u>12.0</u>		<u>12.0</u>
	I CTZ TOTAL	310.0	167.0	0.0	477.0
	PERCENT	65.0	35.0		
<u>II CTZ</u>					
<u>Route QL 1</u>					
501.0	I-II CTZ Boundary to Bong Son	24.0			24.0
553.0	Bong Son to Phu Cat	52.0			52.0
579.0	Phu Cat to Jct 440 (Qui Nhon)	26.0			26.0
669.0	Jct 440 (Qui Nhon) to Tuy Noa	90.0			90.0
784.0	Tuy Hoa to Nha Trang	115.0			115.0
892.0	Nha Trang to Phan Rang	108.0			108.0
950.0	Phan Rang to Tuy Phong	37.0	21.0		58.0
980.0	Tuy Phong to Phan Le Cham		30.0		30.0
1047.0	Phan Le Cham to Phan Thiet	5.0	62.0		67.0
1070.0	Phan Thiet to II-III CTZ Boundary	5.0	18.0		23.0
<u>Route LTL 7B</u>					
1095.0	Tuy Hoa to Phong Hau	8.0	17.0		25.0



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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1149.0	Phong Hau to Phu Tuc		54.0		54.0
1190.0	Phu Tuc to Cheo Reo	21.0	20.0		41.0
1244.0	Cheo Reo to Jct QL 14	25.0	29.0		54.0
	<u>Route LTL 8B</u>				
1282.0	Dao Thong to Gia Nghai		38.0		38.0
	<u>Route QL 11</u>				
1307.0	Phan Rang to Ap Tan My	25.0			25.0
1358.0	Ap Tan My to Xuan Truong	51.0			51.0
1376.0	Xuan Troung to Da Lar	18.0			18.0
	<u>Route QL 14</u>				
1421.0	Dak To to Kontum	45.0			45.0
1479.0	Kontum to Jct 19 (East)	58.0			58.0
1536.0	Jct 19 (East) to Plei Klu	24.0	33.0		57.0
1583.0	Plei Klu to Ban Blech		47.0		47.0
1658.0	Ban Blech to Ban Me Thout	5.0	70.0		75.0
1732.0	Ban Me Thout to Dao Thong	5.0	69.0		74.0
	<u>Route S 344</u>				
1753.0	Gia Nghia to Kien Duc		21.0		21.0
	<u>Route QL19</u>				
1768.0	Qui Nhon to Jct 441 (An Nhon)	15.0			15.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1828.0	Jct 441 (An Nhon) to An Khe	60.0			60.0
1861.0	An Khe to Phu Danh	33.0			33.0
1911.0	Phu Danh to Pleiku	50.0			50.0
	<u>Route QL 20</u>				
1937.0	Da Lat to Duc Trong		26.0		26.0
1986.0	Duc Trong to Di Linh		49.0		49.0
2060.0	De Linh to II-III CTZ Boundary		74.0		74.0
	<u>Route QL 21</u>				
2097.0	Ban Me Thout to B Ea Phe	37.0			37.0
2148.0	B Ea Phe to Khanh Duong	51.0			51.0
2188.0	Khanh Duong to Duc My	40.0			40.0
2199.0	Duc My to Kinh Hoa	<u>11.0</u>			<u>11.0</u>
	II CTZ TOTAL	1044.0	678.0	0.0	1722.0
	PERCENT	60.6	39.4		
	<u>III CTZ</u>				
	<u>Route QL 1</u>				
2288.0	II-III CTZ Boundary to Xuan Loc	21.0	68.0		89.0
2335.0	Xuan Loc to Bien Hoa	47.0			47.0
2363.0	Bien Hoa to Saigon	28.0			28.0
	<u>Route S 316</u>				
2396.0	Saigon to Jct QL 1	33.0			33.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route LTL 1A</u>					
2437.0	Phu Cuong to Phuoc Vinh	28.0	13.0		41.0
<u>Route QL 1/22</u>					
2496.0	Saigon to Go Da Hau (Jct 1 & 22)	59.0			59.0
2530.0	Go Da Hau (Jct 1 & 22) to To Tay Ninh	34.0			34.0
<u>Route LTL 2</u>					
2580.0	An Tan Phan (Jct 1 & 22) to Phuoc Le	25.0	12.0	13.0	50.0
<u>Route LTL 2B</u>					
2600.0	Ham Tan to JCT QL 1		20.0		20.0
<u>Route QL 4</u>					
2628.0	Saigon to Ben Luc	28.0			28.0
2643.0	Ben Luc to Tan An	15.0			15.0
2650.0	Tan An to III-IV CTZ Boundary	7.0			7.0
<u>Route LTL 5A</u>					
2692.0	Saigon to III-IV CTZ Boundary	42.0			42.0
<u>Route QL 13</u>					
2721.0	Saigon to Phu Cuong	29.0			29.0
2744.0	Phu cuong to Ben Cat	23.0			23.0
2798.0	Ben Cat to An Loc	34.0	20.0		54.0
2822.0	An Loc to Loc Ninh			24.0	24.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route QL 15</u>					
2894.0	Bien Hoa to Phuoc Le	72.0			72.0
2916.0	Phuoc Le to Vung Tau	22.0			22.0
<u>Route QL 20</u>					
2945.0	II-III CTZ Boundary to Xa Dinh Quan		29.0		29.0
2978.0	Xa Dinh Quan to Tuc Trung		33.0		33.0
2997.0	Tuc Trung to Jct Rt QL 1	17.0	2.0		19.0
<u>Route LTL 23</u>					
3028.0	Phuoc Le to Xuyen Moc	12.0		19.0	31.0
<u>Route S 314</u>					
3035.0	Bien Hoa to Jct S 313	7.0			7.0
<u>Route S 313</u>					
3049.0	Jct S 314 to Phu Cuong	14.0			14.0
<u>Route L 8 A</u>					
3069.0	Phu Cuong to Cu Chi	<u>20.0</u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>20.0</u>
	III CTZ TOTAL	617.0	197.0	56.0	870.0
	PERCENT	70.9	22.7	6.4	
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
<u>Route QL 4</u>					
3082.0	III-IV CTZ Boundary to Jct 6A	13.0			13.0
3107.0	Jct 6A to Cai Lay	25.0			25.0

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<u>CUM.KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
3151.0	Cai Lay to Vinh Long	44.0			44.0
3202.0	Vinh Long to Than Hoa	51.0			51.0
3244.0	Than Hoa to Soc Trang	42.0			42.0
3293.0	Soc Trang to Bac Lieu	49.0			49.0
3323.0	Bac Lieu to Gia Rai	30.0			30.0
3360.0	Gia Rai to Ca Mau	37.0			37.0
	<u>Route LTL 5A</u>				
3375.0	III-IV CTZ Boundary to Go Cong	15.0			15.0
	<u>Route LTL 6A</u>				
3389.0	Jct QL 4 to Ben Tre	14.0			14.0
	<u>Route LTL 7A</u>				
3439.0	Vinh Long to Jct QL 4		50.0		50.0
3452.0	Jct QL 4 to Phu Vinh		13.0		13.0
	<u>Route LTL 8A</u>				
3475.0	Vinh Long To Sa Dec		23.0		23.0
3493.0	Sa Dec to Jct 147		18.0		18.0
3520.0	Jct 147 to Long Xuyen		27.0		27.0
	<u>Route LTL 8A</u>				
3578.0	Jct 9/27 to Ap Rach Soi	36.0	22.0		58.0
3586.0	Ap Rach Soi to Rach Gia	8.0			8.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>Route LTL 10/9</u>				
3627.0	Chau Doc to Jct 9	41.0			41.0
3640.0	Jct 9 to Long Xuyen (9)	13.0			13.0
	<u>Route TL 24</u>				
3675.0	My Tho to Go Cong	35.0			35.0
	<u>Route TL 26</u>				
3711.0	Ben Tre to Ba Tri		36.0		36.0
	<u>Route LTL 27/9</u>				
3731.0	Can Tho to O Mon	20.0			20.0
3753.0	O Mon to Thot Noi	22.0			22.0
3771.0	Thot Noi to Long Xuyen	18.0			18.0
	<u>Route LTL 31</u>				
3805.0	Vi Thanh to Rach Goi		34.0		34.0
3811.0	Rach Goi to Thanh Hoa		6.0		6.0
	IV CTZ TOTAL	513.0	229.0	0.0	742.0
	PERCENT	69.1	30.9		
	OVERALL TOTALS	2484.0	1271.0	56.0	3811.0
	OVERALL PERCENT	65.2	33.3	1.5	

## d. Essential Waterways, I, III, and IV CTZs :

### I CTZ

#### SONG CUA VIET

15.0	Qua Viet to Dong Ha	15.0			15.0
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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>SONG HUONG (PERFUME)</u>				
35.0	Tan My to Hue	<u>20.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>
	I CTZ TOTAL	35.0			35.0
	PERCENT	100.0			
	<u>III CTZ</u>				
185.0	<u>SONG VAM CO DONG</u>				
	Tay Ninh to Ben Luc		100.0		100.0
	Ben Luc to Junct				
	w/Song Nha Be		50.0		50.0
250.0	<u>SONG VAM CO TAY (in-</u>				
	tsec. w/IV CTZ bound.				
	to junct w/Song Vam				
	Co Dong)		65.0		65.0
280.0	<u>RACH CAN GIOUC (Saigon</u>				
	to junct w/Song Vam				
	Co Dong)	6.0	24.0		30.0
375.0	<u>SONG SAIGON</u>				
	Tri Tam to Phu Cuong	5.0	50.0		55.0
	Phu Cuong to junct w/				
	Song Nha Be	40.0			40.0
410.0	<u>SONG NHA BE (junct</u>				
	w/Song Saigon)	35.0			35.0
420.0	<u>SONG SOIRAP (Song Vam</u>				
	Co Dong to outlet)	10.0			10.0
474.0	<u>SONG DONG NAI (Tan Uyen</u>				
	to junct w/Saigon)	54.0			54.0
519.0	<u>SONG LONG TAU (junct</u>				
	w/Song Nha Be to out-				
	let)	<u>45.0</u>			<u>45.0</u>
	III CTZ TOTAL	195.0	289.0		484.0
	PERCENT	40.3	59.7		

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMEER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>IV CTZ</u>				
669.0	<u>SONG TIEN GIANG</u> Cambodian Bdr to Vam Nao	50.0			50.0
	Vam Nao wtrway to Kinh Cho Lach	100.0			100.0
739.0	<u>SONG MY THO (Kinh Cho Lach to outlet)</u>	70.0			70.0
746.0	<u>KINH CHO LACH (Song Co Chien to Song Tien Giang)</u>	7.0			7.0
776.0	<u>KINH CHO GAO (Song Tien Giang to Song Vam Co Dong)</u>		30.0		30.0
861.0	<u>SONG CO CHIEN</u> Vinh Long to Vung Liem	40.0			40.0
	Vung to outlet	45.0			45.0
1056.0	<u>SONG HAU GIANG</u> Chau Doc to Vam Hao Wtrway	35.0			35.0
	Van Nao Wtrway to outlet	160.0			160.0
1066.0	<u>VAM HAO WATERWAY</u> (Song Tien Giang to Song Hau Giang)	10.0			10.0
1101.0	<u>KINH SA DEC (Song Tien Giang to Song Hau Giang)</u>		35.0		35.0
1141.0	<u>MANG THIET-NICHOLAI WATERWAY (Tra On to Song Co Chien)</u>		40.0		40.0



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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1201.0	<u>KINH CAI SAN</u> (Rach Gia to Song Hau Giang)	35.0	25.0		60.0
1214.0	<u>SONG CAN THO</u> (Kinh Sa No to Song Hau Giang)	13.0			13.0
1249.0	<u>KINH XA NO</u> (Song Can Tho to Vi Thanh)	35.0			35.0
1304.0	<u>KINH XANG</u> (Song Can Tho to Soc Trang)		55.0		55.0
1354.0	<u>KINH NHU CIA</u> (Soc Trang to Bac Lieu)	50.0			50.0
1424.0	<u>KINH CA MAU</u> (Bau Lieu to Cau Mau)	70.0			70.0
1494.0	<u>SONG HAM LUONG</u> (junct w/Tien Giang to outlet)	70.0			70.0
1516.0	<u>KINH SAINTARD</u> (Song Hau Giang to Ba Xau)		22.0		22.0
1522.0	<u>KINH XANG</u> (Soc Trang to Ba Xau)	6.0			6.0
1541.0	<u>RACH NHU GIA</u> (Song My Thanh to Ba Xau)	19.0			19.0
1577.0	<u>SONG MY THANH</u> (Bac Lieu to Rach Nhu Gia)	31.0	5.0		36.0
1636.0	<u>KINH RACH GIA</u> (Rach Gia to Song Hau Giang)	30.0	29.0		59.0
1653.0	<u>RACH LONG XUYEN</u> (Long Xuyen to Kinh Rach Gia)	17.0			17.0
1670.0	<u>SONG CAN THO</u> (Rach O Mon to Kinh Xa No)		17.0		17.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1678.0	RACH O MON (Song Hau Giang to Son Can Tho	8.0			8.0
1694.0	WATERWAY SONG MY THO- BENTRE - SONG HAM LUONG (Song My Tho to Song Ham Luong)		16.0		16.0
	IV CTZ TOTAL PERCENT	901.0 76.7	274.0 23.3		1175.0
	OVERALL TOTAL OVERALL PERCENT	1131.0 66.8	563.0 33.2	0.0	1694.0

e. Vietnamese National Railroads:

<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>I CTZ</u>				
27.0	HUE to TRUOI		27.0		27.0
41.1	TRUOI to CAU HAI		14.1		14.1
53.3	CAU HAI to THUA LIU		12.2		12.2
67.1	THUA LIU to LANG CO		13.8		13.8
87.4	LANG CO to LIEN CHIEU		20.3		20.3
103.1	LIEN CHIEU to DA NANG		15.7		15.7
	I CTZ TOTAL PERCENT		103.1 100.0		103.1
	<u>II CTZ</u>				
113.6	KHANH PHUOC to PHU CAT	10.5			10.5
127.5	PHU CAT to BINH DINH	13.9			13.9

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<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
138.3	BINH DINH to DIEU TRI	10.8			10.8
153.6	DIEU TRI to TANG VINH	15.3			15.3
166.2	TANG VINH to VAN CANH	12.6			12.6
182.2	VAN CANH to PHUOC LANH		16.0		16.0
197.2	PHUOC LANH to LA HAI		15.0		15.0
213.2	LA HAI to CHI THANH		16.0		16.0
226.7	CHI THANH to HOA DA		13.5		13.5
240.2	HOA DA to TUY HOA		13.5		13.5
245.1	TUY HOA to DONG TAC	4.9			4.9
256.0	DONG TAC to THACH TUAN	10.9			10.9
263.0	THACH TUAN to HAO SON	7.0			7.0
275.0	HAO SON to DAI LANH	12.0			12.0
285.8	DAI LANH to TU BONG		10.8		10.8
296.9	TU BONG to GIA		11.1		11.1
323.3	GIA to NINH HOA		26.4		26.4
345.7	NINH HOA to LUONG SON	22.4			22.4
357.5	LUONG SON to NHA TRANG	11.8			11.8
375.6	NHA TRANG to SUOI DAU		18.1		18.1
406.6	SUOI DAU to HGA BA		31.0		31.0
424.7	NGA BA to KA ROM		18.1		18.1
450.4	KA ROM to THAP CHAM		25.7		25.7
479.1	THAP CHAM to CA NA		28.7		28.7

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<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
508.3	CA NA to SONG LONG SONG		29.2		29.2
	II CTZ TOTAL PERCENT	132.1 32.6	273.1 67.4	0.0	405.2
	III CTZ				
520.2	LONG KHANH to DAU GIAY		11.9		11.9
536.4	DAU GIAY to TRANG BOM		16.2		16.2
546.9	TRANG BON to HO NAI		10.5		10.5
556.4	HO NAI to BIEN HOA	9.5			9.5
565.6	BIEN HOA to DI AN	9.2			9.2
572.4	DI AN to THU DUC	6.8			6.8
581.0	THU DUC to GO VAP	8.6			8.6
585.1	GO VAP to SAIGON (FT)*	4.1			4.1
588.6	SAIGON (FT) to SAIGON (PAX)	3.5			3.5
	TOTAL III CTZ PERCENT	41.7 51.9	38.6 48.1		80.3

\*Freight Terminal


<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>SPURS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	II CTZ				
598.8	DIEU TRI to QUI NHON	10.2			10.2
603.1	NGA BA to BA NGOI	4.3			4.3

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<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>SPURS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>II CTZ</u>				
687.1	THAP CHAM to DA LAT			84.0	84.0
	TOTAL	14.5	0.0	84.0	98.5
	PERCENT	14.7		85.3	
	OVERALL TOTAL	188.3	414.8	84.0	687.1
	OVERALL PERCENT	27.4	60.4	12.2	

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